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Chapter 
I 
Introduction: Flood Risk Management in the 
Context of Flood Economics 
1.1 Tradeoffs in flood risk management 
Mitigation of flood risks is one of the purposes of the European 
Water Framework Directive. The effects of mitigation may also af- 
fect the aquatic ecosystems, sustainable water use, water pollution, 
and droughts, which are addressed in other parts of the Directive. 
Catchment Flood Management Plans in the UK concern not only 
multiple-objective management but efficiency improvement in flood 
management based on catchment-based strategies. The plans incor- 
porate both flood defences and land use in flood management that 
will be taken into account in this thesis. 
Most studies of flood risk consider the problem as a technical issue 
that mainly involves hydrology, engineering and geography. Many 
of these studies outline the temporal and spatial features of flood 
21 
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events and modify flood impacts, but few consider the susceptibility 
of individuals, the capacity of society to mitigate flood risks, impacts 
on environmental health or on the economy related to flooding, or 
the interaction between regions. 
Without considering the underlying economic and social factors, 
flood management may be both ineffective and inefficient. Economic 
analysis hence serves a need. Economics is a science that analyses 
human choices. The economists' challenge in this case is to evaluate 
the economic and environmental capacity of a region and to allevi- 
ate the perceived difficulties within given constraints in an efficient 
strategy. In particular, economic analysis can be applied to address 
the tradeoff between development and averting behaviour, and that 
between economic gains and flood risk. 
This thesis aims at modelling the anthropogenic drivers and re- 
sponses to flood risks. Tradeoffs occur both between economic de- 
velopment of floodplains and flood risks, and between environmental 
change in catchments and flood risks. An integrated approach that 
covers both hydrology and economics enables us to identify these 
tradeoffs and their implications for policy. 
This chapter first addresses development and averting behaviour 
on a flood-prone area. It then raises the issue of flood risk ex- 
ternalities and methods for internalising them. Following that it 
discusses the related problem of the public good nature of averting 
behaviour. The final sections describe the aims of the thesis and 
outline its structure and content. 
22 
1.2 Development and averting behaviour in a flood-prone area 
1.2 Development and averting behaviour in a 
flood-prone area 
Flooding, associated with extreme precipitation, brings disturbance 
to both natural and human systems. Directly, it threatens human 
lives, and causes damage to industry, transport, buildings and prop- 
erties. Indirectly, it can be a cause of dislocation, famine, water- 
borne diseases and structural changes in local industries. According 
to the world's largest reinsurer, Munich Re, storms and floods dom- 
inated the fatalities of natural disasters in the year 2001. Floods 
accounted for more than 2/3 of the 700 major disasters in that year 
and caused 91% of all insured natural disaster losses (Munich Re 
Group, 2002). 
In the UK, flooding is not a regular threat. However, some flood 
events occasionally cause serious damage. For instance, the 2000 
(autumn) flood in central and eastern England caused 300 million 
pounds of property loss (Environment Agency, 2004). Elsewhere, 
flooding can be more frequent and severe. In Taiwan, for instance, 
flooding is the most frequent natural disaster. According to the 
Ministry of Interior, there have been 35 floods recorded (exclud- 
ing those related to typhoons), an 899 death toll, 468 people miss- 
ing, 1,021 injuries and 49,626 houses damaged from 1958 to 2000 
(http: //www. wra-gov. tw/default -asp). Moreover, the 
frequency of 
floods has tended to increase over this period (Figure 1.1). 
In spite of the damage flood events can cause, development on 
23 
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Figure 1.1: Flood events in Taiwan (1958-2000). Data source: Ministry of 
Interior in Taiwan. http: //www. nfa. gov. tw. 
floodplains has a long history. In many places around the world, 
flooding is essential for both economic and ecological performance 
by replenishing soils and soil nutrients, regenerating plants and 
aquatic biota, and by recharging aquifers. Floodplains are inclined 
to contain more fertile soil and to retain more water moisture than 
other areas. Examples include the granaries along the Yellow River 
(China), the Nile River (Egypt), the River Ganges (Bangladesh and 
India), the River Tigris and the River Euphrates (Iraq). Before the 
introduction of fertilisers, flooding was often essential to soil en- 
richment. For some areas, flooding is only a disaster if it fails to 
occur. Floodplain ecosystems are often rich in biodiversity and high 
in biomass. 
Development of floodplains increases both the occurrence and 
the costs of flooding (Wolman, 1967; Leopold, 1968; Gregory and 
24 
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Walling, 1973). The occurrence of flooding increases due to the 
declining infiltration capacity of the land. In this case, flooding 
becomes an indicator of the impacts of human activities as well as 
meteorological, topographical and geographical characteristics. Eco- 
nomically, low land prices in flood-prone regions and the increasing 
demand for land encourage development in flood-prone areas. Up to 
2002,12% of land dedicated to residential use in England is located 
in flood risk areas. Regionally, residential land located in flood risk 
areas in East Midlands, East of England, London, respectively are 
21%, 18% and 17%. Yorkshire and the Humber is fourth place, at 
16%. Figure 1.2 shows that the percentage of land at risk of flooding 
in each administrative region in England varies widely (Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister, 2004). 
Histogram of administrative regional land In flood risk area 
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Figure 1.2: Histogram of the percentage of land at risk of flooding by admin- 
istrative region in England (2002). Data source: Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister (2004). 
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Introduction 
As already indicated, flooding does not necessarily involve dam- 
age. Whether it is benign or malign to an area depends on the 
quantity and the quality of water that runs into and out of a region. 
Besides, averting behaviour can be undertaken to minimise flood 
losses and hence the cost of development of floodplains. There are 
two types of averting behaviour: mitigation for decreasing risks and 
adaptation for decreasing losses. ' 
Mitigation strategies such as embankments, drainage, washlands, 
natural buffers and land use management are adopted to reduce 
flood risks. Adaptation strategies such as purchasing insurance, 
improving technology for increasing production, and migration are 
adopted based on experience (ex post) and expectation (ex ante) 
to decrease flood losses. Currently around 0.03% of GDP is in- 
vested annually in flood defences in UK. ' Elsewhere, flood defense 
investments are rapidly increasing. To take the example of Taiwan, 
already mentioned, Figure 1.3 shows the trend in levees, revetments 
and spurs/dykes to mitigate flooding. Since averting behaviour in- 
volves costs of construction and maintenance, there exists a problem 
of balancing the development and averting behaviour in flood-prone 
areas. 
In order to manage flood risks, decision rules that evaluate the 
'They are called mitigation and insurance (or prevention) and cure in Chichilnisky and 
Heal (1993); self-protection, self-insurance and market-insurance in Ehrlich and Becker (1972). 
21n the UK, GDP was 994,037 billion sterling at current price in 2001 according to United 
Nation. Expenditure in England and Wales on flood and coastal defence capital and mainte- 
nance works is approximately 335 million sterling per annum (OERA, 2001). 
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Figure 1.3: Top: Existing levees in Taiwan (1958-2000). Middle: Existing 
revetments in Taiwan (1958-2000). Bottom: Existing spurs/dykes in Taiwan 
(1958-2000). Data source: Statistical Reports of the Water Resources Agency 
at Ministry of Economic Affairs in Taiwan. http: //www. wra. gov. tw/default. asp 
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multiple effects of economic development, averting behaviour and 
mitigation should be derived. Chapter 2 identifies the key issues in 
flood management and derive the decision rules. It focuses on the 
links between economic development and the causes and impacts 
of flooding. Optimisation theory is applied using models of the 
tradeoffs in flood risk management in Chapters 3 and 4. 
1.3 Flood risk externalities 
In the absence of complete markets, development and averting be- 
haviour both involve flood risk externalities. For instance, upstream 
deforestation or drainage improvement may lead to an increase in 
downstream flood risk. The externalities in this case are transferable 
in both temporal and spatial dimensions. 
Temporally, current flood losses often trigger future investment 
in averting behaviour. Moreover, a flood event can also affect fu- 
ture flood events by changing the geomorphological conditions, such 
as changes in river routes and destruction of vegetation. Besides, 
in some areas, a stable frequency of flooding brings ecological and 
agricultural benefits. 
Spatially, development and averting behaviour can generate ex- 
ternalities to the neighbouring and downstream areas in the catch- 
ment. Adverse externalities are mostly generated by upstream or 
neighbouring development and hard mitigation (e. g., embankments 
and drainage) while beneficial externalities are mostly generated by 
upstream or neighbouring soft mitigation (e. g., washlands and nat- 
ural land cover). 
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Therefore, a long-term perspective is required for flood manage- 
ment. Decisions within the long-term perspective are addressed via 
a dynamic model in Chapter 4 while those related to the strategic 
interdependence of interest parties are explained in a game theo- 
retical model in Chapter 5. Due to the interdependence among 
decision-makers located within the same catchment, mechanisms for 
internalising externalities are essential to improve efficiency. 
1.4 Managing public goods 
One reason for the failure of markets in flood management is that 
averting behaviour is a public good. For instance, while the ad- 
verse externality generated by hard mitigation often results in an 
embankments race, the beneficial externality generated by soft mit- 
igation is often compromised due to free-riding. Even though each 
decision-maker is aware of the problem, insufficient resources will 
be committed to soft mitigation. Policy instruments to internalise 
externalities include quantity controls, price controls and a mixture 
of both. To identify the problem and the potential solutions, we 
consider three models. 
The first is the comprehensive management model. This is a 'ra- 
tional' device which produces a policy that aims at achieving the 
desired goal by inputting all relevant data. In the field of envi- 
ronmental management, an interdisciplinary, holistic and long-term 
perspective is required. This model is helpful for providing the out- 
line of the problem set and the potential solutions. However, com- 
prehensive information about preferences, future and non-market 
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goods are difficult for a decision-maker to access. 3 
The second is the incrementalist management model, in which a 
decision-maker does not know all the information essential for effec- 
tive management in advance, but can acquire it over time by trial 
and error. It is an attempt to bring dispersed knowledge together. 
However, the decision-maker's scope is still limited by his/her pref- 
erences and perceptions. Moreover, updating information is often 
time-consuming and hence decisions might easily be outdated. 
The third is the collaborative management model. A user-oriented 
design of this sort can be effective in management but can also be 
costly due to the process of negotiation. Effective communication 
and information systems are therefore required to ensure its effi- 
ciency. By introducing the need for decentralised management, and 
the fact of insufficiency of information and bounded rationality of 
policy-makers, this model is used to identify policy options in flood 
risk management. 
The models introduced in Chapters 3 and 4 are based on the com- 
prehensive management model to show how a centralised decision- 
maker might treat the problem. The problems of commons and 
policy instruments that solve these problems, such as taxes and 
subsidies, are discussed in Chapter 5. To address the disadvantages 
of a centralised management system, stakeholders' committees and 
tradeable flood permits are introduced for implementing collabora- 
3The following two models are introduced to avoid the Nirvana fallacy (Demsetz, 1969), 
the myth of centralised management, which results from the belief in obtaining complete 
and perfect information of resources and human evaluation systems, and in the existence of 
altruistic policy makers. 
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tive management in Chapters 6 and 7. 
1.5 Thesis purposes 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide guidelines for a decision- 
maker to manage flood risks, and to support the sustainable devel- 
opment of catchments (i. e., development strategy undertaken with- 
out undermining the ability of the future generations to meet their 
needs). There are five elements: 
Introducing an indicator incorporating tradeoffs between flood 
hazards and economic gains, development and protection, costs 
and benefits of economic development and averting behaviour 
in flood risk management. 
*Developing economic models of flood risks that link causes 
and impacts of floods, economic development and averting be- 
haviour, from both static and dynamic perspectives. 
9 Developing a game theoretical model that reveals the problems 
of externalities in a cross-region catchment. 
9 Designing the stakeholders' committee and the tradable permit 
system that solve problems of flood risk externalities within a 
catchment. 
9 Investigating the feasibility of the application of the stakehold- 
ers) committee and the tradable permit system in the catch- 
ment of the Yorkshire Ouse, the Swale, the Ure and the Nidd. 
31 
Introduction 
Select key elements and literature review 
Find decision rules using a static model 
Find decision rules using dynamic models 10 Reveal externalities using games 
Internalise externalities by the stakeholders' 
committee and tradeable flood permits 
Investigate the feasibility of the tradeable 
flood permit in the catchment of the Yorkshire 
Ouse, the Swale, the Ure and the Nidd 
Conclusion and discussion 
Figure 1.4: Structure of the thesis 
1.6 Thesis outline 
Figure 1.4 summarises the overall structure of the thesis, and con- 
tents of other chapters are as follows. 
Chapter 2, entitled 'Flooding, Environmental Health and the 
Economy: Causes and Impacts of Flooding', identifies the crucial 
links between flooding, environmental health and the economy. The 
anthropogenic factors and the impacts of flooding are fundamental 
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in the models that follow. Research gaps and existent models that 
can be applied are reviewed. 
Chapter 3, entitled 'Balancing Development and Protection in 
Flood Risk Management: A Static Model', derives the decision rules 
on development and averting behaviour using a static model inte- 
grated by infiltration theory and optimisation theory. This proto- 
type conceptualises tradeoffs between economic and environmental 
value. 
Chapter 4, entitled 'Balancing Development and Protection in 
Flood Risk Management: Dynamic Models', develops two dynamic 
models following the prototype. Their optimal paths and the char- 
acteristics of their equilibria are discussed. 
Chapter 5, entitled 'Externalities of Flood Risk Management, is 
an extended model of the benefits and costs of internalising exter- 
nalities for improving flood management by homogeneous players 
in a catchment. A supermodular game is developed to present the 
'embankments race' and 'insufficient soft mitigation' due to exter- 
nalities. Strategies for obtaining Pareto improvement are explored. 
Chapter 6, entitled Tecentralised Flood Risk Management Us- 
ing the Stakeholders' Committee and Tradeable Flood Permits', de- 
velops the stakeholders' committee and the tradeable flood permit 
system to resolve the economic inefficiency of the embankments race 
and insufficiency of soft mitigation. 
Chapter 7, entitled 'Feasibility of the Tradeable Flood Permit 
System for the Management of Flood risks in the Yorkshire Ouse 
Catchment', investigates the institutional requirements of this ap- 
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proach and the feasibility of the tradeable flood permit system in 
the catchment of the Yorkshire Ouse, the Swale, the Ure and the 
Nidd. 
Chapter 8, entitled 'Conclusion and Policy Recommendations', 
presents the thesis conclusion and discusses the implications and 
implementation of the thesis findings and further research. 
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Flooding, Environmental Health and the 
Economy: Causes and Impacts of Flooding 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe links between economic 
development and the causes and impacts of flooding. Section 2.2 de- 
scribes features of anthropogenic behaviour that may influence the 
probability and potential extent of flooding. Section 2.3 reviews the 
methodology for assessing risks involved. Section 2.4 considers the 
impacts of flooding on the economy and on environmental health. 
Environmental health in this thesis is mainly about flood risk while 
the aspects of human health or other environmental impacts are not 
the focus. Section 2.5 reviews methods for modelling the interac- 
tion between flooding and the economy, focusing on the feature of 
uncertainty. Section 2.6 summarises the chapter. 
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2.2 Anthropogenic factors in flooding 
Generally, the literature categories floods in terms of location, in- 
tensity and duration or distribution of rain, and their predictability 
(Table 2.1). From this descriptive categorisation, we can identify 
the types of floods corresponding to various geographical and cli- 
matological conditions. Such a classification is a valuable precursor 
to assessing the potential impacts of urban expansion or climate 
change on flood risk. 
Table 2.1: Categories of floods 
Location Rainfall Intensity Predictability 
coastal flood flash flood seasonal flood 
river/fluvial flood broad-scale flood sporadic flood 
urban flood 
flash flood in arroyos' 
flash flood in other places b 
'An arroyo is a winter-carved gully or a normally dry creek in arid or desert 
regions. When a storm appears, rainwater cuts into the dry and dusty soil 
and creates a small and fast-moving river. Flooding of this sort may happen 
suddenly, without warning. 
bFIash flood may also happen in the valley such as the Boscastle flood in 
2004 or low altitude area such the Tynernouth flood of 1952. 
Rain, snowfall, sleet and hail are collectively known as preczpzta- 
tion. Precipitation can be absorbed by the soil to initially fill small 
pores and then larger pores. The rate of downward flow of water 
depends upon the pore size distribution and pore inter-connectivity. 
This process is called infiltratton. If the precipitation rate exceeds 
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infiltration rate, surface runoff or local flooding becomes likely. Thus 
in the hydrological balance (equation (2.1)), apart from precipitation 
and infiltration, only runoff, which directly contributes to flooding, 
is considered. 
Precipitation = infiltration + runoff + interception 
+ evaporation + transpiration 
2.2.1 Climate change 
Studies in various parts of the world have shown that the frequency 
of large-scale floods increased substantially during the 20th cen- 
tury and have suggested that the trend will continue (Milly et al., 
2002; Palmer and Raisanen, 2002). Trends in coastal flooding are 
mainly dependent upon sea level rise. Trends in fluvial flooding are 
explained by changes in rainfall patterns (though they are often dif- 
ficult to detect) and changes in factors such as land use and flood 
mitigation. Hence, a regional perspective is more useful in averting 
risk of fluvial flooding, as well as taking a global view. 
From the annual precipitation in England and Wales from year 
1766 to 2003, shown in Figure 2.1,95.8% of all observations are 
located within two standard errors. Two annual values are above 
two standard errors in the 19th century while three are above in the 
20th century. The average annual precipitation is 915.5 mm. Long- 
term trends in annual data seem to reveal little about the existence 
of climate change effects. A time series plot such as Figure 2.1 
provides an indication of frequency of typical wet years. However, 
it does not give direct evidence for increased probability of flooding, 
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since the latter will depend upon the distribution of precipitation 
and/or snowmelt throughout the year. 
Annual Precipitation In the England and Wales 
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Figure 2.1: Annual precipitation in England and Wales (1766-2003). Solid 
line: mean; dashed lines: ± one standard error; dotted line: ± two stan- 
dard errors. Data source: Hadley Centre. Access the link: http: //www. met- 
office. gov. uk/research/hadleycentre/CR-data. 
From seasonal data, Robson et al. (1998) found no evidence for cli- 
mate change from the peak-over-threshold (POT) data and annual 
maximum flood peaks during 1941-1990. ' The ratio of winter pre- 
cipitation (October-March) to annual precipitation from 1766-2003 
has an upward trend however (Figure 2.2). The UK Climate Impact 
Programme in 2002 (UKCIP02) predicted that winter precipitation 
'POT data comprise a series of flood peaks that are bigger than a selected threshold. 
Refer 
to Subsection 2.3.4 for details. 
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The Ratio of Winter Precipitation In the England and Wales 
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Figure 2.2: Ratio of winter precipitation to annual precipitation in England 
and Wales (1766-2003). The linear regression coefficient is 0.49 while the 
slope is 0.34 x 10-3 . Both 
have p-value 0. Data source: http: //www. met- 
office. gov. uk/research/hadleycentre/CR-data. 
will not increase by more than 15% above the 1961-1990 mean (base- 
line) before the 2080s in the high emission scenario (Tyndall Centre 
and Hadley Centre, 2004). 2 
The occurrence of wetter winters and drier summers is a com- 
mon prediction from most research on climate change in the UK 
(Mayes, 1996). Palmer and Raisanen (2002) found that the prob- 
ability of total boreal winter precipitation exceeding two standard 
errors above normal would increase by a factor of five over parts of 
the UK in the next 100 years. According to Sefton and Boorman 
(1997), catchments in northern and western England suffer more 
floods when most severe reductions in low flows occur in central and 
2 In UKCIP20 Climate Change model, the high emission scenario assumes global tempera- 
ture increases 3.9'C and atmospheric C02 concentration becomes 810 ppm. 
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eastern England. 
Asia may also face increased flood events, especially in mon- 
soon regions. Palmer and Raisanen (2002) found increases in the 
probability of precipitation in many parts of Asian monsoon regions 
in summer. Milly et al. (2002) concluded that flood frequency in 
extra-tropical areas would increase, though they also indicated their 
model's weakness in the simulation of tropical climate. 
There is still an on-going debate about climate change and its im- 
pacts. Although the detection of anthropogenically forced changes 
in flooding is difficult because of the substantial natural variabil- 
ity of the environment, precautionary policies are preferred. Most 
research shows no instant menace of hydrological anomaly as a con- 
sequence of predicted climate change in the UK, but preparation for 
undertaking averting behaviour in the long run is necessary. 
2.2.2 Land use 
Change of land use may influence flood risks by changing the to- 
pographical and hydrological characteristics of an area. This thesis 
focuses on the elements that affect infiltration. 
Infiltration capacity, the maximum rate at which water can enter 
into soil, depends on factors related to soil texture, soil structure, 
and the moisture deficit in the upper soil layer. Soil erosion can 
also impede the infiltration process if, for example, small eroded 
soil particles clog macropores. Erosion may then accelerate runoff. 
Land use patterns of particular interest here include economic 
plantation, deforestation and urbanisation. Change of land surface 
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is also a factor affecting infiltration capacity. Mulches, cracks and 
wormholes influence the entrance and passage of infiltration water. 
Vegetation influences the hydrological cycle both above and be- 
low ground to an extent that depends upon plant types. Plants, 
especially tree canopies, intercept water. Evergreen trees, for exam- 
ple, often intercept more than deciduous trees, especially in winter. 
Wet woodland can add to the retention of flood water because tree 
trunks, buttress roots and deadwood on the woodland floor slow 
down water movement across the flooded ground (Gregory et al., 
2003). Tropical afforestation leads to increased transpiration, and 
roots help stabilise soil structure. According to Cheng et al. (2002), 
in a monsoon climate, infiltration dominates the water balance equa- 
tion in areas with forests. The importance of vegetation to flooding 
can also be found in the high risk of landslides after forest conflagra- 
tion (Brown, 1972; Lavabre et al., 1992). However, the influence of 
forest is minimal on landslides or floods caused by large scale storms 
or rainfall (Lu et al., 2001; Cheng et al., 2002). 
One consequence of deforestation is reduced interception of pre- 
cipitation, so that more water reaches the soil surface. Moreover, 
the forest canopy may have partly dissipated the energy of falling 
raindrops. On the other hand, forest may facilitate interception of 
mist or horizontal precipitation on slopes. Especially in the absence 
of ground cover vegetation, deforestation may increase the proba- 
bility of soil erosion. In central and eastern Taiwan, the plantation 
of shallow-rooted cash crops (such as betel nut and vegetables) or 
urbanisation in place of forest has been blamed for flooding and 
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landslides (Lu et al., 2001; Cheng et al., 2002). 
Cities bring social and economic advantages, ecological losses and 
environmental risks. The construction of streets, buildings and park- 
ing lots seals the ground, and thus lowers the infiltration capacity 
of the land (Wolman, 1967; Leopold, 1968; Gregory and Walling, 
1973). Newson (1992) presented the impermeability of various ur- 
ban covers (Table 2.2). Not only land use change, but also structural 
measures such as porous pavement, stormwater management ponds, 
and constructed wetlands, can improve the infiltration capacity of 
the land. With the same input of rainfall, the amount of runoff in 
an urban area is greater than that which occurs on natural terrain 
due to a decrease in infiltration capacity. The lag time between the 
occurrence of a rainfall peak and flooding is shorter for urban floods. 
In other words, the timing and the probability of flooding change 
due to urbanisation. 
There has been a debate about the relationship between soil con- 
servation and flooding. Some attribute forest cover with the ability 
of attracting rainfall while most suggest that natural forests can 
prevent floods. Although the interaction between forest cover and 
landslide activity is a highly complex phenomenon (Haigh et al., 
1995), density of vegetation cover and stability of slope usually 
have a positive relationship. Most studies contend that poor soil 
conservation leads to more serious flood problems. One reason for 
that is the effect of development, surface runoff, and the stability of 
slopes (Gokceoglu and Aksoy, 1996; Jakob, 2000; Dai and Lee, 2002). 
However, Greenway (1987) found negative relationship between the 
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Table 2.2: Impermeability of various surfaces (Newson, 1992) 
Type of Surface Impermeability 
Watertight roof surfaces 70-95 
Asphalt paving in good order 85-90 
Stone, brick and wooden block pavements: 
with tightly cemented joints 75-85 
with open or uncertain joints 50-70 
Inferior block pavements with open joints 40-50 
Macadam roads and paths 25-60 
Gravel roads and paths 15-30 
Unpaved surfaces. railway yards, vacant lots 10-30 
Parks, gardens, lawns, meadows - depending on the 
surface slope and character of the subsoil 5-25 
density of vegetation and the stability of slopes. 
Little empirical work has been done on impacts of land use change 
in the UK on the possible trend towards more flooding. The UK 
landscape has undergone widespread and progressive urbanisation 
throughout the 20th century. Fuller et al. (1994) stated that the 
area of urban land increased by about 50% between 1930 and 1990. 
According to the Ordinance Survey, Forestry Commission and Forest 
Service in the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, 
the area of the urban land and land not otherwise specified in the 
UK is 3,855 thousand hectares, 3 16% of the total land in the UK in 
2002. Robson et al. (1998) emphasised the significance of land use 
3The land not otherwise specified covers the land other than urban land, crops and bare 
fallow, grasses and rough grazing, other agricultural land, and forest and woodland. 
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change and drainage on flood probability but quantitative effects in 
the UK flood regime were not identifiable in their research. 
2.2.3 Mitigation 
Mitigation reduces the probability of flooding. There are two types 
of mitigation: (1) 'hard mitigation', e. g., putting up concrete dykes, 
leads to more direct and immediate effects; (2) 'soft mitigation', 
e. g., maintaining (or creating/re-creating) washlands and natural 
land cover, has longer term ecological, aesthetic and sustainability 
benefits. Washlands are often associated with hard mitigation, such 
as flood gates, in order to save storage for higher order flood events. 
Soft mitigation applies a more natural solution to flooding. Both 
usually take a long time to prepare and have high opportunity costs. 
Hence the capacity of the economy is support investment in either 
option matters. 
HARD MITIGATION 
Hard mitigation applies traditional engineering concepts to build 
embankments, dams, flood walls and drainage systems to contain 
flooding. Its opportunity costs include expenditure on construction 
and maintenance, engineering failure, deterioration of surrounding 
ecosystems, diminution of dilution of pollutants by blocking flows, 
and increasing probability of flooding in neighbouring regions. Fur- 
thermore, inadequate building standards, unsafe sites and the burst- 
ing of dams may lead to flooding or aggravate flood losses. 
To identify the OPtimal level of mitigation, the classical treatment 
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of the problem was given by Dantzig (1956). He set up a model to 
minimise the total building cost of the dyke (1) and the current 
value of the expected flood losses (L) with respect to the height of 
water that the dyke is capable of retaining (H). The probability 
of any height of sea level being attained declines exponentially with 
increasing h. The first order condition for the optimal height of a 
dyke is 
dIldH + dLldH =0 
p(H) denotes the probability of the water level exceeding the height 
of the dyke. The estimation of flood losses 
00 
L= p(H)V J: (l + 0.016)-' 0-Id 100p(H)VI6 =: 100poe-'xVI6 
t=O 
is based upon a threshold equation to estimate the expected value 
of all future losses associated with coastal floods whilst the sea level 
is higher than the critical height of the dyke H: 
0 if h< H 
V ifh>H 
where S is the loss, h is the sea level, and H is the critical height 
of the dyke. Here Dantzig (1956) assumed that a sum L was set 
aside to cover anticipated losses, and that attracted interest at A. 
V is the value of goods. This research can also be applied to river 
flood walls by replacing sea level with river level. As with other 
research on this problem, economic activities such as development 
were ignored, or else subsumed in the probability of flooding. 
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SOFT MITIGATION 
Ecological concerns focus attention on soft mitigation. The oppor- 
tunity costs of soft mitigation mainly involve sacrificing economic 
gains of land development. Hence there is a need to balance de- 
velopment benefits and potential flood losses. Besides, there is a 
debate of the effectiveness of soft mitigation against strikes of large 
amounts of energy from flood water (DEFRA, 2004). Soft mit- 
igation includes constructing parks in cities, restricting land use 
of environmentally sensitive regions, keeping (or creating/ restoring) 
washlands, and possibly even removing current hard mitigation. 
Active erosion and runoff can also be reduced by the applica- 
tion of appropriate soil and land management techniques, such as 
improved crop rotations, contouring and terracing, gully damming, 
cover cropping, tree planting, woodland conservation, and so forth 
(Morgan, 1969). The principle is to absorb and retain more rainfall 
in the soil. In other words, there must be sufficient moisture storage 
capacity in the soil, and this is a function of soil depth, structure, 
porosity and organic matter (Hudson, 1995). 
FROM HARD MITIGATION TO SOFT MITIGATION 
In spite of its ecological advantages, soft mitigation is not often un- 
dertaken under the pressure of development, population growth and 
the problem of free-riding. There are four disadvantages to hard mit- 
igation that urge us to think of the alternative: draining floodwater 
to other areas generates externalities; the limitation of technology 
and the risk of engineering failure confines the effectiveness of hard 
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mitigation; hard mitigation can be expensive; and materials used 
4 for hard mitigation may be threatening to the local ecosystems. 
Hence, an integrated ecosystem management approach is recog- 
nised as a better option for the sustainable development and use of 
floodplains. Soft mitigation generates multi-functionality and bene- 
fits downstream areas and future generations while hard mitigation 
results in direct effects of flood alleviation in local areas. The ways 
to convert hard to soft mitigation are considered below. 
1. Natural process restoration 
Restoring natural processes in a region resumes natural mitiga- 
tion as in the past. First, a better recognition of functions and 
values of original natural land covers, such as wetlands and forests, 
provide opportunities for their rehabilitation or restoration. This 
may come from the public concern for preserving environmentally 
friendly or aesthetically or ecologically attractive sites or realising 
sustainability. 
Compared with developed land, deserted land may be politically 
easier to return to nature. However, it may still be challenging 
because of soil physical properties, hydrological and climatic condi- 
tions, biological activities, and related water and soil pollution. For 
instance, metal residues in soils may be toxic to plants, exterminat- 
ing the plants completely or damaging root growth, which results in 
susceptibility to drought (Bradshaw and Chadwick, 1980). 
Bradshaw and Chadwick (1980) discussed the problems of derelict 
41n the project like 'Moses' at Venice, the anodes protecting the gates from corrosion is 
estimated to release more than 10 tons of toxic zinc in the lagoon per year (Drake, 2004). 
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land. For instance, it may be possible to obtain fully developed 
soil from another site and spread it over the derelict land. Good 
structure of soil ensures satisfactory water retention. Apart from 
mitigating flood risks, the restoration of certain derelict land may 
also prevent a secondary flood hazard, such as decreasing pollution 
in drainage water. The organic matter and nutrients of the soil 
constitute a buffer against toxicity. 
Though there are techniques for restoring natural processes, the 
best solution is prevention rather than cure. This should be realised 
in the process of development, for instance avoiding the unneces- 
sary removal of vegetation, minimising construction of roads, and 
avoiding decreases in the porosity of land surfaces. 
2. Riparian buffer zones 
Riparian buffer zones are green zones along streams, rivers, and 
lakes. They benefit flood risk management by improving bank sta- 
bility, preventing silt deposition, and removal of sediment and pol- 
lutants 5. 
Ducros and Watson (2002) conducted research aimed at filling 
the gap between policy-makers and users by interviewing farmers 
about their willingness to take up a riparian buffer zone scheme. 
Economic capacity, concerns about future generations, and attitudes 
to conservation are key factors to encourage adopting the riparian 
buffer zone policy. Farmers with less ownership or less land have 
less to 'sacrifice', hence the policy is less attractive for them. The 
5The removal of chemicals, such as nitrogen, depends on various factors, i. e., hydrological 
elements, temperature, slope, biota, and characteristics of the soil. 
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willingness of farmers with successors or more farms to adopt the 
scheme appears higher. 
However, there are some side effects of mitigation conversion. For 
instance, the use of heavy earth-moving machinery, especially on 
soil lacking organic matter, may cause considerable compaction and 
loss of soil structure. The compaction changes the physical nature of 
the soil by restricting root penetration, reducing pore space, water 
holding capacity, aeration, and rates of water movement and gas 
exchange (Moffat and McNeil, 1994). The higher density remains 
a barrier to proper root growth and the infiltration of water unless 
vegetation is established (Bradshaw and Chadwick, 1980). This 
hinders the recharge of soil's moisture supply in the wet season and 
hence increases the surface runoff (Moffat and McNeil, 1994). 
Overall, hard mitigation rather than soft mitigation is usually 
more attractive to local authorities because it involves minimum 
disturbance to landowners (Boardmand, 1995). However, the op- 
portunity costs of hard engineering measures, including risks of en- 
gineering failure and impacts on ecosystems, are often high. Fur- 
thermore, the disposal of water from dams and drainage can also 
induce problems of externalities. 
2.3 Estimation of the probability of flooding 
Having reviewed the anthropogenic factors in flooding, we now need 
methods to incorporate them into the estimation of the probability 
of floods. This estimation is mainly based upon hydrological models 
that discuss the collective risk for a whole region instead of individ- 
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ual risks. Hydrologists express their concern about flood risks in 
terms of 'exceedance probability', that is the probability of a flood 
event exceeding a certain amount occurring. 
2.3.1 Visualisation of hydrological characteristics 
Hydrological datasets are often massive, so visualisation is helpful to 
condense the information. Flood frequency curves and flow duration 
curves are valuable in this context. Other descriptive figures such 
as time series plots for precipitation, river flow, and runoff are not 
covered in the discussion because of their simplicity. 
FLOOD FREQUENCY CURVES 
Flood frequency is a statistical measure of the probable occurrence 
of a flood at a given magnitude (Smith and Ward, 1998). It shows 
the positive connection between discharge magnitude and the return 
period, which is the inverse of the probability of flooding. 
In reality, there are often too few data available to plot a flood fre- 
quency curve precisely. Empirical distribution functions are there- 
fore often not smooth, and not easy to interpolate. Besides, we 
cannot estimate the frequency of the occurrence of any flood event 
greater than the maximum recorded. 
The strategy is to fit a theoretical frequency distribution to the 
sample, calculating the parameters from the observed data. Trans- 
forming the data to logarithms and using log-normal distribution or 
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Figure 2.3: Flood frequency curve for the Taxes Stream (the USA). Source: 
Taxes Department of Transportation (2004). 
other skewed distribution, such as general extreme value distribution 
(Gumbel distribution and Weibull distribution) is more appropriate. 
Ideally, flood frequency helps show the probability of the occur- 
rence of different amounts of discharge. However, the flood fre- 
quency plot alone is too simple to portray the interaction between 
various elements in the hydrological cycle, the dynamic variation of 
the relationship between frequency and magnitude over time, and 
comparison between catchments. Hence other indicators are neces- 
sary for improving the understanding of flow regimes. 
FLOW DURATION CURVES 
Flow duration curves denote the proportion of time during which a 
flow is equalled and exceeded (Figure 2.4). A logarithmic scale is 
usually used for the discharge axis while a normal probability scale 
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is used for the frequency axis. The discharge axes are standardised 
with respect to the average flow for comparison between catchments. 
The shape of a flow duration curve provides a slightly simplified 
overview of the catchment's response to precipitation. A curve with 
a steep slope indicates variable flow, usually from a catchment with 
quick flow and little baseflow; a curve with a flat slope usually results 
from the dampening effects of high infiltration and ground water 
storage (Burt, 1996). 
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Figure 2.4: Flow duration curve for gauged daily flows of the Yorkshire Ouse 
at Skelton. Data source: National Water Archive, Centre for Ecology and 
Hydrology. 
2.3.2 General form of river flood estimation 
There are many simple empirical flood estimation equations which 
adopt the general form 
CA' 
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where Q,,,., is the maximum flood discharge, A is the area of the 
catchment with n as a positive exponent, and C is the coefficient of 
runoff which represents the geographical characteristics in an area. 
The maximum flood discharge is assumed to be positively related 
to the area of the catchment only. 
2.3.3 Empirical models 
To take more variables into account, hydrological models for esti- 
mating the probability of flooding are often applied. For instance, 
in the UK Flood Estimation Handbook (Robson and Reed, 1999), 
time to peak flow is estimated by 
TP = 4.27Dpsbar- 
0.35 Propwet-0-8Dplbaro . 54(l + Urbext)- 5.77 
where Dpsbar is the mean of all the inter-nodal slopes for the catch- 
ment, 6a measure of channel slope; Propwet is the median length of 
spells when the soil moisture deficit was below 6 mm during 1961-90 
(days); Dp1bar is the mean of distances between each node and the 
catchment outlet (km), characterising catchment size and configu- 
ration; Urbext is the fraction of urban and suburban land cover in 
the catchment in 1990. 
Various variables and functional forms can be chosen and tested 
in a deterministic model of this sort. However, there is seldom 
substantial explanation of the formulations. 
6The nodes are on regular 50 m grid. 
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2.3.4 Peak-over-threshold (POT) 
Thresholds play a key role in defining a flood event and hence there 
are measurements of taking the threshold level of flooding into ac- 
count. First is peak-over-threshold. 
Since runoff within a certain range can benefit the environment 
and the economy, we need to define a borderline to distinguish be- 
nign floods from malign floods. Peak-over-threshold (POT) can be 
applied to serve this purpose. It is a count of all floods above a spec- 
ified threshold. POT counts are often used to represent the number 
of floods in a catchment (Robson et al., 1998; Robson and Reed, 
1999; Black and Burns, 2002). 
2.3.5 Probable maximum flood and probable maximum 
precipitation 
Probable maximum flood events (PMF, in equation (2.2)) and prob- 
able maximum precipitation events (PMP in equation (2.3)) are 
other measurements associated with threshold. They estimate the 
largest flood that is possible for a target catchment. They are sup- 
posed to be useful in checking how well a mitigation strategy can 
cope with flood hazards. 
There are two methods of estimating PMF. One is deriving PMF 
indirectly by the conversion of PMP estimates using unit hydro- 
graph procedures and considering physical characteristics (e. g., the 
spatial variation of rainfall, the direction of storm movement, and 
the duration and profile of flood-producing precipitation events) of 
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the target catchment (Smith and Ward, 1998). ' 
The other is a statistical method. For instance, 
PMF = a(A/b)'-' (2.2) 
where A is catchment area, K is a regional coefficient, and a and b 
are constants. 
There are also two methods of estimating PMP. One is a process- 
based approach, which generally contains the following three steps 
(Smith and Ward, 1998): 
(1) maximum rainfall for the target catchment and for other com- 
parable areas are identified from rainfall records; 
(2) where these rainfall events are for other comparable areas 
they are transposed to the target catchments; 
(3) the transposed values are maximised for the target catchment 
on the basis of the differences in meteorological conditions between 
the target catchment and the area over which the rain originated. 
The other is a statistical method. For instance, Hershfield (1965) 
proposed that 
PMP ý Pbar + Ka (2-3) 
where Pb,,, is mean precipitation, K is frequency factor, and o, is 
standard deviation. 
According to Newton (1973, cited in Ward (1978)), PMF and 
PMP, however, occur rarely in reality. Apart from the limitation of 
7The unit hydrograph model was produced by Sherman in 1932. It was a major advance 
in rainfall-runoff modelling and the technique had been widely adopted. It assumes that, in 
a given catchment, a given input of rainfall over a given time period will always produce the 
same hydrograph response. 
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extrapolating to a rare event with a long return period from existing 
data, Kuchment et al. (1993, cited in Smith and Ward (1998)) 
argued the difficulty in estimating these two values 'correctly' by 
including 'unusual' factors, such as human activities. Hence they 
should be combined with other parameters to work out the risk 
estimation. 
2.3.6 Horton's infiltration theory 
Horton's infiltration theory considers surface runoff as the amount of 
precipitation which exceeds the infiltration capacity, in other words, 
the excess water which is unable to infiltrate into the soil (Horton, 
1933). 
ft = f, + (f, - fc) - ý-, Il (2.4) 
where ft is the infiltration rate at time t, f,, and f, are the maximum 
and minimum infiltration rates respectively, and 3 is a parameter 
which indicates how quickly the infiltration rate decreases from its 
maximum to its minimum. According to Smith and Ward (1998), 
it can also be simplified as: 
(Z - f) -t=P, = Q, 
(2.5) 
where i is rainfall intensity, t is time duration, P, is precipitation 
excess, Q,, is surface runoff, and f is infiltration capacity. With 
the link to infiltration capacity, properties of land such as land use 
patterns can be incorporated to generate a conceptualised model. 
Horton's model (based on a white box approach) provided a phys- 
ical basis for Sherman's unit hydrograph model (based on a black 
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box approach) (Anderson and Burt, 1990). These two models to- 
gether dominated catchment hydrology for several decades. 
Ward (1978) claims Horton's infiltration theory had subsequently 
manifested itself in flood prediction methods directly in the form of 
infiltration indices, and indirectly in the form of antecedent precip- 
itation indices, soil moisture and the proportion of the catchment 
under different land-use types. These methods are in accord with 
more recent ideas of runoff formation involving the generation of 
quick flow from source areas of variable size and location within the 
catchment. Note that only when baseflow and the difference in soil 
saturation are not crucial in research can the application of Horton's 
infiltration theory be appropriate (Betson, 1969; Burt, 1996). 
2.4 Impacts of flooding on environmental health 
and the economy 
The health and economic impacts of flooding, summarised in Ta- 
ble 2.3, generally depend on what the flood water brings in and out, 
how powerful the flood is, the economic activities in the area, and 
the numbers and types of individuals affected. The impact is neither 
spatially uniform across the region nor confined to the short term, 
so heterogeneity and long term effects need to be considered. Adap- 
tation, the actions of eliminating the negative impacts of floods, and 
the evaluation measurement of flood impacts will also be reviewed. 
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Table 2.3: Effects of floods on health and the economy 
Effect Health Economy 
Negative Loss of life 0 Damage to properties/ 
Diseases caused by pathogens facilities 
or pollutants 
Destruction of health systems 
Famine 
Psychological problems 
CO poisoning when using 
gas-powered pressure 
washers to clean basements 
Positive 
Electrical hazards 
Psychological effects 
Dilution effects on pathogens 
Recharging ground water 
or pollutants 
Losses to animals and crops 
Damage to transportation/ 
communication networks 
<ý Harvest is menaced by 
excessive salinity or 
alkalinity, or polluted silt 
Damage to natural 
recreational resources 
0 Loss of tourism 
Regenerating plants/ 
aquatic biota 
Adding fertility to 
agricultural land from silt 
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2.4.1 Flooding and health: Dilution v. s. dispersion 
Water serves as a pathway for exposure to microbial contagious, 
and hazardous pollutant-related diseases to an extent that depends 
upon dilution and dispersion effects. Water can bring in hazardous 
elements and can also flush away harmful materials. The net result 
depends on the economic activities, geographical conditions, envi- 
ronmental quality and environmental protection in the region and 
its neighbouring areas. 
Soil is a major recipient of precipitation on land. It is also home 
to resident and itinerant bacteria and pollutants. The chemical char- 
acteristics of a contaminant might change as it percolates through 
the soil zone to an aquifer (Hu and Kim, 1993). For example, 'if wa- 
ter contaminated by bacteria from sewage enters groundwater sys- 
tem, it may become purified through natural processes. The harmful 
bacteria may be mechanically filtered out by the sediment through 
which the water percolates, destroyed by chemical oxidation, or as- 
similated by other organisms' (Lutgens and Tarbuck, 1986). 
However, soil might not be able to purify a huge amount of pol- 
luted water from industrial discharges and agricultural runoff which 
comes all at once such as flood water. Besides, contaminants may 
migrate from the source into surrounding uncontaminated materials. 
For instance, an outbreak of leptospirosis in Thailand after the 
year 2000 flood caused a death toll of more than 200 and more than 
4) 000 infection cases. In rural Bangladesh, cholera transmission is 
seasonal, with a peak after the monsoon (Siddique and Baqui, 1992). 
Colwell and Spira (1992) considered that the post-monsoon season 
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is associated with a considerable bloom of zooplankton, maximum 
recreational water contact, and maximum available crustacea in the 
market place. Several researchers have postulated that there is a 
permanent environmental reservoir for Vibrio cholerae in brackish 
ponds and canals of rural Bangladesh (Colwell and Spira, 1992). 
Not only tropical and subtropical countries but also temperate 
countries like America have suffered from health problems of this 
sort. An outbreak of cryptosporidiosis, one of the common drinking 
water-related diseases, at Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1993, which re- 
sulted in 403,000 reported cases, coincided with heavy spring rains 
and runoff from melting snow. It was believed that the spring floods 
flashed into the reservoir at Milwaukee with cryptosporidium from 
excreta of cattle and then overloaded the filtration function. Accord- 
ing to Atherholt et al. (1998), rainfall increases the concentration 
of cryptosporidium through its influence on turbidity, flow volume, 
and other site-specific environmental factors (e. g., differences in par- 
asite source contributions). In the 2002 flood aftermath in central 
Europe, dioxin, mercury and bacteria in the sludge carried by flood 
water triggered health alerts. 
Apart from the life threatening injuries, other health problems 
are usually less severe, including minor injuries, throat infections, 
skin irritations, gastro-intestinal illness, allergies and psychological 
health problems such as anxiety and stress after the flood events. 
The physical impacts result from the characteristics of the flood 
events, the locations and the averting behaviour undertaken. The 
psychological impacts result from frustration and anxiety of restor- 
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ing the normal life and the adjustment of averting behaviour (Flood 
Hazard Research Centre, 2002), the distress of being threatened 
or harmed by the hazards (Rotton et al., 1997). As to whether 
other characteristics such as age and sex influence the susceptibil- 
ity of physical disabilities or psychological disturbances, different 
results have been found by different research (Bennet, 1970; Abra- 
hams et al. , 1976). 
Sometimes, however, flood control appears disadvantageous to 
health. Emch (2000) found that individuals living in flood-controlled 
areas were 2.47 times more likely to be hospitalised with cholera. 
A similar result was found in the case of non-cholera watery diar- 
rhoea. One explanation is that flood control exacerbates cholera 
boom by some unknown mechanisms (Colwell and Spira, 1992). 
More clearly, flood control may change the salinity levels or im- 
pede the natural flushing out of the cholera-laden water. Thompson 
(1986) considered that flood-control embankments could often be 
blamed for cholera outbreaks in rural Bangladesh because seasonal 
flooding does not flush out the inadequately disposed of sewage after 
their installation. 
2.4.2 Flooding and the economy: Benefit and damage 
Though there are both positive and negative impacts of flooding, 
we are generally interested in situations where damage overwhelms 
the benefits a flood can bring. Flooding can directly and indirectly 
destroy inputs and outputs and change consumption patterns. The 
price and amount of commodities may therefore be affected tem- 
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porarily, unless the damage is on an enormous scale. Preparation 
(ex ante) and remedy (ex post) for flood risks also affects the eco- 
nomic behaviour. Different types of economy suffer different effects. 
For instance, traffic interruption in York (UK) is very different from 
widespread morbidity and mortality in Darfur (Sudan). The levels 
of the impacts also depend on the characteristics of a flood, such as 
its timing, duration, velocity of water flow and the depth. 
In the market, the price of domestic agricultural products usually 
rises after, or even just before, a flood event because of actual or 
expected damage to certain products. In extreme cases, the damage 
to a monopsony (monopolist) directly affects sellers (buyers) of the 
factor. Some economic impacts are driven by consumption. 
Floods may also alter the budget (constraint) of a household, di- 
rectly through a shock or indirectly by changing the relative price 
of commodities. People might lose their properties, health, and in- 
come. Adjusting to a new budget constraint, households may need 
to change the consumption patterns either temporarily or perma- 
nently. Refurbishment, furniture purchase, and cleaning services 
might be necessary after floods. However, in some cases, the expen- 
diture on these items might not be affordable for every household, 
especially for those who lose their properties or jobs. 
Population and the socio-economic conditions also affect the scale 
of flood losses. An area with high density of population or of indus- 
tries usually suffers more from flood losses because the base a flood 
can affect is large. Residents with high income can usually afford to 
invest in mitigation and adaptation whilst people with lower socio- 
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economic status may instead be 'forced' to live in the flood-prone 
areas. 8 
To further consider the impacts of flooding, agricultural and man- 
ufacturing industries are distinguished because of their different lev- 
els of dependence on land. ' 
AGRICULTURE 
Soil, a crucial input of agricultural production (apart from hydro- 
ponics) can benefit from floods due to the fertile silt added by flood- 
water and groundwater replenishment. However, flooding can be 
harmful if the silt is too saline, too alkaline, polluted, or if energy of 
the flood water is too huge. Due to the application of fertiliser and 
pesticide, non-point source water pollution may be expanded in the 
wake of a flood. The result can be catastrophic, e. g., exacerbating 
the forming of oxygen-starved 'dead zones' in the ocean caused by 
the increasing runoff which contains nitrate-based fertilisers. Hence 
the location of the farm is crucial. Being located downstream of 
a factory or a waste water treatment plant poses a higher risk to 
farms of being contaminated while farms situated on hills may be 
susceptible to landslides. The characteristics of a flood event also 
affect its impact on agriculture: 
(1) TimZng. Flooding might have tiny negative impacts or even 
positive influences when the land is fallow but it might cause a huge 
81ndividuals in the same area may have different flood risks, based on different perception 
of flooding, location, and different abilities to mitigate or adapt flood hazards. 
90ther economic activities, e. g., tourism, are excluded in the discussion in this research 
though they may also be affected by floods. 
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loss just before harvest or right after planting. In some cases, winter 
flooding may have damaged old stems and prevented oxygen from 
reaching the rhizomes (Coops et al., 1994). 
(2) Duratton. Some crops can withstand a short term strike from 
floods. Most of them might not be able to survive after long-term 
or even short-term saturation. 
(3) Velo6ty. Higher velocity of flood water usually causes more 
serious damage. Facilities, buildings, crops, livestock and even hu- 
man beings can be washed away by high speed flood water. Some- 
times, damage is caused by the debris travelling from other places. 
(4) Depth. Agricultural products (including livestock) are mostly 
located on the ground, where it is locationally susceptible to flood- 
ing. Animal carcasses are commonly seen in the countryside in flood 
aftermath while crops are sensitive within a certain range of flood 
depth. It makes no difference once the flood depth exceeds a thresh- 
old level. 
(5) Water quality. Flood water which carries fertile elements 
is beneficial while that brings pollutants is harmful to agricultural 
production. 
MANUFACTURE 
Manufacturing industry is generally not as susceptible to floods as 
agriculture is because of the nature of the industry. However, losses 
can be devastating once the flood water flushes into a firm either 
because of the lack of precautionary protection or the tremendous 
scale of a flood. The location and characteristics of a firm and the 
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effectiveness of averting behaviour influence flood losses. Further- 
more, the characteristics of floods also affect the magnitude of flood 
losses. 
(1) TimMg. Floods without warning might lead to huge damage 
due to inadequate precautionary protection. If there is enough time 
for moving to a safe location or protecting facilities and products, 
the timing of floods will not be crucial. The loss of stock and that 
of trades can be catastrophic if flooding comes at certain periods of 
the year such as Christmas or New Year, the peak of many business 
and sales. 
(2) Duratton. The duration of a flood might prolong the suspen- 
sion of production and transportation. 
(3) Depth. Firms situated in accommodation below the surface of 
flood water are influenced directly whilst those above it are not. In 
other words, the higher the location, the safer a firm is when faced 
with flooding. However, even safer firms may suffer from flood losses 
due to the links to damaged firms. 
(4) Veloctty. Floodwater with high-speed is more likely to destroy 
facilities and factories. 
(5) Water quahty. Manufacture usually does not benefit from 
the quality of flood water as agriculture does. On the other hand, 
industries which rely on clean water supply might suffer from poor 
water quality. 
Overall, to estimate flood losses in a specific region, more details 
in the categories of production and social capacity are necessary. 
Besides, adaptation undertaken to decrease flood losses should also 
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be considered. 
2.4.3 Adaptation 
Adaptation strategies are adopted with a view to reducing flood 
losses rather than decreasing the probability of flood occurrence 
in the way that mitigation does. Adaptation strategies include 
warning system operation, flood memory maintenance, sandbag ar- 
rangement, furniture-lifting, rescue programme operation, insurance 
purchase, migration, facility adjustment, and public health mainte- 
nance. Note that different types of floods might result in focus on 
different patterns of adaptation strategies (Montz and Gruntfest, 
2002). An efficient warning system is crucial for adopting adaptive 
strategies. 
WARNING SYSTEM OPERATION 
A warning process covers the recognition of the event, recognisation 
of flood hazards, decisions on alerting others, reaching an official 
decision, and determination of public protective actions. Timely 
warning is decisive. A few minutes lost in any part of the process 
can be devastating. The most effective warning system integrates 
the subsystems of detection of flooding, management of related in- 
formation, and timely public response (Sorensen, 2000). 
Not only technologies, but the social factors are crucial to the 
effectiveness of a warning system. For instance, broadcast stations, 
especially those that can target at specific geographical areas, might 
be influential and incorporated in the warning system. 
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. 
Any breakdown in the process can result in an ineffective warn- 
ing. Sorensen and Mileti (1987) reviewed 39 warning systems in 
the United States and considered the communication problems, due 
to equipment and human failure, were the most significant causes 
of poor warning dissemination. Fundamentally, the recognition gap 
between emergency managers and the public also needs to be care- 
fully studied. 
MAINTAINING FLOOD MEMORY 
Maintaining flood memory is for raising the awareness of flood haz- 
ards amongst the inhabitants of the area. There are several ways to 
maintain flood memory: placing 'high water signs' in visible spots 
commemorating the history of a flood, constructing special posts 
or obelisks with the flood's highest water level marking, organis- 
ing permanent exhibits and expositions on local flood history, using 
the anniversaries of a flood for media to take up the issue (Siudak, 
1999), and setting up a landmark such as the King's Arms Pub in 
York. 
SANDBAG ARRANGEMENT AND FURNITURE-LIFTING 
Arranging sandbags (or other flexible barriers that are put in place 
only at times of flood risks) and lifting furniture are the most effec- 
tive ways to reduce flood losses within a short time, just before or 
even during flooding. The work in this category can only be done 
a little time before, or during, floods, hence the opportunity cost 
can be enormous. For instance, residents were afraid to go on holi- 
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days as they knew that they would not be able to relax if rain were 
forecast (Garvin et al., 2004). 
RESCUE PROGRAM OPERATION 
Using helicopters to rescue residents trapped by floods is a common 
scene in a flood disaster. Mobile phones have also become important 
in the communication link for those who encounter imminent threat 
and for emergency managers during rescue operations. 
INSURANCE PURCHASE 
Insurance has a risk-sharing mechanism. Income of the individuals 
who join the insurance market is redistributed. 
Insurers have paid out 5 billion pounds during 1999 - 2003 on 
weather damage claims in the UK, over twice the amount in the 
previous five years period (Association of British Insurers, 2004). 
Though the UK market has been providing 'all risks insurance' in- 
cluding fire, theft, subsidence, property owner's liability, storm, es- 
cape of water, and flood, flooding has become very expensive to 
cover recently, especially after the devastating year 2000 flood. 
Some early research found that insurance is more popular in 
the case of high-probability-low-loss events rather than for low- 
probability-high-loss events when the expected losses and premiums 
are equal (Edwards (1962) and Slovic et al. (1977), from Quiggin 
(1993)). This implies that flood insurance is more demanding for 
an individual who faces higher probability but a lower loss than one 
who faces lower probability but disastrous damage. 
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Kunreuther (1984) provided several possible reasons for individ- 
uals' failure to purchase flood insurance: differently perceived flood 
risks and unacceptably high insurance fees. On the demand side, 
empirical evidence revealed that homeowners had been reluctant 
to protect themselves against low-probability-high-loss events un- 
less they were required to do so; on the supply side, the insurance 
industry had also been hesitant about providing this type of cover. 
Browne and Hoyt (2000) and Ganderton et al. (2000) presented 
the results of experiments that indicated the factors of influencing 
insurance purchase for flood risks and for disaster-type of risks re- 
spectively. Browne and Hoyt (2000) set up the following model for 
the empirical analysis using data from 50 states in America (1983- 
1993): 
log(insurance demand) 
= 00 + Oi (state i) + 01 (mitigation) + 02(disaster-relief) (2.6) 
+03log(price) + 04log(income)+135(FHA-loan) 
+06log(recent-flood) +c 
where 00 is the intercept, Oi is the parameter of a dummy variable 
(state i) for testing the fixed effects, 'O 01-06 are the parameters of 
different variables, and c is the error term. The last six variables 
are federal government expenditures on mitigation, disaster relief 
expenditure by the federal government, premium per $ 1,000 of in- 
10A fixed effect model is a statistical model that stipulates that the units under analysis 
are the ones of interest, and thus constitute the entire population of units. 
Only within-study 
variation is taken to influence the uncertainty of results of a meta-analysis using a 
fixed effect 
model. 
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surance in force, disposable personal income per capita ($, 000), the 
number of the Federal Housing Administration mortgages per 1,000 
population, and total flood damage during the previous year. 
The model is used in two ways, using different definitions of the 
number of flood insurance policies purchased per 1,000 population 
in a state during a year, and the face amount of flood insurance in 
force per capita in a state during a year. " 
The result supported the hypotheses that 'income' (positively) 
and 'price' (negatively) were influential factors in the decision to 
purchase flood insurance. Flood insurance purchase at the state 
level was found to be highly correlated with the level of 'flood losses 
in the state during the prior year'. Hence 'time lag' is crucial in the 
model setup. Concerning price effect, similar results were presented 
in Ganderton et al. (2000), consistent with the law of demand. 
In terms of income effect, the findings of their paper suggested 
that individuals with higher income are more likely to purchase flood 
insurance and purchase a greater amount of insurance than low in- 
come individuals. This differed from the results in Ganderton et al. 
(2000) where wealth variable had a negative coefficient. The nega- 
tive estimated effect implied that as wealth increased, subjects were 
more likely to self-insure. 
Since the demand for insurance against low-probability-high-loss 
events is not well understood, the idea of catastrophe bond finds its 
niche. For instance, transactions of 'catastrophe futures' occur in 
"Face amount is the amount stated on an insurance policy, to be paid upon death or 
maturity, the date on which a debt becomes due for payment. 
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Chicago Board of Trade. 
When it comes to the responsibility for mitigating flood risks, 
ideally, governments, insurers, and reinsurers are encouraged to set 
up a 'risk partnership' for covering risks over a broad scale. Though 
it is ethically controversial, some research such as Browne and Hoyt 
(2000) suggested increasing the sales of flood insurance by modifying 
individuals' perceptions of potential losses. 
MIGRATION 
Migration occurs ex ante when people have to leave the area to 
secure their safety and wealth. It might happen ex post when a 
flood itself or its damage forces people to leave. " 
One of the principles of building sustainable communities is en- 
suring that housing is built in the 'right' place (Edward and Turrent, 
2000). Being careful about site selection, choosing a non-flood-prone 
area for instance, is fundamental to avoid flood hazards. 
FACILITIES ADJUSTMENT FOR PROPERTIES 
There are ways to make properties less vulnerable to flood dam- 
age. One is to raise floor levels directly. The other is to minimise 
potential damage, e. g., raising electric sockets above flood height, 
replacing chipboard or medium-density fiberboard floors and fittings 
with more resilient materials, using door-boards and window guards 
120n the other hand, migration towards flood-prone areas occurs when driven by economic 
incentives. In the past few decades, most cases are about human activities' expanding into 
more flood-prone areas ex facto. 
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to keep out sediments and contaminants. Another is to strengthen 
the material of construction to provide better shelters. 
To reduce runoff, the design and application of permeable sur- 
faces on the ground is crucial. Besides, the capture of rainfall for 
certain water usage such as watering vegetables and flushing toilets 
can also reduce the amount of rainwater falling on the ground. Mak- 
ing the best use of the rainwater can not only decrease flood risks 
but decrease demand from public water supplies. 
PUBLIC HEALTH MAINTENANCE 
Public health should be considered before, during and after floods 
to avoid sequential calamities. Based on the observation of flood 
events, the following principles are crucial for public health man- 
agement associated with flooding: 
(1) Facilities such as hazardous waste landfills and nuclear power 
stations should be located outside flood-prone areas and well-protected 
from flooding. This is often listed in the principles of siting. 
(2) Risks associated with potential sources of contamination such 
as sewage systems, chemical plants, and waste water treatment fa- 
cilities should be scrutinised. 
(3) Ironically, a deluge might result in an interruption of water 
supply because of the deterioration of water quality. Drinking wa- 
ter supply, in particular, should be protected from being polluted 
by bacteria such as Salmonella. The outbreak of Cryptosporidio- 
sis in Milwaukee (USA) in 1993, already referred to, coincided with 
usually heavy spring rains and runoff from melting snow that pol- 
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luted drinking water. The concern that inhabitants in the affected 
area might need to be vaccinated against hepatitis A, which can be 
spread by faeces leaking into drinking water supplies, was raised in 
the 2002 flood of the Rhine. 
(4) Disinfectant is often sprayed right after flood events to prevent 
the spread of disease from decomposing bodies. However, the side 
effects of using chemicals to control outbreaks of biological diseases 
need attention because such chemicals might trigger pollution in the 
next inundation. 
(5) The dilution effects of flooding should not be impeded by 
flood control facilities. This is one of the controversial issues of 
flood mitigation in Bangledesh and the Venice lagoon. Otherwise, 
a compensatory mechanism should be established. 
(6) The destruction or dysfunction of large facilities might also 
bring secondary flood hazards, such as the overtopping of dams. For 
example, the menace of overtopping the dam in Calderdale (Eng- 
land) triggered the evacuation of residents in the summer of 2004. 
2.4.4 Welfare estimation of environmental goods 
The welfare effects of flooding can be quantified in hydrological and 
economic terms. From the perspective of hydrology, a depth-damage 
curve is often applied. It aims at providing the reference losses 
for each category of the flooded area or buildings for prediction 
by compressing the information on flood losses into one function. 
In economic analysis, damage function estimation and production 
function approach are reviewed. 
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DEPTH-DAMAGE CURVES 
There are two ways of obtaining depth-damage curves. One is using 
the relationship between actual damage from a past flood event and 
its depth; the other is producing 'synthetic depth-damage curves', 
as suggested by White (1964) (cited in Perry (1981)). For example, 
Penning-Rowsell and Chatterton (1977) and Parker et al. (1987) 
(cited in Perry (1981)) published synthetic depth-damage curves in 
the UK, and the Ministry of Construction (1996) (cited in Dutta 
et al. (2003)) published depth-damage curves in Japan. Usually, 
damage rises dramatically from a certain depth which can be viewed 
as a threshold. On the other hand, damage is often constrained to 
a limited amount whilst water depth reaches a higher level. 
It is usually not easy to access enough data to plot a depth- 
damage curve, so a synthetic depth-damage curve appears to be 
more practical. A synthetic depth-damage curve is estimated by 
interpolating from existing data. 
Ideally, data are categorised into groups, e. g., sectors, character- 
istics of buildings, or crops and then the damage are monetarised. 
For convenience, a specific percentage is often employed for each 
group to calculate flood losses. According to Smith (1994) (cited 
in Smith and Ward (1998)), flood damage surveys often assume 
that the average remaining value is 50% of that of a comparable 
new item. Relevant data, such as warning time, structural damage 
which results from extreme floods, clean-up and repairing services, 
are therefore necessary when interpreting the curves. 
Smith (1994) (cited in Smith and Ward (1998)) pointed out that 
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. 
although plotting depth-damage curves was internationally accepted 
as a standard approach to urban flood damage assessment, there 
had been relatively few published accounts that gave details of the 
methodology for their construction or application. In reality, dam- 
age is not only associated with depth but also related to flood water 
velocity, effluent content, and flood duration (Perry, 1981). To in- 
corporate more dimensions into the estimation of flood damage, a 
damage function is hence introduced. 
DAMAGE FUNCTION 
The damage function approach has, particularly in the past, been 
popular in analysing environmental impacts. It involves estimation 
of a damage function, an inventory of materials at risk, and multi- 
plication of them by appropriate unit values (Farber, 1987; Gau and 
Liu, 2002). Development presents an economic decision while flood 
risks represent damage. 
However, development is not the only type of human activity that 
affects flood risks. The damage function approach is criticised for 
ignoring people's averting behaviour. Therefore, a production func- 
tion approach (and a cost function approach) incorporating averting 
behaviour have been proposed (Freeman, 1993). 
PRODUCTION FUNCTION (AND COST FUNCTION) 
This methodology was introduced by Just and Hueth (1979) and 
developed by Freeman (1993). It explains the welfare change in a 
society using a production function and measurements of consumer 
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surplus. 
In the production function approach, social welfare W comprises 
welfare of n individuals, m types of inputs, and environmental qual- 
ity (q). It is a net social welfare, the monetary value of all the 
products less total factor costs. 
W(Vlll 
... i Vnm, q) = p(u)du -F- Vi 
where v is input, u is output, p(. ) is the price of the output. For each 
individual i, the total cost of input is [fl, f2), --i 
fM1_ 1jV1 
i V2) ... ) VM] 
For convenience, vector F is the cost of input vector V. Environ- 
mental quality, q, is shown as a factor in the production function 
to influence social welfare using envelope theorem. The 'envelope', 
by definition, is a curve or surface that is tangent to every one of a 
family of curves or surfaces. The envelope here is composed of the 
maximum welfare under all the possible combinations of inputs. Be- 
fore applying the envelope theorem, the F. O. C. s for choosing input 
vij to maximise social welfare are: 
awl(gvij = (OYIOvij) - P(Y) - fj =0 for all Z, i 
In other words, the value of the marginal product 
(aylavij) - P(Y) 
should equal marginal cost fj. 
Using the envelope theorem, net social welfare can be expressed 
by the sum of both indirect impacts and direct impacts from the 
change of environmental quality. It also equals the value of the 
marginal product of q in the production function. This methodology 
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is useful for incorporating the environmental impacts into produc- 
tion decisions. 
aw ay av* (q) 
o9q o9v* (q) aq 
Oy (v * (q), q) 
o9q 
= P(Y*) 
ay(v*(q), q) 
aq 
The advantages of adopting the production function approach are 
the following. First, it endogenises environmental quality into the 
production decision and incorporates averting behaviour. Second, 
the data of a production function may be easier to access than that 
of a consumption- based welfare function. When information about 
the cost function is easier to access, the cost function approach may 
be applied instead (Freeman, 1993). 
OTHER METHODS 
The 'shadow value' of risks can also be estimated using other meth- 
ods such as willingness to pay (WTP), hedonic price and option 
price. These estimates can also support decision-makers in gather- 
ing information about flood risks. 
1. Willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
The WTP for decreasing the level of flood risks from x0l to x1, can 
be estimated in either a direct utility function or an indirect utility 
function. The direct utility function may take the form: 
U(xl, m- CV) = U(x 0 M) IIý 
where M is the units of a numeraire good and CV is the compensat- 
ing variation measure of this change. The indirect utility function 
is: 
V(P, X,, y- CV) = V(P, x y) 
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where y is the wealth level and p is the price of goods. Note that 
the estimation of WTP is invalid while the decision maker faces a 
non-linear constraint (Driscoll et al., 1994). 
2. Hedonic price 
Tobin and Montz (1990) and the Montz (1992,1993) investigated 
the effects of floods on property values in communities in the United 
States and New Zealand. They found the housing price usually 
decreased temporarily after a flood event and then increased back 
to, or even exceeded, its previous level. However, if another flood 
struck this area, the price might not be able to return to the previous 
level. 
In severely flooded areas, a decrease in house price might result 
from the visual reminders such as unrepaired or abandoned struc- 
tures, damaged vegetation or high water marks. An increase in 
value in an area of frequent flooding might occur due to repairs 
and flood protection work, but the increase is lower than would be 
the case without flood hazards. The price of houses that have not 
been flooded, but are located in the affected area, usually decreases. 
Montz (1992) also testified that the greater the time interval between 
floods, the less the housing price differential (before/after flooding) 
would be. 
House characteristics, not the hazardous locations of being flooded, 
are primarily responsible for differences in housing price in the long- 
run after all. Flood hazards generally only cause temporary distur- 
bance. 
3. Option price 
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Option price theory tries to indicate the value of 'non-used' as- 
sets. In this case, a decision-maker facing uncertainty intends to 
preserve the option to use the resource. Since Weisbrod (1964) pro- 
posed this theory for application to environmental evaluation, and 
it has been ubiquitously used in financial studies. Capozza and Li 
(1994) provided a general formulation for estimating the value of 
a development project, including the timing of investment and the 
intensity of development, in an expectation conditional on the cash- 
flow process over a period of time. Uncertainty over land prices 
is reflected by the assumption the prices exhibit using Brownian 
motion. 
2.5 Decision-making under uncertainty 
Unlike many other pollution issues, flooding often involves a high 
level of uncertainty. Averting behaviour has similar effects to insur- 
ance, lowering possible damage or costs of flood events. Expected 
utility (EU) theory, the general principle applied to insurance, is 
therefore employed. 
Uncertainty implies insufficiency of information or knowledge and 
the limitation of the cognitive ability. EU function developed by 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953)" and a plethora of follow- 
up revisions are the most typical methods in economics for dealing 
with uncertainty. 
13 The idea can be traced back to Pascal- Fermat's expected value in 17th century and Daniel 
Bernoulli's solution (1738) to St. Petersburg Paradox. 
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2.5.1 Definition of the expected utility theory 
Note that it is the expected utdity rather than the return in a gamble 
that is used to avoid St. Petersburg paradox (or St. Petersburg- 
Menger paradox). " The difference is that utility follows the law 
of diminishing marginal utility whilst the return does not have the 
property of diminishing value. Utility must also be bounded to 
resolve the paradox of this sort (Menger, 1934). 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) used the summation of 
various possible utility values multiplied by their own probabilities 
of occurrence to denote the maximum value to a decision-maker. It 
can be expressed as follows: 
EU(L) piui 
where EU is expected utility, L -- (pj,... 'p,, 
) is a lottery, pi is 
n the probability of the possible event i (Ei=l pi = 1) , and ui is the 
utility from the event i. In other words, applying EU, uncertainty 
is described in terms of a range of possible consequences and the 
probability distribution across the consequences. 
According to EU theory, utility is linear in probability as shown 
in the equations above. It reflects preferences for the utility of ex- 
pected outcomes instead of dealing with outcome comparison after 
14St. Petersburg Paradox shows the expected payoff of the following lottery is infinite, but 
in reality individuals are not willing to pay this amount of money to play the game. Consider 
tossing a coin repeatedly until the tail comes up. If this happens in the Mth toss, the lottery 
gives a monetary payoff of 2m. Since the probability of this outcome is 2-m, the expected 
payoff of this lottery is E'=, 2m . 2-m = oo. It means an individual should be willing to M 
give up all her/his wealth for the opportunity to play this lottery, which is not true. 
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the fact. The insight of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) is to 
avoZd defining preferences over outcomes and capturing everything 
in terms of preferences over lotteries shown in the form of a utility 
function. 15 
Utility differs in different states. EU is the ex ante utility of cur- 
rent decisions. For technical convenience, EU captures both proba- 
bilities and utilities of different possible states and links each utility 
to its probability. 
The central behavioural concept in EU is risk aversion which 
helps us compare different options. Formally, from Mas-Colell et al. 
(1995): 
iff 
where xi and xi are different outcomes. This theory is based on the 
three axioms that characterise an individual's rationality (Laffort, 
1989; Mas-Colell et al., 1995). 
1. Pre-ordering preference The individual has a complete pre- 
ordering on the space, M, of lotteries defined over the consequences. 
It reflects an individual's appraisal of the likelihood of the various 
events, and their attitude toward risks. 
2. Continuity axiom For all L, L', L" EM such that L ý- L, 
L". There exists L' - aL + (1 - a)L" where aE [0,1]. Any small 
change of probabilities does not change the nature of the ordering 
between two lotteries. This axiom insures that preferences can be 
represented by a utility function. 
15This comment is based upon 'http: //cepa. newschoo1. edu/het/essays/uncert/vnmaxioms. htm'. 
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3. Independence axiom 
The preference relation >- on space of simple lotteries M satisfies 
the independence axiom if for all values of L, L/ )L" cM and a 
[0,1], we have 
L >- L' iff aL + (1 - a)L" >- aL'+ (I - a)L" (2.7) 
2.5.2 Limitations of the expected utility theory 
EU theory lays a rational foundation for decision-making under risk. 
However, it usually only explains what an individual 'should' do in- 
stead of how s/he 'really' behaves, a normative guideline instead 
of a positive explanation (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). In theory, the 
independence axiom, though absent in the original von-Neumann- 
Morgenstern (v. N-M) theory, is problematic. In practice, some of 
the experimental settings and observations in market are found in- 
consistent with EU theory (Quiggin, 1993). 
1. Extreme values in probability, consequence, and wealth 
(1) Low-probability-high- loss hazards 
The interpretation of averting behaviour undertaken in response 
to low-probability-high-loss hazards is debatable. Lees and Rice 
(1965) considered people would be more likely to insure against 
larger rather than smaller losses. However, other research show that 
people 'misjudge' the risks if we compare the probabilities ex ante 
and ex post. Kunreuther (1984) contended some people are consid- 
ered as 'underinsured' based on the common lament from uninsured 
victims after a disaster. Ganderton et al. (2000) considered EU suit- 
able for explaining some purchase of insurance only for those risks 
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with low probabilities. Furthermore, there is an issue of equity be- 
cause the money to be spent on assistance is from taxpayers who 
are mostly not victims. 
For most flood-prone areas, this is not a problem because flooding 
comes regularly. Non-flood prone areas, however, might encounter 
floods unexpectedly, with low probability. In this case, the appli- 
cation of EU needs adjustment. Kunreuther et al. (2001) pointed 
out the necessity of giving individuals enough context to draw on 
their own experience and well-developed risk perception if we ask 
them to evaluate an unfamiliar risk which has a small likelihood of 
occurrence. Hence, adjustment estimation is needed in modelling, 
e. g., applying weighted utility function. 
(2) Over-estimation of the risk 
Risk perception can be 'biased' in an utterly opposite way. Ac- 
cording to Lichtenstein et al. (1978), the overall pattern observed is 
that people over-estimate the likelihood of low-probability events, 
but under-estimate that of high- probability events. The reason be- 
hind this over- or under- est imat ion is the difference of the accessibil- 
ity of 'appropriate' information. If information about the occurrence 
of an uncertain event is repeated sufficiently frequently, particularly 
if it is provided to a degree far in excess of its overall relative value, 
flawed risk perceptions are likely to occur (Viscusi, 1991). 
The reasons for misjudgement include: regret, lack of experience, 
and insufficient information. The first issue is left to psychology. 
Experience is the history a decision-maker encounters. So it cannot 
be influenced ethically. The only aspect we can work on is infor- 
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mation supply. Though accessing 'sufficient' information may avoid 
such misjudgement, for low probability events, sufficiently correct 
information might simply not exist. 
(3) Low income individuals 
The coefficient of relative risk aversion measures risk aversion 
related to income levels, and is denoted by: 
r (x) =-x- V' (x) / U'(x) 
where x is wealth (supposed to be a positive value), r is a measure 
of the degree of risk aversion, and U is utility with positive marginal 
utility (U') and negative value of the second order derivative (U") 
(Pratt, 1964). 
Further, Zeckhauser and Keeler (1970) introduced the concept of 
the coefficient of partial risk aversion: 
r(x) = -(x - xo) - U"(x)IU'(x) 
where xO is a base level that ensures wealth is above the 'minimum 
surviving level', omitting the consideration of individuals with lower 
wealth. This coefficient also expands the application of the coeffi- 
cient of relative risk aversion that needs x to be positive. 
A similar idea is provided by the 'first-safety model' (Dasgupta, 
1993), in which households with a low amount of income might 
not be averse to risks. Figure 2.5 describes a utility function V(Y), 
which is flat at low levels of income and rises sharply near the thresh- 
old income Y*. 
These models describe that people with extremely low or high 
wealth might become risk lovers. 
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V(Y) 
7rl V (YI) + 72 V 
V(Y-) 
Figure 2.5: von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function at low in- 
come (Dasgupta, 1993). V(Y): Utility function; Y*: Threshold 
income; Y1, Y2: Income under the two states, 1 and 2; 7rj, 72: 
Probability of the two states, 1 and 2. 
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2. Violation of the independence axiom 
The independence axiom is crucial to EU, but it is also a poten- 
tial cause for argument. There have been experimental results that 
violate the independence axiom, such as the Allais paradox (Allais, 
1979), common ratio effect, and reverse preference (Quiggin, 1993). 
Adjustment of the definition of a utility function might help avoid 
the violation of the independence axiom. 
These results of experiments and surveys have revealed the limits 
of applying EU theory. Nevertheless, the development and revision 
of EU in ways that diminish the aberration of the original theory 
can still be suitable for decision-making to condense all the possible 
circumstances into one value under uncertainty. 
2.5.3 Revisions of the expected utility theory 
To conquer the challenge in the axioms of EU theory, revisions have 
been provided. In the weighted EU theory, Chew and MacCrimmon 
(1979) and Fishburn (1988) considered that people weight the under- 
lying probability distribution based on either the value of outcomes 
or on their trust in the data. In the rank-dependent utility theory, 
Quiggin (1993) proposed an introduction of critical thresholds for 
key model parameters which can serve as a basis for changing from 
one option to another in the decision-making process. Lichtenstein 
and Slovic (1971) advocated the possibility of 'preference reversal' 
and allowed regret in decision-making. Ramsey (1926) asserted that 
individual assessment of probability relates to the knowledge pos- 
sessed by a particular individual, which is subjective EU. However, 
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the probability discussed in von Neumann-Morgenstern EU is un- 
derstood to be 'objective' instead of 'subjective'. 
Savage (1972) proposed both qualitative and quantitative meth- 
ods to calculate subjective probabilities. Qualitative probability de- 
fines the preference relation '<' as 'not more probable than'; quanti- 
tative probability assumes a set of outcomes for which a probability 
is to be measured can be partitioned into an arbitrarily large num- 
ber of equivalent subsets. Anscombe and Aumann (1963) showed it 
can have the same practical expression as that in objective EU. 
The discussion of subjective probability reminds us to be careful 
when we apply and explain probabilities, and to avoid unreasonable 
assumptions. The probability of flooding of each region, contributed 
to by its climatological and geographical conditions and the avert- 
ing behaviour undertaken, can be expressed as an objective value. 
Hence only collective action can be analysed in terms of an objective 
probability. This will be the case in the following chapters. 
The revision for EU theory has challenged the original EU using 
different functional forms, arranging different types of preference 
order or revising its axioms. In common with the original EU theory, 
the follow-up development of EU captures preference in 'utility' with 
'probability'. 
Though there are limitations of EU theory, it still provides a 
succinct formula for analysing human behaviour under uncertainty 
in a normative perspective. Applying hydrology, the probability 
of flooding is the frequency of flood occurrence that incorporates 
economic activities and averting behaviour. The utility of outcomes 
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of decisions to invest in hard or soft mitigation is the expected social 
welfare of those decisions. 
2.6 Summary 
To improve efficiency and to avoid fatal mistakes in decision-making, 
e. g., whether to discharge 600,000 tonnes of sewage-laden storm 
water into the Thames or not when flood occurrence is critical, 
well-structured information and decision-making systems are essen- 
tial. Hence the guidelines of policies associated with land practice 
to river management should be focused. Land use, mitigation and 
adaptation activities, are factors influencing the probability of flood- 
ing. Both economic and health impacts are considered in estimating 
flood losses. 
Due to the characteristics of flood events and the focus on eco- 
nomic tradeoffs, a flood economics model is developed. Infiltration 
theory in hydrology is applied to link land use and hard mitigation 
to the probability of flood occurrence while expected utility theory 
and the production function approach in economics are applied in 
modelling collective behaviour. 
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Balancing Development and Protection in Flood 
Risk Management: A Static Model 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims at identifying the decision rules facing flood haz- 
ards. Both economic and environmental concerns are crucial to so- 
cial welfare analysis on flood risk management. However, the dual 
relationship between development and protection for welfare im- 
provement, complementarity and substitution, complicate the prob- 
lem. An economy can either increase development and provide fi- 
nancial support for flood mitigation, or decrease development and 
reduce flood risks. The optimal choice depends on the conditions in 
both economic and hydrological environments. Therefore, integrat- 
ing hydrological characteristics and economic behaviour is essential 
for flood risk management. 
Information about the magnitude and frequency of floods is re- 
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quired for engineering design of mitigation works, development plan- 
ning, flood insurance, and decisions on land use. Information on the 
demand side, including financial capacity, should also be included 
in the decision-making process. Most research (Pattanayak and 
Kramer, 2001; Jepsen, 2003) including hydrological and economic 
analyses, apply the empirical results of hydrological studies to wel- 
fare analysis. This chapter, instead, develops a theoretical model 
incorporating both hydrological and economic theories in order to 
generate the principles of flood risk management. 
In environmental economics, the impacts of environmental haz- 
ards have often been estimated by dose/damage functions. This 
methodology is widely applied to evaluate the impacts of pollu- 
tion or the effects of pollution control on public health (Alberini 
et al., 1997; Machado and Mourato, 2002). Freeman and Harring- 
ton (1990) proposed the production function approach in order to 
endogenise environmental quality and averting behaviour in welfare 
analysis. However, these approaches are implicitly based upon the 
assumption of perfect foresight whereas uncertainty is a significant 
feature of flood events. Apart from this, the magnitude of damage 
is often related to the scale of economic performance. An equiva- 
lent magnitude of flood, for instance, can induce more damage in 
a developed area than in a non-developed area unless the former 
undertakes a higher level of averting behaviour. 
To incorporate uncertainty and the scale of economic develop- 
ment in welfare analysis, this chapter develops a model based on an 
expected welfare function using a production function approach. It 
90 
3.2 Assumptions 
integrates Horton's infiltration theory to include the impacts of land 
use and averting behaviour on hydrological flows. 
Section 3.2 discusses assumptions for the model setup in Section 
3.3. Section 3.3 builds up a prototype and derives analytical results 
C trom it. Section 3.4 presents the chapter conclusion. 
3.2 Assumptions 
In the expected utility approach, hydrology and economics are linked 
by the probability of flooding (a physical dimension) and by the 
utility of flood events (a welfare dimension). Collective choices on 
land use and on averting behaviour arise because of the public good 
nature of mitigation actions. A social decision-maker aims at op- 
timising expected social utility (for estimating welfare) under un- 
certainty. ' This chapter develops a flood economics model of the 
decision process, built upon the following assumptions. 
3.2.1 Economic model 
To observe the tradeoffs among increasing economic gains, decreas- 
ing flood risks, decreasing flood losses and to merge the multiple 
targets, an indicator 'expected welfare' is proposed. Expected 
welfare is the welfare net of floods multiplied by a scaling factor 
that incorporates the expected flood risks and magnitude of losses. 
It can be applied to estimate the value of welfare that is scaled down 
by environmental risk, including flood risks and flood losses. 
'This thesis follows the modern practice of making no distinction between risk and uncer- 
tainty. 
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Conventionally, a damage function is applied to evaluate the im- 
pacts of environmental quality. However, people often undertake 
averting behaviour whilst facing flood risk. Since Freeman and Har- 
rington (1990), the literature on environmental evaluation has drawn 
attention to the incorporation of averting behaviour and have pre- 
sented the social welfare using the production function approach. 
y 
W(Yll) ... i Ynm, q) = 
fo 
p(y)dy -F- Vi 
where V is a vector of input, y is a vector of outputs, p(. ) is the 
price of output, and F is the cost of input vector V. Environmental 
quality, q, is shown as a factor in the production function to influence 
social welfare using the envelope theorem: 
OW10q = p(y*) - Oy (V* (q), q) lo9q 
Inputs in production can be placed in the first term while the 
costs of averting behaviour can be kept in the second term on the 
right hand side of equation (3.1). This methodology assumes that 
demand functions are compensated so that social welfare function 
associated with producing u is the area under the demand curve for 
u, deducted by the cost of inputs. It simplifies the application of 
welfare analysis because only information on production is required. 
According to the Bergson- Samuelson social welfare function, we 
have social welfare as a function of the utility of a representative 
individual: 
max W= max W (U) 
Welfare may be proxied by profit as in Ehui et al. (1990). Their 
model is to maximise the serially continuous utility index of ag- 
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gregate benefit from agriculture and forestry. Welfare is measured 
through the utility of profit ('benefit' in Ehui et al. (1990)). 
f 00 
e-6t -W (U (7r(. ))) dt 
This function can appropriately deal with problems of pollution. 
However, it cannot encompass uncertainty. Furthermore, problems 
like pollution are often taken as by-products of production (Keeler 
et al., 1971; Freeman, 1993). Averting behaviour that affects either 
the probability of or the loss due to flooding should be linked to 
capital instead of production. However, averting behaviour does not 
affect the probability of the event in existing models. For instance 
(Freeman, 1993), 
E(u) =7r -v (M - R, A(R, G)) + (I - 7r) -v (M - R, 0) 
where M is wealth, R is private spending on averting behaviour, G 
is government protective spending, A is the magnitude of the event. 
They are suitable in evaluating the cases in which only adaptation 
can be undertaken (in other words, only the consequences can be af- 
fected). However, this is not the case in flood management. Ehrlich 
and Becker (1972) incorporated 'self-protection' (called 'mitigation' 
in this thesis) to influence the probability of an event and employed 
'self-insurance' and 'market insurance' (called 'adaptation' in this 
research) to affect the loss of an event. For instance, when mar- 
ket insurance and self-protection are jointly available, utility can be 
presented by 
-p(p 
U (I e+p (pe U (10' -r+ 8) 
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where p is the probability of the event, p' is the endowed probability 
of the event, r is the expenditure on self-protection, Ii represents the 
states, s is the price of insurance, 7r is the insurance amount. 
Three other features are emphasised. First, most models of this 
sort capture individual's choices instead of social decisions. Hence, 
they are useful to find the optimal individual choices rather than 
collective decisions. Secondly, these models condense all choices 
into one term, often a monetary term. This is suitable for deciding 
insurance or entrance fees but not for decisions with multiple pur- 
poses. Thirdly, sacrificing economic development to decrease the 
probability of flooding should be taken into account in the analysis 
of environmental protection. 
Suppose there are two sectors, non-manufacturing and manufac- 
turing. Suppose that manufacturing occurs on developed land while 
non-manufacturing occurs on non-developed land (including agri- 
cultural land and open space). ' A social planner has to decide the 
following: 
(1) Economtc development: This increases social welfare by con- 
verting non-developed land to developed land at the cost of increas- 
ing the probability of flooding. Non-developed land often depreci- 
ates due to production (e. g., land degradation) while developed land 
depreciates on a relatively small scale. 
(2) Mitigatton: This reduces the probability of flooding at the 
cost of economic gains, including hard mitigation (e. g., embank- 
2Though there has been a debate on the impacts of agricultural land on flood risk, natural 
land cover generally has higher infiltration capacity than developed land that is dedicated to 
industrial purposes or urbanisation. 
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ments) and soft mitigation (e. g., afforestation and maintaining wash- 
lands). 
(3)Adaptation: This decreases flood losses by purchasing insur- 
ance or improving warning systems. 
An expected welfare function is employed to evaluate the trade- 
offs between these three actions in the decision-making process. 
Moreover, it aggregates individuals' utility into social utility that 
suits the centralised management of land use and averting behaviour 
for flooding. It also helps measure social welfare under uncertainty 
(Crew and Kleindorfer, 1976; Drazen and Grilli, 1993). 
Based on von Neumann-Morgenstern's expected utility function, 
U(L) YIP1 +* *'YNPN 
where L= (pl, ---) PN) is a lottery with an assignment of numbers 
(YI) * '' i YN) to the 
N outcomes, the expected welfare function offers 
an ex ante analysis that shows a way to make choices before uncer- 
tainty is resolved. A social planner aims at selecting the bundle of 
decisions which gives the highest expected welfare (EW). 
N 
max EW = max Epi - Wi 
i=l 
Wi is the social welfare of the outcome i while pi is the probability 
of its occurrence. N is the total number of outcomes. EWA> EWB 
is equivalent to A>B. In other words, A is more desirable than 
B when the expected welfare of A is larger than that of B. In this 
case, N=2 (with floods and without floods) and the probabil- 
ity and the corresponding welfare value are presented in Table 3.1. 
The dichotomy of 'with' and 'without' floods here is for expository 
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convenience. We can also divide the probability of flooding and its 
corresponding flood losses into n scales, i. e. the value of ', r - v' can 
n be replaced by Ej=j (ri - vi), without affecting the analytical results. 
Table 3.1: Probability and welfare with/without flooding 
i Pi Wi 
with flooding T (1 - V) -W 
without flooding I-rW 
EW can then be represented as the product of the probability of 
being flood damage free (0) and the maximum social welfare net of 
floods (W). 
EW = Epi - Wi 
=r- ((I - v) - W) + (I - r) -W 
(3.2) 
=O-W 
where 0= I-r-v. Equation (3.2) shows that a society expects 
to have a 'discounted' welfare taking the probability and losses of 
flooding into account. 0, where 0<0<1, is a scaling factor for 
scaling down the value of the maximum welfare net of floods by 
incorporating flood risk. 
3.2.2 Hydrological model 
A hydrological model is essential for estimating the probability of 
flooding. Though there are a plethora of models of flood risks and 
flood losses, most are 'black-box' empirical rather than theoretical 
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models. 
Horton's infiltration theory (Horton, 1933; Smith and Ward, 1998) 
succinctly constructs the interaction between infiltration capacity 
(,; ), precipitation intensity (n), ' precipitation duration (t) and the 
amount of runoff (Q) using the concept of water budget. It also al- 
lows us to endogenise the threshold level below which the region can 
cope with (Q), above which a flood hazard occurs. Symbolically, 
(n-4; ) t=Q >Q (3-3) 
Equation (3.3) can incorporate the economic activities - land use 
and mitigation - that affect the probability of flooding. Anthro- 
pogenic climate change is not considered here. Only factors that 
influence water on/below the ground are introduced. 
Developed land (M) decreases the infiltration capacity of land 
((; ýj :5 0) due to paving watertight surfaces in the name of con- M- 
venience while hard mitigation (K) raises the threshold of flood 
occurrence (QK ý! 0). The probability of flooding (0 <r< 1) is the 
exceedance probability of the threshold level: 
r(Q > c2) 
r «n -«M» t> C2(K» 
(3.4) 
r(M, K) 
where t is assumed as given and n follows a stochastic process. This 
conditional probability varies with hard mitigation, economic devel- 
opment and also with the rainfall pattern. By definition, the return 
period of flooding is the inverse of the exceedance probability. In 
3This discussion focuses on the role of rainfall. 
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other words, the T-year flood has a probability of IIT of being 
equalled or exceeded in any single period of time. 
P (X > X*) = 
or 
T(X*) = (1 -P (X < x*»-' 
where T(X*) is the (mean) return period of flood level X* and X 
is the magnitude of a flood. 
Though Horton's infiltration theory has been criticised for ig- 
noring subsurface flow and the difference in soil saturation (Betson, 
1969; Burt, 1996), it is still appropriate for this research. The reason 
is that infiltration capacity is valid for distinguishing flows between 
developed land and non-developed land. 
3.2.3 The integrated model 
The aforementioned hydrological model and economic model provide 
the foundation to establish an integrated model. The assumptions 
are based on the discussion in earlier chapters (Chapter 2 mainly), 
Ehui et al. (1990), Ehrlich and Becker (1972) and economic axioms. 
(1) Social welfare net of floods: W= W(M+, K-, D-) 
Here I assume that social welfare net of floods, W, comprises 
profits from industries (manufacturing on developed land and non- 
manufacturing on non-developed land) and costs of averting be- 
haviour. W is assumed to be twice differentiable. 
>o /I 
-I 
wlým <0 
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Developed land generally brings a higher profit compared with 
non-developed land. Following Ehui et al. (1990)'s research about 
the impact of deforestation on agricultural yield, the input of devel- 
oped land follows the law of diminishing marginal product. 
Wý < 01 WýK <0 
It is straightforward that expenditure on hard mitigation reduces 
welfare and investment in hard mitigation also follows the law of in- 
creasing marginal cost. The cost of hard mitigation includes labour, 
capital, disturbance of ecosystem, risks of engineering failure, and 
costs of maintenance and repairs. 
Wý/ < 0) WýD <0 
Similarly, expenditure on adaptation reduces welfare and invest- 
ment in adaptation also follows the law of increasing marginal cost. 
(2) Probability of being flood damage free: 
0= O(M-, K+, D+), where 0<0<1 
The probability of being flood damage free is formed by the prob- 
ability of flooding and the proportion of flood losses. The former 
is affected by development and hard mitigation while the latter is 
influenced by adaptation. If 0 is twice differentiable, 
01 < 
03 0 11 
m- mm <0 
This states that development of land reduces the probability of being 
flood damage free via the probability of flood as it decreases infiltra- 
tion capacity. It is based on the discussion about the impact of devel- 
opment on flood risk in the Subsection 2.2.2 and assumption about 
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damage function in conventional environmental economics (Perman 
et al., 1999). The rate of decrease in the probability of being flood 
damage free accelerates with the increase in developed land. It is 
caused by the movement onto more flood-prone areas as economic 
development proceeds. On the other hand, soft mitigation increases 
the probability of being flood damage free. Its effect on the proba- 
bility of being flood damage free diminishes because the flood-prone 
areas are supposed to be released to efficiently store flood water at 
an early stage in a rational decision. 
Secondly, we have that 
0, > ol 0 
// 
<0 K- KK 
It follows Ehrlich and Becker (1972)'s discussion about the relation- 
ship between expenditure on self-protection (mitigation in this case) 
and probability of hazard (the probability of flood in this case). The 
probability of being flood damage free increases with hard mitiga- 
tion via the probability of flood. The increase in the rate of hard 
mitigation slows down the increase in the probability of being flood 
damage free due to technological limitations. 
Thirdly, 'I - v' scales down the welfare due to flood losses. Adap- 
tation decreases flood losses. 
ol > 0) 
0 // 
<0 D- DD 
postulates that the probability of being flood damage free increases 
with adaptation via the proportion of flood losses. It follows Ehrlich 
and Becker (1972)'s discussion about the relationship between ex- 
penditure on self-insurance (adaptation in this case) and loss (loss 
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due to flooding in this case). The increase in the rate of adaptation 
slows down the increase in the probability of being flood damage free 
due to technological limitation. The remaining second-order deriva- 
tive of either W or 0 function are assumed to be equal to zero. The 
rationale behind the model is plotted in Figure 3.1 and the options 
of flood risk management are presented in Table 3.2. 
Figure 3.1: Links among variables in the model. 
EW: = W(M, K, D) - (I - r(M, K) - v(D)). 
(3) Objective and constraints 
In light of these definitions, the objective function and the con- 
straints are as follows: 
max O(M, K, D) - W(M, K, D) (3-5) 
s. t. o<m< A) 0< KID 
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Table 3.2: Strategies for dealing with flood hazards and their cost and benefit 
Averting Behaviour Doing 
Mitigation Adaptation Nothing 
Benefit rtrtVIW 
Choice hard soft warning, economic 
mitigation mitigation insurance development 
Cost expenditure on opportunity expenditure on r 
hard mitigation cost of adaptation 
non-development 
Note: W is the welfare net of floods; r is the probability of flooding; 
v is the proportion of flood losses to the welfare net of floods. 
where A is the total amount of land and 
Wýj ý: 0, WLM < 0,0' < 0,0 
// 
<0 M- MM 
II<0 Wý <- Oý WýK < 01 OIK 01 OKK 
I Wý <- 01 WýD < 0) OD >- 01 ODD < 0' 
In summary, employing EW function brings three advantages in 
the flood risk management. First, it integrates all possible outcomes 
into one function. Secondly, the costs and benefits of economic 
development and averting behaviour can be clearly distinguished in 
one functional form. Thirdly, the conflicting relationship between 
economic gains and flood risks, as well as their complementarity, 
can be observed in the tradeoff between 0 and W. 
3.3 Model setup and the analytical results 
Consider the case which has a stable equilibrium. Time is netted 
out and so is the distinction between flow and stock. 
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0 is a monotonically increasing function of K and D but mono- 
tonically decreasing with respect to M. On the other hand, W is 
a monotonically decreasing function of K and D but monotonically 
increasing with respect to M. 
3.3.1 Conditions for the equilibrium 
When the economic system is at equilibrium with optimal decisions, 
the first partial derivatives of the objective function (equation (3.5)) 
with respect to all the choice variables (M, K and D) are equal to 
zero. 
EWý = O'W + WýO =0 (3-6) 
where 
(M, K, D)T 
with the constraint 
MA 
From equation (3.6), we have 
,-W= -WX' -0=: >- 0' /WX' = -O/W (3.7) Ox x 
The economy is statically fully efficient if condition (3.7) is sat- 
isfied for all M, K and D. In other words, the ratio of the marginal 
impact of each control variable on the probability of being flood 
damage free to that on the maximum welfare should equal the ratio 
of the probability of being flood damage free to the welfare net of 
floods. 
Rearranging equation (3.7), we have 
Of (X/O) X 
WXI(X/W) 
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or 
Eox = -Ewx (3.8) 
where c represents the partial elasticity of 0 (or W) with respect to 
X. 4 
Equation (3.8) asserts that the sensitivity of changes in the prob- 
ability of being flood damage free in response to each variable should 
balance that in the maximum social welfare net of floods with re- 
spect to the same variable. Two propositions are derived from the 
model: 
PROPOSITION 3.1: If cgx + cwx > 0, the amount of X 
should increase until Eox + cwx = 0. If cox + cwx < 0, the amount 
of X should decrease until Eox + Ewx = 0. 
Proof: When 
/ 
we have 
W-O' +O. Wx'=EWx>O x 
The decision-maker in this case has incentives to increase the level 
of X until the marginal impact of X on EW becomes zero. On the 
other hand, when 
/xx OX 
.o<w 
we have 
EWx' <0 
4According to the assumptions, there is not interaction among the decision on M and that 
on K or D. W' -0W, -0W, = 01 19', K = 01 
O'M, D = 01 O'K, D = 0. Therefore, M, K -IM, D -)K, D M 
equation 3.8 is the equilibrium solved simultaneously for the three variables 
(M, K, D). 
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where X should decrease to bring up the value of EWx. Further- 
more, when 
/xx OX 
we have 
EWx' =0 
at which the equilibrium occurs. These three conditions can be 
reconsolidated into the following statement: 
(cox + cwx) - EWx' > 0, when cox -, Ewx (3-9) 
EWx' = 01 when cox -cwx 
The policy implications of this are straight forward. Since the 
unit of measurement is not concerned in the elasticity, and hence 
equation (3.9), is convenient to apply in empirical studies. Each 
strategy will increase (decrease) when its expected marginal benefit 
is larger (smaller) than its expected marginal cost and cease when 
these two marginal values are equal. 
For instance, a catchment with lower probability of flooding has 
a lower 60K and hence the catchment employs a smaller quantity of 
hard mitigation (K) to keep a lower value of I EWK I. Similar logic can 
be applied to adaptation (D) and soft mitigation (decreasing M). 
A catchment with higher probability of flooding has higher 6OKand 
60D. Hence, the catchment can reach its optimal status by investing 
in hard mitigation and adaptation to bring up IEWK and6WD - 
PROPOSITION 3.2: When 0 is high, a rational decision- 
maker should increase W and vice versa. 
Proof- 
105 
Ch3. Static model 
Equation (3.7) shows that when W increases, the absolute value 
of 0' /Wx' should be decreased. With Ox"x <0 and Wýx < 0, K x 
and D should be increased while M should be decreased. 0 is then 
enhanced. 
On the other hand, when 0 increases, the absolute value of 0' /Wx' x 
should be increased. With the assumptions 0" <0 and Wx"x < 0, xx 
K and D should be decreased while M should be increased. W is 
then increased. 
Resources are applied to boost the weaker part in the product of 
the expected welfare. It makes the marginal gain higher because of 
the larger base. 
O1W is often high at the beginning of the economic development 
due to little increment of flood risks induced by development and 
also the low value of welfare net of floods. Equation (3.7) showed 
that hard mitigation and adaptation should be low and development 
should be high to obtain a high level of 10' IWKI, 10'IWDI and KD 
10' IWý, J. In other words, when a fast developing economy faces a M 
low environmental risk, the priority is to increase welfare. 
Gradually, O1W decreases accompanied with an increase in eco- 
nomic development. Hard mitigation and adaptation should be high 
and development should be low to obtain small values of 10' IWK' 
1, 
K 
10' IWDI and 10' 1 Wýj 1. When an economy develops at the cost of DM 
environmental risks, averting behaviour should be undertaken. 
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3.3.2 Income and substitution effects 
Following the assumptions above, we have 
EW = O(M, K, D) - W(M) K, D) 
WýJ>O, WýM<0,01 <0,0/fm<o M- m 
IY/>o Wý <- 0) WýK < 0) OK 
-I 
OKK 
1 ;, 11 1 11 Wý :5 03 4DD < 01 OD ýý 01 ODD < 0- 
INCOME EFFECT 
The income effect is the impact of a change of the endowments 
on the income in each decision. When endowment increases, i. e., 
W increases, M will decrease and K and D will increase follow- 
ing equation (3.7). On the other hand, if an economy suffers huge 
flood losses and hence incurs a huge decrease in the endowments, 
M should be increased and K and D should be decreased. 
SUBSTITUTION EFFECT 
The substitution effect is the impact of an exogenous increase in the 
price of each averting behaviour or development on its equilibrium, 
According to equation (3.7), an increase in the marginal benefit of 
developed land (W,,, ) results in an increase in hard mitigation and 
adaptation. It represents the increased financial support for these 
two types of averting behaviour. It also shows the increased oppor- 
tunity cost of undertaking soft mitigation. Hence, the economy will 
be better off by adopting hard mitigation and adaption instead. An 
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increase in the marginal cost of hard mitigation ( /) results in an -Wk 
increase adoption in its substitutes, adaptation and soft mitigation. 
3.4 Discussion and conclusion 
I conclude this chapter by recapitulating the results and discussing 
the prototype model. First, expected welfare is a way to estimate 
welfare when a decision-maker faces uncertainty and multiple pur- 
poses in flood risk management. It links the causes and impacts of 
flooding. Welfare is scaled down by the related environmental risk. 
The product of the probability of being flood damage free and the 
welfare net of floods involves both substitution and complementarity 
between environmental and economic realms in welfare analysis. 
Secondly, an economy reaches its optimal level when the impact 
of the probability of being flood damage free with respect to each 
decision equals that of the welfare net of floods (Proposition 3.1). 
Development will keep increasing (decreasing) while it has positive 
(negative) marginal impact on the expected welfare; the level of a 
choice variable will be maintained while its marginal impact on ex- 
pected welfare is zero. The same logic applies to averting behaviour. 
Thirdly, the property of maximising the product of probability of 
being flood damage free and the welfare net of floods suggests that 
an economy should increase the former as the latter is high or the 
other way around within resources constraints (Proposition 3.2). 
Fourthly, when the opportunity cost of hard mitigation is high, 
the option of soft mitigation or adaptation will be preferable. When 
the costs of both hard mitigation and adaptation are high accom- 
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panied with high level of development, soft mitigation is favoured. 
The parameters for the probability of being flood damage free 
and the measure of welfare net of floods should be estimated based 
on individual cases. In other words, the tradeoffs between economic 
development and environmental risks should reflect the interests and 
concerns of residents and related groups. 
The application of this prototype can be possibly extended to 
other environmental issues. The losses and probability of contract- 
ing a serious illness following exposure to a chemical can be de- 
creased by undertaking averting behaviour. Incorporating the causes 
and impacts of climate change on flood risk management can extend 
the current model to a long-term perspective. 
The following constraints of this model should be noticed. First, 
the landscape is assumed homogeneous in this model while it is 
usually heterogeneous in reality. This concern will be considered in 
the later chapters. 
Second, the impact of climate change can be evaluated using 
the current model by adjusting the stochastic process of rainfall 
amount in the probability of flooding. This requires information 
about the interaction between the variation of rainfall and industries 
on a global scale. This concern will be left for further study. 
Third, the elasticity value might change due to learning or envi- 
ronmental constraints. In other words, the optimal decision at each 
period of time does not necessarily equal the optimal decision in the 
long run. Though the envelope theory can be helpful for incorpora- 
tion of the optimal decisions in the long run based on this model, the 
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optimal paths of different variables should be derived in a dynamic 
framework. 
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Balancing Development and Protection in Flood 
Risk Management: Dynamic Models 
4.1 Introduction 
Sustainable development requires a long term perspective. A dy- 
namic model, providing decision paths over time, serves the need. 
This chapter develops two dynamic models based on the prototype 
introduced in Chapter 2 using optimal control theory. 
The setting of the two dynamic models differs in accommodat- 
ing different foci of optimisation. The first model has one control 
variable and one state variable associated with development (I xI 
dimension). The second model includes one more state variable, the 
stock of mitigation (I x2 dimension). 
A theoretical model with one control variable and one state vari- 
able is typical in optimal control theory. In reality, however, we of- 
ten face multiple control variables and multiple state variables which 
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complicates the mathematics. Dorfman (1969) suggested consider- 
ing the control variables, state variables, and their derivatives as 
vectors to make the problem appear identical to the one-state-one- 
control case. There are two types of variables which can be compiled 
into one vector. 
Identical behaviour. For instance, hard mitigation and adap- 
tation can be merged into one vector in the dynamic system 
because they behave consistently in affecting the maximum wel- 
fare net of floods (W) and the probability of being flood damage 
free (0), apart from the impacts of their relative price change. 
Applying difference and ratio to screen out one of the variables. 
For instance, we can use the difference or the ratio as a control 
variable when two variables, measured by the same unit, have a 
fixed sum. Setting the land area covered by forest as a control 
variable like Ehui et al. (1990) brings no need to set another 
variable to indicate deforestation when no other economic ac- 
tivities involved. 
Introducing the environmental perspective makes the model pos 
sess the following additional features: 
9 The accumulation of land stock, comparing with the accumu- 
lation of capital in capital theory, has positive effects on future 
production and negative impacts on flood risks. 
The tradeoff is not a question about consumption in the present 
or increasing production in the future. It aims at balancing 
the welfare effects of production and environmental damage. 
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Undertaking averting behaviour can also avoid damage to a 
certain extent. 
In this chapter, investment in development, or averting behaviour, 
is set as a control variable while the stock of development assets is 
a state variable. Maximising expected welfare remains as the objec- 
tive. Section 4.2 shows that the optimal growth rate of development 
should be decreasing before reaching the optimal level of develop- 
ment. Section 4.3 shows development and averting behaviour are 
complements up to the optimal level of development. After that, 
soft mitigation should dominate. Section 4.4 concludes this chap- 
ter. 
4.2 Model (1) 
The task of the first model is to find the optimal path of economic 
development in the face of environmental hazards. Averting be- 
haviour is viewed as sacrificing economic benefit from development. 
This involves a strong assumption that the marginal cost of averting 
behaviour undertaken equals the marginal benefit of development. 
To maximise expected welfare, a decision-maker balances the sum 
of current and future welfare net of floods against the value of the 
future probability of being flood damage free. 
The control variable, designated by mt, is current investment in 
development. This is a closed loop control problem in which the 
optimal trajectory is not only a function of time but incorporates 
new information that arises from current state of the system. 
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The state variable Mt is total extent of developed land at time t. 
MO is the initial state. A large MO indicates a highly developed level 
while a small MO denotes a less-developed region. The 'depreciation' 
of developed land, at the rate of 6, includes wearing of hard surfaces 
over time and growth of vegetation that improve the infiltration rate. 
The costate variable p, t denotes the marginal shadow value of the 
developed land at time t. 
4.2.1 Model structure 
The aim of this problem is to plan the development rate to maximise 
expected welfare at the initial date (t = 1). 
T 
max PV O(Mt) - W(Mt, mt) - e-"dt Mt 
ft 
St. M=Mt-6,. Mt 
(4.1) 
o<mt<A, mt<A-mt, mt=o=mo 
The objective is to maximise discounted expected welfare over the 
time horizon, T. u is the social rate of time preference. The choice 
is constrained by the motion of the developed land and boundary 
conditions. 
The current value Hamiltonian for the problem describes ex- 
pected welfare at time t from the perspective of time t. 
H= O(M, ) - W(Mt, Tnt) + p,, t - (Tnt - 6m - Mt) (4.2) 
oo, 
current expected welfare future expected welfare 
The first term on the right hand side of the current value Hamilto- 
nian represents the cunrent expected welfare induced by the current 
decision. The second term denotes the future expected welfare, the 
114 
4.2 Model (1) 
monetary value of the changes of the total developed land at time 
t measured by its shadow value. Note that the dual role of Mt on 
affecting Wt and on Ot makes the sign of this term ambiguous. It is 
no more guaranteed to be positive as that in the capital theory. 
The first order conditions (F. O. C. s) are derived by maximising 
the current value Hamiltonian (equation (4.2)) with respect to rnt. 
OH 
amt 
0* wýt + lLmt ý`: ý 0 (4.3a) 
OH 
=. -0 1. Wt + Ot - wLt - pt - d', ' 
(4.3b) 
Omt 07 * Mmt - Mm - Mt 
OH 
= Mt = mt - dm - Mt (4.3c) 
Condition (4.3a) indicates that along the optimal path of the invest- 
ment in development at any period of time the marginal expected 
welfare of investment must just counterbalance its effect on decreas- 
ing the probability of being flood damage free an instant later. 
Condition (4.3b) shows along the optimal path of developed land, 
the contribution of one unit of developed land to the expected wel- 
fare should just cover its impact on current expected welfare and 
the discounted and depreciated impact of investment on expected 
welfare (-p*M = EW, ý + (u + J,,, ) - EWm). 
Condition (4.3c) states that change in the extent of developed 
land is the difference between investment and depreciation or be- 
tween conversion and reversion of land. 
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4.2.2 Equilibrium analysis 
To solve the system of equations, we start by taking the time deriva- 
tive of equation (4.3a), substituting it into equation (4.3b) to obtain 
-P' = 
0' 
' 
M'W, 
n 
+ 0' 
mm 
(W, 1nm + W,,, 
M 
1 
=O, w+O. W m m 
ýI + (Or + 67n) -0- 
W' 
The rate of investment in developed land then can be expressed 
as: 
m= 
01 W+0- wýI + (or + 6m) -0- w, - (0, - wm, +0-W, ', 'M) ü m 
0- wm// m II If (EW j- - (EW, ý + (o- + 6, ) - EWý - EWým m 
0 when EWýj + (o- + J, ) - EW,,, EW,,, m - Tn 
(4.4) 
The sign of EW,,, is positive. EW, ý, the cross partial derivative, 
measuring the rate of change in EWý, with respect to m, is assumed 
to be negative because of the compensatory property between M and 
m and the law of diminishing marginal product. The split point 
of the signs of EWý, can only be obtained when the information 
about the functional forms of 0 and W are given. The growth rate 
of development (Th) therefore decrease until the stock level comes 
lower than the maximum point. This growth rate is positive unless 
the negative marginal impacts of development are stronger than the 
aggregate impacts of investment on marginal expected welfare with 
respect to its stock and on the expected welfare discounted and 
depreciated. 
At the steady state, (fn, 1ý1), Aý = rh = 0. In this case, 
6, 
rn -M (4.5) 
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From equation (4.4), we can obtain the condition 
EWý = EW', * - fn - (a + EWfi, m 
(7h, 1ý1) can be derived from equations (4.5) and (4.6) 
(4-6) 
Equation 
(4.5) asserts that investment should equal the amount of deprecia- 
tion at the steady state. The smaller the depreciation is, the less 
the investment should be. Equation (4.6) indicates the steady state 
value of investment in development. It shows that the marginal loss 
of expected welfare caused by the effect of development on flood risk 
should equal the marginal gain in terms of expected welfare. 
4.2.3 Example 
Suppose the probability of being flood damage free is positively re- 
lated to the proportion of the land with protection (either without 
development or with averting behaviour). Welfare net of floods is 
a function of profits from developed land and developing land. The 
expected welfare function is denoted by a Cobb-Douglas function 
in which the relative share of total expected welfare accruing to 
the probability of being flood damage free is a/(a + b) while that 
accruing to the welfare net of floods is bl (a+ b). Once land is trans- 
formed into developed land, it loses infiltration capacity and hence 
increases flood risks. For development, keeping up investment in 
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averting behaviour is a way to avoid flood losses. Symbolically, 
ot = (I - (mt/A) 
)a 
Wt = (P (t) (Mt +Tnt))' 
EWt = (i - (MtIA) 
)a (p (t) (Mt + Tnt)) 
b 
0<a, b<1, Mt=o = Mo 
where P(t) is the marginal profit of each unit of developed land. 
Hence we have 
EW= I- 
M)a 
p(t)b(M + rn)b A 
EW, ',, =1- 
M)a 
bP(t)b(M +, rn)b-1 ýý, 0 A 
M)a 
p(t)b(M + M)b -a 
b 
EWýj =I-+ A A-M M+m 
(t)b 
M)a 
b-I -a b -1 0 EWLM = bP 1- (M + M) ý+ 
(A (A-M 
M+m 
Substituting these expressions into equation (4.6) and applying (4.5) 
yields 
where 
f, =(B 
)A 
(4.7a) 
D+B 
6m 
(BA 
(4.7b) 
D+B 
b ((I + o, + J, )(1 + 6, ) + (I - b)6,, ) >b 
a(l + 6,,, ) (1 + J,,, (I - b)) >a 
The boundary constraints in equation (4.1) should also be satisfied. 
First, because B, D>0, ' the optimal stock of developed land is an 
interior solution, below the total amount of land. In other words, 
ISince B>b, D>a, and a, b > 0, we have B, D > 0. 
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the economy will not develop all the land while incorporating both 
environmental and economic concerns into optimisation. ' According 
to equation (4.6), EWýj <0 when the equilibrium occurs. It implies 
-a/(A-M)+b/(M+m) <0 because the investment in development 
can increase current welfare and bring only damage afterwards. 
Convergence to equilibrium can be shown in a phase diagram 
(Appendix A) obtained from equations (4.3c) and (4.4). Figure 4.1 
shows the two saddle paths leading the system towards equilibrium, 
the singular point E(1ý1, fa). The arrows indicate the directions of 
the movement of decisions over time. For instance, when a=b= 
0.51 A= 100) o, = 0.02, and 6,,, = 0.001, the steady state (fn, AýI) is 
(0.05,50.52). 
The initial value also affects decisions. When MO > Aý, we have 
EWýjo < EWý. From equation (4.6), we can deduct either small 
or even negative value of mt. When MO > Aý, the initial value 
of developed land exceeds its optimal level, the community should 
decrease the investment in development. In some cases, converting 
developed land back to its natural status might be necessary. In any 
case, the level of investment in development should be lower than 
that in the case of MO <k 
4.2.4 Policy implications 
The following discussion considered the effect of changes in policy 
parameters, primarily using the example in Subsection 4.2.3. The 
relevant parameters are the rate of time preference and measures of 
2UnIess averting behaviour has no effects (a = 0), which is not the case here. 
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m 
7h 
0 
Figure 4.1: Phase diagram solution. E: the equilibrium; M: total 
developed land; m: investment in land development. 
economic and environmental values. 
(1) Discount rate: a 
OM 
=A 
(b(I + 6, ) Bb(I + 6m)) 
D+B (D + B)2 
Ab(I + 6m)D 
>0 (D + B)2 
am 6,,, Ab(I + 6,, )D 0 
Ou (D + B)2 
A decrease (an increase) in the discount rate implies an increase 
(a decrease) in the value of future income or damage. When the 
discount rate decreases, rate at which floodplains are developed will 
decrease. In other words, the higher the value of future income, the 
lower the optimal developed land should be. The adjustment path 
is illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
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m 
m 
7Th, 
0 
Figure 4.2: Effects of a fall in the discount rate in the phase dia- 
gram. Equilibrium moves from E(Aý, fn) down to E'(k, fn'). M: 
total developed land; m: investment in land development. 
(2) Expected welfare and the probability of being flood damage 
free: a/ (a+ b) 
The value of being flood damage free increases with the concern 
for environmental health. The influence of the probability of being 
flood damage free on the expected welfare can be derived by the 
differentiation of equations (4.7a) and (4.7b) with respect to a. 
aM + J, ) (I + J,,, (I - b)) 0 
aa (D + B)2 
am + 6, )(1 + b)) 
<0 
Oa (D + B)2 
The higher the value of the probability of being flood damage free, 
the lower the area of developed land should be. 
(3) Expected welfare and welfare net of floods: b/ (a + b) 
The impact of welfare net of floods on expected welfare can be 
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derived by the differentiation of equations 4.7a and 4.7b with respect 
to b. 
Om 
Ob 
Om 
Ob 
A ((D + B)(B - Jb) - B(-a(l + 6, )J, +B- Jb)) 
(D + B)2 
A (D (B - bJ,,, ) + aB6, (1+ 6, )) 
(D + B)2 ý, 
v 
6, A (D(B - b6, ) + aB6, (I+ 6, )) 
(D+B)2 >0 
The higher the welfare of development net of floods, the greater 
the area of developed land should be. An increase in parameter 
value b might result from the efficiency improvement of production, 
an increase in compensatory inputs, or emphasising the philosophy 
about consumption. 
In summary, this model shows that investment in development 
should be restrained and averting behaviour should be undertaken 
if there are concerns for future generations or for long-term environ- 
mental health. However, there are two restrictions in this model. 
First, examining economic development alone cannot help an econ- 
omy to decide when to increase its development to financially sup- 
port averting behaviour and when to sacrifice its development di- 
rectly. Secondly, the accumulation of mitigation and adaptation in 
fact does not influence welfare in the same way that developed land 
does. The next model will distinguish these two types of capital 
stocks and derive the policy implications for both development and 
averting behaviour undertaken. 
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4.3 Model (2) 
In the second model, it is assumed that a ratio oz of every unit of 
land is compulsorily committed to hard mitigation. mt, investment 
in developed land, remains as the control variable at time t. Apart 
from Mt and p, t, a new pair of state and costate variables, Kt and 
Akt, is introduced. The land on which mitigation (and adaptation) 
are undertaken at time t is Kt. Kt, and their depreciates (or returns 
to a natural state) at a positive rate 6k, 
a of every unit of developed land is protected by mitigation. De- 
preciation of hard mitigation infrastructure is assumed to be higher 
than that of developed land, 6k > 6m - Akt is the shadow value of 
averting behaviour at time t. 
4.3.1 Model structure 
Suppose the objective function and the constraints are 
max PV 
JT 
0 (Mt, Kt) -W (Mt, mt) -e -t dt 
t Mt t=l 
St. Aý Mt - JM - Mt, Mt=0 == Mo (4.8) 
=Ce ' Tnt - 
6k 
*Kti Kt=O = KO 
o<m, <A, m, <A-m, 
We can then obtain the current value Hamiltonian 
H=0 (Mt, Kt) -W (Mt, mt) 
current expected welfare (4.9) 
+Mmt - (Tnt - 
6m 
' 
Mt) + /Ikt * 
(Ce 
* Mt - 
6k 
*Kt) 
future expected welfare 
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The F. O. C. s are: 
OH 
Omt 
0* wýt + Mmt + aPkt =0 (4.10a) 
OH 
= (u + 6. ) - M. t - fim = 0'Mt - Wt + Ot - Mit (4.10b) amt 
OH 
01 t. wt (4.10c) aKt --- ::: 
(0' + 6k) * iLkt - ýk :::: -- K 
OH 
= Mt = mt - Mt (4.10d) 
OH 
-- Kt =a' Mt - 
Ök 
- Kt (4. Iüe) Ollkt 
Condition (4.10a) indicates the marginal expected welfare of the 
developed land should equal its value of decreasing the probability of 
being flood damage free less the effect of required amount of averting 
behaviour. aAk, with a positive value, is new here compared with 
the corresponding condition in model (1). Hence the optimal m 
should be higher for bringing down the value 0-W,,, t. 
Condition (4.10b), same as the corresponding condition in model 
(1), indicates that along the optimal path of the investment in 
development at any period of time the marginal expected welfare 
of investment must just counterbalance its effect of decreasing the 
probability of being flood damage free an instant later. Similar in- 
terpretation can be applied to condition (4.10c). 
Condition (4.10d), same as the corresponding condition in model 
(1), states the change in the extent of developed land equals the in- 
vestment in developed land less depreciation on reversion. A similar 
interpretation is applied to condition (4.10e). 
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4.3.2 Equilibrium analysis 
To solve the system, we can take the time derivative of equation 
(4.1 Oa): 
Mm + -0 
(W, 
1,17il + W, 1,1, IÜ) - 
(01 k+ 01 Ü) 
- Km 
Compare this with the sum of equation (4.10b) and equation (4.10c) 
multiplied by a. Combining equation (4.1 Oa) and /, t. ý- OWn/n - aAk 
produces 
P'm +0' ýk : --' 
(W, 1,17h + W, 1,1,1, Ü) - 
(01 k+ 01 Ü) 'W, 
1, 
=(o-+6, )P, -O' -W-O-W, ý m 
a(O- + 6k))Uk - aofKW 
=::: - (a Jm) OWml +a 
(Jk 
- 
Jm) Ak - 
OIM *W 
-O-Wý-ao' W K 
= 
(C7 +- O'M -W-0- 
Wýj 
+ äk) (0 * 
W-mI + ilmt) - aOK 
1 
Hence we obtain 
+ dm)OWI ++ a01 W-T- 0' K- 0' W,  m 11 kt 
Ce(Ök - 
äm) 
T+ (0' K+ 0' M)W,  - (1) - 
(0'+ dk)0Wm/ - a0/ W mK 
Arnt ::: 6k 
- 
6m 
where T=0-+W, 1,, 1, Aý) , 4D = 0/ W+ 
OWý, m 
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Applying equations (4.10b) and (4.10c) yields 
/W+ (0' + 6k) / (Ce (Ök - 
dm» -OK 
«or + 6)Ow, ', + (V + ceo' w- -r - (0, K+ OM K, 
ü) wm, 
) 
Mm -:: -- _OIMW - 
OWýl + (0'+ Örrý)/(dk - 
dm) 
1 
(r 
+ (OKIIý + OIMÜ)Wý - 
4) 
- 
(0'+ 6k)Ownb 
- a0K1W) 
1 
where T=0- 
(Wrln'mTh 
+ Wml'mÜ) ,D= 
01 W+ OWýl m 
At the steady state, P'm == ýk = Aý =k=0. Hence we have the 
conditions at equilibrium: 
(or + J, )EW,,, t = -EWýjt - (a(o- + J, )EWýt) /(or+ Jk) (4.11a) 
mt - J,, - mt =o (4.11b) 
0 *Mt - 6k - K, =: 
The value of EW,, t and EWKt are positive and EWý, t should there- 
fore be negative. Two propositions follow. 
PROPOSITION 4.1: If u decreases, a decision-maker should 
increase the value of EW,,, by decreasing investment in land devel- 
opment. 
This follows directly from the condition that 
OEW, ',, tl0o- 
PROPOSITION 4.2: If a increases, a decision-maker should 
decrease the value of EW,,, t by increasing investment in land devel- 
opment. 
This follows directly from the condition that 
(9EWm't/Oa <0 
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4.3.3 The stability of equilibria 
The study of stability includes identification of 'plausible' conditions 
that ensure stability but usually focuses on sufficient conditions. 
There are three types of equilibria: stable, unstable and neutral 
(Gandolfo, 1997). A system is stable if all subsequent motions re- 
main in a correspondingly small neighbourhood of the equilibrium 
with slight perturbation from its equilibrium state. An unstable 
equilibrium may be an important feature in some cases, such as a 
saddle point. A neutral equilibrium occurs when a disturbance leads 
to a new situation which does not change unless there is a further 
disturbance. 
In a case with one state variable, stability can be shown using a 
phase diagram as in model (1). In a case with more than one state 
variable, stability is often examined by calculating the characteristic 
roots (eigenvalues) of the linearised dynamical system evaluated at 
the steady state. 
The nonlinear systems of equations we have are 
M =F(Mt, mt, Kt) 
rh =G (Mt, Tnt, Kt) (4.12) 
k=J (Mt, mt, Kt) 
where F, G, and J are continuous and differentiable. To investigate 
the properties of stability in the neighbourhood of the steady state, 
we can approximate this system in a Taylor expansion about the 
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steady state (Jllý, ? "n, k) - 
aF 
am 
(mt aF (mt - fn) + - fl) +a 
aF (Kt 
_ 
t mt aKt aG M=- (mt aG - 1ý) + (mt - 7in ')+ 
aG (Kt 
- k) 
(4.13) 
amt amt aKt 
ai 
am 
(mt ai (mt - fn) + - 1ý0 + 
Oj (Kt 
- k 
t amt aKt According to the proof in Birkhoff and Rota (196 9), when the 
linear system as shown in equation (4.13) is structurally stable, the 
nonlinear system in equation (4.12) will have the same behaviour in 
the neighbourhood of (M, fin, K). 
Following the example in subsection 4.2.3, we can obtain 
M =Tnt - 6,, -, Mt = 
G= rh = (or + d', ') (P(t) - ac(t» 
+ bP(t) _a 
(P(t)(M + m) - C(t)cem) 
Ä-M+K 
+a 
(or + 6, ) 
-a_ 
(P (t) (M + m) -c (t) am) 
0-+& 
(Ä-M+K 
=0 
amt- 6kKt =0 
Let 
all =OFIOMt, al2= (9F/(9rnt, al3 = OFIOKt, 
a21=0GIOMt, a22 = OGI&nt, a23 = (9GI(9Kt, 
a3l =aJI(9Mt, a32= i9J/amt, a33= (9JIaKt 
The eigenvalues (A's) of the Jacobian matrix 
all a12 a13 
a2, a22 a23 
a3, a32 a33 
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are given by the characteristic equation 
all -A a12 a13 
det[X - AI] a2l a22 -A a23 
a3l a32 a33- A 
-Jm -A0A 
I ce -A BC 
0 -6k -AC -A 
A3+ (6, - (I - a)AC) 
A2 
-C (ceAC - (I - ce)6, AC + 6kBC) A 
+ C6,, (ceA - 6kB) 
= 
where 
A-M+K 
C= a(o, + 
d') 
-1<0 0- +4 
(A -M+ K)' 
a (P(t) - C(t)a) __, n 
a (P(t)(M + m) - C(t)am) >0 
By trial and error, we can factor the cubic function as 
(A +jm) (A2 _ (I - a)ACA +C (aA- JkB)) 
whose characteristic roots are 
A-213= 2-1 ((1 - a)AC ± 
((I 
- ce) 
2 A'C' - 4C(aA- JkB)) 
1/2 ) 
When aA- JkB < 0, we have two negative eigenvalues (stable roots) 
and one positive eigenvalues (unstable root); when aA- U> 
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0, we have one negative eigenvalue (stable root) and two positive 
eigenvalues (unstable roots). 
4.3.4 Policy implications 
Consider the implications of changing the discount rate and the 
compulsory hard mitigation rate. 
THE ROLE OF DISCOUNT RATE 
Proposition 4.1 suggests that a decrease in the discount rate o, in- 
creases the value of EW,,,. In this case, investment in developed 
land should fall. 
THE ROLE OF COMPULSORY HARD MITIGATION ON DEVEL- 
OPED LAND (a) 
Proposition 4.2 suggests when the compulsory ratio of hard mitiga- 
tion increases, the value of EW,,, should decrease. Developed land 
therefore increases. That is, the optimal extent of developed land 
increases with the compulsory ratio of hard mitigation. One impli- 
cation of this is that soft mitigation is encouraged /discouraged by 
decreasing/ increasing the compulsory ratio of hard mitigation. 
ENSURING THE STABILITY OF THE SYSTEM 
We can always make the system stable provided that we are free to 
choose as many initial conditions as there are unstable roots (Gan- 
dolfo, 1997). When aA - 413 < 0, the system can reach stability 
by choosing the initial level of the investment in developed land. In 
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the case of ozA- &B > 0, the stability can only be obtained by 
affecting the initial developed land. Hence it may not be easy to 
obtain. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The dynamic models indicate the conditions under which the devel- 
opment of floodplains, and the adoption of hard or soft mitigation 
is optimal. 
As in other problems in environmental economics, a decrease in 
the discount rate implies a fall in current development. An increase 
in the concern for environmental health encourages investment in 
soft mitigation, including deterring development. The second model 
also suggests that an increase in the compulsory rate of hard mit- 
igation leads to higher levels of development. In other words, un- 
dertaking soft mitigation might be ignored when investment in hard 
mitigation is the focus. 
However, within a catchment, different regions may attach dif- 
ferent values to the probability of being flood damage free. Exter- 
nalities may also occur. For instance, the increase in drainage in 
uplands was suspect to be associated with the increase in flood oc- 
currence in York in the 1980s. Hence, research on the interactions 
between regions is required to clarify the externalities caused by 
regional economic activities and averting behaviour. 
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Externalities of Flood Risk Management 
5.1 Introduction 
The decision models in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are based on cen- 
tral planning from both static and dynamic perspectives. In reality, 
decisions are often the results of interactions among related individu- 
als, institutional agents in this case, within a catchment. Moreover, 
individual decisions often involve strong externalities. This raises 
the issues of how to take account of both the strategic interactions 
among these individuals, and the potential benefits of cooperation. 
The occurrence of externalities, ' adverse externalities in partic- 
ular, is common in flood risk management. For example, upstream 
drainage and over-grazing in the Yorkshire Dales increase the prob- 
ability of flooding in the Rivers Swale and Ouse. The extent of 
1The externality is defined as the action of one decision maker that affects the welfare of 
another, and that is not captured by market transactions. By definition, adaptation is beyond 
the scope of discussion. 
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flood externalities has long been recognised. For example, the Code 
of Hammurabi (eighteen century B. C. ) states the punishment for 
generating externalities of flood risk. ' 
Flood risk externalities comprise a change in the likelihood of 
floods resulting from the regime of others. A reciprocal external- 
ity implies a common pool resource (e. g., regions located on both 
sides of a river). A unidirectional externality implies a one way or 
upstream-downstream effect. 
Policy instruments of internalising externalities for catchment 
management include restrictions, water fees, and increasing public 
participation, etc.. A few theoretical models have been recently ex- 
plored (Marino and Kemper, 1999; Saleth and Dinar, 1999; Ostrom, 
1999). Economic research on risk management primarily involves 
the financial market and the insurance market. The methodology 
is often based on expected utility theory, the approximation of the 
probability function, and the instruments of hedging. 
To model the interplay among decision-makers, game theory is 
applied. There are two reasons of this. First, a game is able to 
explain which allocations can be sustained and which cannot in the 
strategic interaction among decision-makers. Secondly, a game the- 
21t included the duty of maintaining the mitigation facilities and also the responsibility for 
causing floods. Section 53: If anyone is too lazy to keep his dam in a proper condition, and 
does not so keep it; if then the dam breaks and all the fields are flooded, then shall he in whose 
dam the break occurred be sold for money, and the money shall replace the corn ruined by him. 
Section 55: If anyone opens his ditches to water his crop carelessly, and the water floods his 
neighbour's field, then he shall pay his neighbour corn for his loss. Section 56: If a man let in 
the water, and the water overflow the plantation of his neighbour, he shall pay ten gur of corn 
for every ten gan of land (revised from http: //www. wsu. edu/-dee/MESO/CODE. HTM). 
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oretical model describes the operation of a decentralised system. 
Game theory addresses the interaction among institutional agents, 
such as local authorities, environmental authorities, and NGOs, 
etc. in both conflicting and cooperative relationships and provides 
a framework for understanding private decisions. Conflicts among 
players in this case mainly result from the downstream flood risks as- 
sociated with upstream hard mitigation and economic development. 
Benefits can come from soft mitigation due to efficiency improve- 
ment of water storage and from avoiding efficiency losses in hard 
mitigation. 
Environmental games which combine externality analysis and 
game theory have been widely used, especially in modelling trans- 
boundary agreements such as those for managing acid rain impacts 
(Maler, 1989) and greenhouse gases reduction. In flood manage- 
ment, research by Alber et al. (1972) applied a game with single- 
dimensional strategy space to show different payoffs for either con- 
solidation or split-up when farmers face flood hazards. 
However, the strategy space is often more than one dimension. 
There are usually several sub-strategies (e. g., soft mitigation, hard 
mitigation, and development) corresponding to several specific sub- 
objectives for one major objective (e. g., containing flood risk and 
maximising the welfare net of floods are merged into one major ob- 
jective, maximising expected welfare). Thus, tradeoffs between sub- 
objectives and between sub-strategies should be taken into account. 
The principle of sub-objective dominance (deleting the choice which 
might violate the purpose of undertaking it) and supermodularity 
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are applied to interpret the decisions involving strategic complemen- 
tarity of (sub)strategies in a multi- dimensional strategy space within 
a catchment. 3 
Apart from externalities, threshold effects related to development 
or mitigation are also crucial for indicating the critical point of 
abrupt change of efficiency in aggregating decisions within a catch- 
ment. Threshold effects occur in many ecological processes and en- 
vironmental hazards. For instance, Hartwick and Olewiler (1998) 
presented a situation in which the total damage function contains 
two linear segments, with discontinuity at the threshold emission 
level. Beyond the threshold level, there is a step change in both 
marginal damage and marginal abatement cost. 
The impacts of threshold effects differ in the cases with and 
without externalities. Threshold effects are not crucial in the cases 
without externality because a rational decision-maker already per- 
ceives the losses from surpassing thresholds. However, they may be 
triggered by aggregate decisions of players in the cases related to 
externalities. Figure 5.1 illustrates the case where the probability 
of flooding in a catchment increases sharply once developed land 
exceeds 1ý1. Increasing hard mitigation k becomes a source of ef- 
ficiency loss once hard mitigation reaches a certain level. Further 
investment in hard mitigation generates no effect on decreasing the 
probability of flooding in the catchment after passing the threshold 
level. 
3 Strategic complementarity of strategies means that when others increase their effort levels, 
you wish to increase yours as well; strategic complementarity of sub-strategies means that 
when one of the substrategies increases, you wish to increase other sub-strategies accordingly. 
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Figure 5.1: Left: The threshold effect of development /soft mitiga- 
tion; right: The threshold effect of hard mitigation. 
Section 5.2 reviews the theoretical background to set up the game 
theoretical model. Section 5.3 presents externalities associated with 
flood risk management in a common pool, while Section 5.4 presents 
externalities in the upstream-downstream case. Section 5.5 discusses 
the policy implications of the results related to the game of common 
pool and upstream-downstream externalities. Section 5.6 presents 
my conclusions. 
5.2 Theoretical background 
First, the concept of equilibrium in game theory is reviewed, and 
then the types of games associated with this research will be intro- 
duced. 
137 
M kK 
Ch5. Externalities of flood risk management 
5.2.1 Equilibrium 
There are various types of equilibrium in a game: Nash equilibrium, 
undominated equilibrium, and Pareto-dominant equilibrium being 
the most frequent. The first two are normative while the third 
is often a reference point. The Nash equilibrium and the Pareto- 
dominant equilibrium can be applied to justify the necessity of co- 
operation. 
A Nash equilibrium (si* for player i, referring to equation (5.1)) 
occurs when everyone plays his/her optimal strategy simultaneously. 
It is the best state that a player can reach in the absence of coop- 
eration. Hence, it can be used as a 'threat point' when there is 
an opportunity for Pareto improvement. If cooperation cannot be 
agreed upon, a Nash equilibrium will occur. 
A strategy profile s= (s 1, ..., sj) constitutes a 
Nash equilibrium 
s* for every individual i=1, ..., 1, when the payoff 
U(Si*, sj*) ý! u(si, sj*), sj* :ý si 
where sj is the counterparts' strategy. 
A strategy is strictly dominated if another strategy always im- 
proves payoffs whatever the other players do. Ruling out the irra- 
tional strategies (those generate less payoffs) obtains the undomi- 
nated equilibrium. 
A Pareto-dominant equilibrium is often a cooperative equilib- 
rium. Cooperation will not be obtained unless agreements are well 
bound and enforceable, free-riding is trivial or fixed, and no player 
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is worse off. It can be shown as 
U(Sic, Sc) ý! U(S, -. c, 8, -. c) (5.2) ii 
where c represents cooperation and -c indicates non-cooperation. 
5.2.2 Non-cooperative game and cooperative game 
Welfare comparison between a non-cooperative game and a coopera- 
tive game is helpful to justify cooperation. Cooperation only occurs 
when Pareto improvement is obtained by a win-win solution. Hence, 
it only happens in a non-zero-sum game that can be defined by a 
positive sum of payoffs: 
ui (si) 
where ui and si are the payoff and strategy set of individual i, and 
N is the number of players. The equilibrium of a zero-sum game 
(with pure conflict) is not taken into account because of the focus on 
efficiency improvement. The occurrence of threshold effects and the 
economic and geographical differences among players and/or among 
regions provide the foundation of a non-zero-sum game. 
For efficiency improvement, players can agree on the choice with 
the most efficient combination of location, mitigation technique, 
hard mitigation, and economic activities for the whole catchment, 
and then allocate the gains to each player. Hence, the incentives to 
conclude an agreement and the mechanisms for allocating the extra 
value from cooperation characterise a cooperative game. Flood tax, 
subsidy for hard mitigation and for soft mitigation, restrictions on 
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land use and on hard mitigation, and compulsory insurance are the 
options for re-structuring the rules of the game. 
5.2.3 Supermodular game 
A supermodular game considers strategic complementarity and multi- 
dimensional strategy. Multiple equilibria, resulting from strategic 
complement arity, provide a possible coordination failure (or success) 
which is inefficient (or efficient) to the economy. 4 The supermodular 
game was introduced by Topkis (1979) and first applied in economics 
by Cooper and John (1988), and then Milgrom and Roberts (1990) 
and Vives (1990). In a supermodular game, the order of choices in 
the strategy space should be clear and the reaction curves should be 
upward sloping under the assumption of strategic complement arity. 
A supermodular game can be applied among players and/or among 
strategies. 
When the strategy sets of all players are partially ordered, the 
marginal return to increasing one's strategy will rise with an 
increase in the counterparts' strategies (strategic complemen- 
tarity). It implies an increase in player J's action encourages an 
increase in player i's action. The increasing payoff accordingly 
suggests the occurrence of strategic complement arity. 
a2U, / (asio8j) >0 
4Coordination failure in macroeconomics often implies the economy can get fixed, for ex- 
ample, in an unemployment equilibrium (Romer, 1996). The coordination failure in this thesis 
implies inefficient use of resources. 
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In multi-dimensional strategy sets, the marginal return to one 
sub-strategy rises with an increase in other sub-strategies (Mil- 
grom and Roberts, 1990). ui is supermodular in strategy si, if 
and only if, for any two components Si, b and Si, -b Of 8ii 
a2Ui/ (08i, 
b08i, -b) 
>- 
In applications, a way to obtain the ordering of sub-strategies is 
required. In the dynamic version, stocks instead of flows should be 
ordered (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). 
Supermodular games are frequently applied to externalities in 
macroeconomics, such as the search model in Diamond (1982), the 
rational expectations model in Bryant (1983), some of the Bertrand 
oligopoly with differentiated products quality, new technology adop- 
tion in Katz and Shapiro (1985), the arms race game in Milgrom and 
Roberts (1990), and the explanation of multiplier effects (Romer, 
1996). 
In summary, using the typical single-dimensional strategy space 
to solve multi-dimensional strategy by stablising other dimensions 
is a way to the answer, but the enlarged payoff matrix generates 
difficulties in deriving an analytical solution. By recognising the 
knowledge gap, the principle of dominant sub-objective, a revision 
of the principle of dominance in multi-dimensional decision space, 
and supermodularity are introduced to solve a game with multi- 
dimensional strategy. 
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5.3 Reciprocal externalities in a catchment: Com- 
mon pool 
In common pool, externalities of flood risk are reciprocal among 
homogeneous players. It hence shapes a symmetric game. 
Decision-makers increase the welfare net of floods (W) instead of 
the probability of being flood damage free (0) in a non-cooperative 
game because of the awareness of strategic interdependence on the 
probability of flooding (r). 5 Increasing the welfare net of floods is 
at the cost of decreasing probability of being flood damage free. On 
the other hand, increasing the probability of being flood damage 
free is at the cost of decreasing the welfare net of floods. 
5.3.1 Assumptions 
For simplicity, we assume there are only two identical regions, i 
and 3, in a catchment (e. g., symmetrically facing a river in common 
pool). They have equal bargaining skills and aim at maximising 
their own welfare 
EW, = 06 , W, t= ilj' 
The payoff functions are continuously differentiable. There are three 
options: hard mitigation (increasing K), development (increasing 
M), and soft mitigation (decreasing M). 
Suppose economic markets are open and competitive. Only eco- 
nomic development, soft mitigation, and hard mitigation can cause 
5Recall that EW=r. (1 -v). W+(l -r) -W = (1-r. v)-W=O-W in Chapter 3. 
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externalities, presented in the change of the probability of flooding. 
An increase in i's development or hard mitigation generates adverse 
externalities to J's probability of flooding. On the other hand, an 
increase in i's soft mitigation generates beneficial externalities to j's 
probability of flooding. In the static version, suppose the objective 
function is 
max EWi = max0i((Mi + M3), (Ki - Kj)) - Wi(Mi, Ki) (5.3) Mi, Ki 
where 
M <A 
w ýli 
- 
> oý wzi < 03 wýi < 03 wzi < oý wzi, Mi 
>- 0 11 
01 
Ki >o 3 0 11 <00, <0 Ki Kj 3 0 11 <0 o', >0 Kj Kj, Mi - 
01 
mi < 03 0 11 <0 om', < 0, mi 3 3 
0" < 0. Mi 
To ensure the existence of an interior solution, we have 
lim EWi (Ki, Kj) >0 and lim EWi (Ki, Kj) <0 K-+O K---ýk 
lim EWi (Mi, Mj) >0 and lim EWi (Mi, M, ) <0 
M, O M'Icl 
where k and llý are the upper bounds of K and M. 
5.3.2 Characteristics of the game 
Extensive research has been carried out to investigate the efficiency 
improvement of internalising externalities and welfare comparison 
among policy instruments. This model instead focuses on the pat- 
terns of strategic interdependence for exploring the possibility of 
concluding an agreement. 
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Derived from the assumptions in Subsection 5.3-1, the character- 
istics of this game are the following: 
* (CI) Negative spillovers occur from j to i when economic 
growth is adopted '9Ewi = Ojm - Wi <0 when AM > 0. amj 3 
9 (C2) Positive spillovers occur from j to i when soft mitiga- 
tion is adopted -. - '9Ewi = Ojm - Wi <0 when AM < 0. amj 3 
e (M) Negative spillovers occur from j to Z when hard miti- 
gation is adopted -. - '9Ewi=O' W< OKj iKj i-O. 
9 (C4) Strategic substitution exists in undertaking soft miti- 
gation and development 
02 EW- 
W +0/ '011 M.. W., m, < 0. v r, amiamj - im?, 3 imi 
9 (C5) Strategic complementarity exists in undertaking hard 
mitigation 
02 EWi 
= 011 
wi1 
Ki 
> i+ 
OIKj'w. 
DKiOKj iKiKj i 
9 (C6) EW is supermodular in the strategy set of economic 
development and hard mitigation 
02 EW- Z =: of, wi+Olm -W' 4 'WIM +o"WI Ki > 
0Mi0Ki i iKi 
4 Ki ,i1 iMi - 
On the one hand, (CI) implies increasing economic development 
in area i increases its own welfare net of floods at the cost of de- 
creasing the probability of its counterpart being flood damage free. 
On the other hand, (C2) shows area i sacrifices its own welfare net 
of floods by undertaking soft mitigation to increase the probability 
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of its counterpart being flood damage free. Similar to other public 
choice issues, a community may have no incentive to sacrifice self- 
interest to benefit free-riders unless there is compensation, altruism, 
or an agreement. (M) shows an increase in hard mitigation of one 
area may offset the effects of the hard mitigation in its counterpart 
area 
Strategic substitution (C4) suggests a negative slope of the re- 
action function associated with soft mitigation and development. 
Strategic complementarity (C5), on the other hand, suggests a pos- 
itive slope of the reaction function associated with hard mitigation. 
Figure 5.2 presents them in a linear relationship. 
Ki mi 
0 Kj Mi 
Figure 5.2: Left: The linear reaction curves of hard mitigation; 
right: The linear reaction curves of development/ soft mitigation. 
Supermodularity is presented in two forms respectively ((C5) and 
(C6)). Among players, supermodularity occurs between hard mit- 
igation. Among strategies for each player, supermodularity exists 
in economic development and hard mitigation. For substitutes, the 
equilibrium occurs when their marginal welfare values are equal; for 
complements, multiple equilibria often occur. 
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Different from the multiplier effect in macroeconomics, this chap- 
ter presents the strategic complementarity with negative spillovers. 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the payoff function (EW) with two equilibria. 
Negative spillovers imply the function of choosing a higher level of 
effort (eh) locates lower than that of choosing a lower level of effort 
(el) because of the efficiency losses in competition. 
EW 
0 
Figure 5.3: Payoff functions of a high/low level of efforts in the 
case of negative spillovers (after Cooper (1999)). EW: payoff. e: 
equilibrium. 
5.3.3 Equilibrium of the single dimensional strategy 
First how the single dimensional game works with respect to soft 
mitigation and hard mitigation is considered. In a game that con- 
sists of sub-objectives and sub-strategies, the equilibrium may not 
be obtained using traditional techniques without knowing numerical 
values. Hence, the prMciple of sub-objective domMance for ruling 
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out choices which violate the sub-objective of a sub-strategy is ap- 
plied to derive the equilibrium. The result shows that players tend 
to increase development and hard mitigation, and decrease soft mit- 
igation accordingly. 
THE PRINCIPLE OF SUB-OBJECTIVE DOMINANCE 
Without the information about the functional form and values of pa- 
rameters, which is occasionally the case in reality, we cannot make a 
comparison based on payoffs. In some cases, neither dominant equi- 
libria nor Nash equilibria can be obtained. However, an equilibrium 
can be derived using the principle of sub-objective dominance. It 
rules out the decisions which may violate their own sub-objectives. 
The axiomatical approach is shown as follows. 
AXIOM 1. For each game, there is a unique solution. 
AXIOM 2. Each sub-strategy aims at improving only one sub- 
objective. 
AXIOM 3. Each sub-strategy has dual impacts on the payoff 
through costs and benefits. 
AXIOM 4. When the multi-dimensional strategies are well- 
ordered, choices depend on the rank of payoffs; when the strate- 
gies are not well-ordered, one deletes any strategy that violates 
its own sub-objective. 
AXIOM 5. The solution is a symmetric function, with no dis- 
tinction between player i and player J. 
147 
Ch5. Externalities of flood risk management 
SOFT MITIGATION 
A single dimensional payoff matrix with respect to soft mitigation 
is presented in Table 5.1. Player i's payoff, in terms of the change 
of the maximum welfare net of floods (W) and the probability of 
being flood damage free (0), is given on the top while player j's is 
at the bottom of each cell. Denote the payoff combination in the 
bottom-right cell as a reference point, for instance, the optimal value 
without concerning externalities. Since the two players are identical 
and move simultaneously, the equilibrium is expected to occur along 
the diagonal. 
Table 5.1: Payoff matrix with respect to soft mitigation and develop- 
ment. 
I mi T mi --+ M3- 
(f or T 0j) (for T wj) (---+ 0j, wj) 
IA (Oi T Wi I A Wi I AT Wi I 
(for T Oj) Oj T wj 1) Oj wj T) Oj T wj --4) 
TA 
(Oi 
--4 
Wi (Oi I Wi T AI Wi T 
(for T Wi) Oj 
--ý 
Wj Oj I Wj T) Oj I Wj 
--+) 
--4 
Mi AT Wi AI Wi A ---> Wi 
oi, Wi) oj T wj 1) Oj t Wj T) Oj --4 Wj --+) 
Note: Y non-cooperative equilibrium; '0' cooperative equilibrium 
Different types of land use satisfy different sub-objectives. The 
payoff matrix in Table 5.1 contains three sub-objectives, increasing 
the probability of being flood damage free (T 0) by converting devel- 
oped land to natural land, increasing the welfare net of floods (T W) 
by converting natural land to developed land, or doing nothing. The 
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matrix hence reveals the nature of conflicts between economic devel- 
opment and environmental protection. A player can either increase 
(T), decrease (1) or maintain (-*) the level of soft mitigation in this 
single dimensional game. The result will not violate a player's sub- 
objective no matter whether the counterpart increases or maintains 
the amount of soft mitigation. However, if the counterpart increases 
development, keeping up development will be the only choice that 
will not violate one's sub-objective. The catchment will then end 
up with increasing development if no cooperation occurs. What is 
the impact of this trend of increasing development? 
Suppose there are f regions in the catchment. Each of them pos- 
sesses A amount of land. Let Mi be the private good (development) 
and Ai (soft mitigation) be the public good invested by area Z. P" 
is the rate of profit per unit of developed land. Suppose region j (all 
j. :ý z) provides A* units of soft mitigation. Given a specific function 
form that EW = (EA)' - (P, .Mi )b . 
The probability of being flood 
damage free, 0, is ((f - 1) - A* + Aj)'. The welfare net of floods, W, 
is (p . M)b Mi. Region i's problem can 
be presented by 
max EWi = max (a - log ((f - 1) - A* + Aj) +b- log (Pm - M,, )) Mi, Ai 
s. t. Ai + Mi <A 
(5.4) 
From a Lagrangian function: 
a- log ((f - 1) - A* + Aj) +b- log (P,, - Mi) +A- 
(A - Ai - Mi) 
and deriving solutions from the first order conditions: 
aLlo9Ai == 0 (5.5a) 
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OLIOMi = (5-5b) 
At the symmetric Nash equilibrium, the solution of Ai must equal 
A*. We may now solve the equations to conclude that region Z's 
choice at this equilibrium is 
M* (bfA)I(aP, + bf) 
(5.6) 
A* (aPA)I(aP, + bf) 
A whole catchment faces the problem of 
max EW = max (a - logA,, +b- log (P. - Mw)) Mw, A,, (5.7) 
s. t. A,,, + Mw < fA 
and the equilibrium at which 
M, *, (bfA)/(a + b) <A 
(5-8) 
A* (afA)/ (a + b) <A w 
Compare the equilibrium in equation (5.8) with the aggregate results 
from f regions using equation (5.6). The undersupply of public goods 
and the oversupply of private goods are notable when the number 
of regions is large. The difference between the two equilibria is the 
following: 
bf2 A bf A 
": -: bf Af (5.9a) 
aP, + bf a+b 
(aP, 
+ bf a+b 
afA 
_ 
afA 
= afA 
PM (5.9b) 
a+ba+b 
(aPm 
+ bf a+b) 
When f Pm, equation (5.9a) 0 and equation (5.9b) 
This result suggests that the aggregate decisions of individuals 
already generate the problem of over-development and insufficiency 
of soft mitigation. The increasing investment in development is 
supposed to make the problem worse. 
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HARD MITIGATION 
Table 5.2: Payoff matrix with respect to hard mitigation 
i\j T Kj -4Kj 
Ki (Oi --4 Wi AT wi 
Oj 
--4 
Wj oj wj 
---+) 
Ki (Oi Wi -4 (Oi Wi --4 
oj wj t) oj wj -) 
Note: Y non-cooperative equilibrium; 
'0' cooperative equilibrium 
Table 5.2 contains only one sub-objective, increasing the proba- 
bility of being flood damage free (T 0). Hence we can derive the Nash 
equilibrium using the conventional dominance elimination process. 
Since hard mitigation is often located in flood-prone areas, decreas- 
ing hard mitigation implies the area will be flooded as a buffer zone 
(considered as 'I M' in Table 5.1). 
Whichever strategy the counterpart chooses, a player will increase 
hard mitigation to prevent the probability of flood damage free from 
decreasing. A non-cooperative solution hence involves an increase 
in hard mitigation. Increasing hard mitigation is the only way to 
cope with a higher river level in this single dimensional game and 
hence an embankments race follows. For instance, pumping flood 
water between areas keeps some areas flooded in water after a flood 
event. 
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5.3.4 Multi-dimensional strategy in a supermodular game 
In reality, a strategy often covers multi-dimensions in flood risk man- 
agement. In the case of flood management, a decision-maker takes 
economic development, soft mitigation, and hard mitigation into ac- 
count. Hence a supermodular game that covers multi-dimensional 
strategies is applied. 
THE SETUP OF A SUPERMODULAR GAME 
There are three requirements for setting up a supermodular game. 
First, the strategy set shall be a complete lattice. Second, the pay- 
off function shall be supermodular in strategy. Third, the payoff 
function of a player exhibits increasing first differences in his/her 
strategy and the counterpart's strategy, i. e., the marginal utility of 
each player's strategy is monotonic in the counterpart's strategies 
(Cooper, 1999). The ordering of sub-strategies shall be obtained. 
Stock instead of flow is considered in the dynamic model though 
policy implications need to be decoded in terms of flow. 
First, suppose a strategy set L is partially ordered and composed 
of Si and Sj'. In this strategy set, we have all the combinations of 
(Si, Sj') from the infimum (0,0) to the supremum (g, ' 
ýi). 6 There- 
fore, L is a complete lattice. It is the same in each sub-lattice di- 
vided by the threshold levels of developed land and hard mitigation 
including all the possible choices. Once the complete sublattices are 
defined, the upper bound and the lower bound of a strategy set can 
be clearly identified. A single equilibrium is expected to be either the 
61nfirnurn is the greatest lower bound while suprernurn is the least upper bound in a set. 
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upper (SivSI, max(Si, S. i')) or the lower bound (SiASil, mzn(Si, Si')). 
Secondly, we know that EWj is supermodular in Si (given Sj) 
because Mj (developed land) and Kj (hard mitigation) are strategic 
complementarity (Subsection 5.3.2 (C6)). An increase in Mi with Ki 
implies the awareness of environmental health and financial capacity 
for a growing economy to manage flood risk by hard mitigation. A 
decrease in Mi with Ki suggests Z's replacing hard mitigation by soft 
mitigation without considering economic recession. 
Thirdly, the payoff function EWj exhibits increasing first dif- 
ferences in Si and Sj'. In other words, when the counterpart in- 
creases hard mitigation and developed land, a player shall catch up 
to avoid losses (i. e., EWj (Si, Sj) - EWj (Si', Sj) is increasing in Sj 
when Si > Sj'). When the counterpart chooses a higher level of hard 
mitigation and developed land, keeping up is the best choice for a 
player without cooperation. EWi(Si, Sj) is supermodular in Sj if for 
each Sj satisfies equation (5.10). In other words, efficiency is higher 
in strategies prone to complement arity. 
E Wi (Si, Sj) +E Wi (Si', Sj) <EW (Si A Sj', Sj) +EW (Si V Sj', Sj) 
(5-10) 
Consider a simple case in a two dimensional Euclidean space R2 
(0,0), (0,1), (1,0), (1,1) are the combinations of developed land and 
hard mitigation for two homogeneous players. (0,0) represents the 
baseline of developed land and hard mitigation; (0,1) denotes no 
change of developed land but an increase in hard mitigation; (1,0) 
indicates an increase in developed land but no change of hard miti- 
gation; (1,1) shows an increase in both developed land and hard mit- 
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igation. Either (0,0) or (1,1), the minimal or the maximal element, 
is the fixed point according to the definition of supermodularity. 
RESULTS: REACTION FUNCTIONS AND NASH EQUILIBRIA 
To prove the existence of a Nash Equilibrium in a supermodular 
game, Topkis (1979) suggested the application of Tarski's fixed point 
theory and the property of monotonicity. Tarski's fixed point the- 
ory, unlike the conventional Kakutani's fixed point theory, need not 
impose restrictions on payoffs and on strategy space to ensure the 
convexity and upper semi-continuity of the best reply correspon- 
dence. From the feature of monotonicity, the least (Si A Sj') and the 
greatest (Si V Sj') elements are monotonically related to the strategy 
profile of the other player (Sj). 
In this case, the best response to (0,0) is 1(0,0), (1,1) 1 while the 
best response to (1,1) is (1,1). For both (0,0) and (1,1), the best 
response of a player is (1,1), increasing both developed land and 
hard mitigation. The result is consistent with that in the analysis 
of single dimensional strategy. A geometric exposition of this result 
is given in Figure 5.4. It illustrates the reaction function in this 
supermodular game and the points which cross the 45' line are the 
equilibria. 
A symmetric game does help players to understand and accom- 
modate the movements to each other's. However, mathematical 
symmetry does not exist frequently in reality (Schelling, 1960). For 
instance, upstream-downstream, which generates asymmetric exter- 
nalities, is often the case in flood management within a catchment. 
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Upstream-downstream 
Ej 
(0,1) 
(0,0) 
Figure 5.4: Reaction function of the supermodular game (after Cooper and 
John (1988)) 
5.4 Unidirectional externalities in a catchment: 
Upst ream- downstream 
The unidirectional externality is concerned with the case of upstream- 
downstream effects. The equilibrium of the unidirectional external- 
ity in a catchment is simply without strategic dependence unless 
cooperation is involved. 
155 
Ei E2 '' E3 Ei 
Ch5. Externalities of flood risk management 
5.4.1 Assumptions 
Apart from the probability of being flood damage free in the up- 
stream area, the assumptions are identical to those in the common 
pool. Suppose the objective function of the upstream area (denoted 
by the lower case u) and the objective function of the downstream 
area (denoted by the lower case d) are: 
max EW,,, = max (0,, (M,,,, K,, ) - W,, (M,,, K,, )) M,,,, K,, 
max EWd = max 
(Od((Md + M,,, ), (Kd - K,,, )) - 
Wd(Md, Kd)) 
Md, Kd 
where 
mi 
1 wiýi >- oý 11 wzi < 03 1 wýi < 01 w 11 Ki <0 , w" >0 Ki, Mi - 
01 
Ki >01 
0 11 
Ki < 
01 01 
Kj <0 1 
o', 
Kj < 
0, o', 
,>0 Kj Mi - 
01 
mi < 01 011 mi <0 3 01 r. iwi < 0, 0 11 Mi <0 
i= 
j. =u when i= 
Similarly, to ensure the existence of an interior solution, we have 
lim EWi (Ki, Kj) >0 and lim EWi (Ki, Kj) <0 
e--ýo K ---+ 
k 
lim EWi (Mi, Mj) >0 and lim EWi (Mi, Mj) <0 
e-0 M, Iýr 
where k and 1ý1 are upper bounds of K and M. 
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Upst ream-downst ream 
5.4.2 Equilibrium 
The case associated with unidirectional externality is basically with- 
out interactive strategy. The equilibrium occurs when the upstream 
area optimises its own decision and the downstream area optimises 
its decision given the upstream decision. 
5.4.3 Opportunities for cooperation 
Even though the downstream area cannot influence upstream flood 
risks, there are still chances for cooperation by influencing upstream 
welfare net of floods. The opportunities lie in the capacity of the 
downstream area to compensate upstream. 
Table 5.3 presents the impacts of various upstream actions up- 
stream and on the downstream area. The downstream area ap- 
parently prefers upstream to retain water and suffers from draining 
water upstream. It hence sheds the light of the cooperation between 
downstream and upstream areas. 
Cooperation can only occur when 
B,, > C,,, + Cd 
where B,,, is benefit for changing upstream action, C,, is upstream 
cost of changing action, and Cd is downstream cost of making the 
upstream area change action. Issues associated with the hydrological 
cycle such as droughts, navigation, water supply, and water quality 
control can stimulate the cooperation. 
In practice, Axelrod (1984) proposed principles of promoting co- 
operation, enlarging the shadow of future by making the interaction 
157 
Ch5. Externalities of flood risk management 
Table 5.3: Impacts of upstream actions 
Action Impact on downstream Impact on upstream 
Hard mitigation 
- retain water 
Decreased flood risks; 
(increased water supply; )a 
risk of engineering failure 
Cost of dam construction; 
risk of engineering failure 
Hard mitigation 
- drain water 
Increased flood risks Cost of flood walls 
Soft mitigation 
- retain water 
Decreased flood risks; 
(increased water supply) 
Sacrificing development 
'Items in parenthesis depend on the geological and hydrological characteristics of the area. 
more durable and more frequent, teaching people to care about each 
other, teaching reciprocity (common belief, in other words), improv- 
ing recognition abilities, and changing payoffs. They help to reshape 
the characteristics of the interaction so it is possible to have a stable 
cooperative equilibrium in the long run. 
5.5 Discussion 
Development and mitigation of floodplains are frequently public 
goods, and also involve the management of common property re- 
source. Game theory shows that strategic complementarity exac- 
erbates the problem by encouraging both development and hard 
mitigation. Surpassing flood risk thresholds can increase the neg- 
ative effect of developed land and reduce the effectiveness of hard 
mitigation. However, game theory has its limitations. In reality, the 
payoff matrix, the rules for reaching an equilibrium, welfare and con- 
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straints are often implicit. They are often revealed through political 
procedures instead. 
5.5.1 Policy implications of the game theoretical models 
Strategic complementarity is efficient below the threshold level. Once 
the threshold is surpassed, strategic complementarity can prevent 
free-riding but not increase efficiency. Efficiency loss in an embank- 
ments race occurs when a player's investment in hard mitigation 
is only to offset the incremental flood risk produced by the coun- 
terpart's investment in hard mitigation. Strategic complementarity 
speeds up the flood risk once the threshold of developed land is 
exceeded. 
However, in a non-cooperative game, soft mitigation is often ig- 
nored due to the incentive to free-ride. The tit-for-tat principle 
is often applied in a dynamic game so cheating may not occur all 
the time. Nevertheless, a catchment will end up with an increasing 
share of floodplain being developed, increasing hard mitigation, and 
a reluctance to undertake soft mitigation. Hence, mechanisms are 
needed to induce cooperation. 
The difference between the supermodular game described in this 
chapter and supermodular games described elsewhere in the litera- 
ture lies in the type of externality. Strategic complementarity here 
aims at keeping the payoff from falling, and should stop before trig- 
gering the threshold effects. To avoid reaching a threshold for effi- 
ciency improvement, cooperation is an option. 
Cooperation can lead to efficiency improvement in the long term. 
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Repetitive interactions between players can constrain opportunism 
and reinforce the information received by players. The whole catch- 
ment should be able to obtain a higher payoff by concluding an 
agreement, in which no one suffers a welfare loss. 
The incentives to cooperate include the extra cost on penalty for 
violating the agreement, and the distribution of the benefits due to 
cooperation. The allocation of the benefits is usually discussed in 
terms of core theory, von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions (or stable 
sets), Shapley value, nucleolus, minimising the maximum complaint 
that any coalition could have against it. The principle of equity is 
applied where players are homogeneous while the stakeholders' prin- 
ciple applied where players are heterogeneous. Apart from economic 
incentives, cooperation can also be induced by traditional methods 
including the stability of institutions and leadership itself (Schelling, 
1960). 
Incentives such as flood taxes, subsidies, punishments for breach- 
ing a contract, and the distribution of the benefits of cooperation 
change the structure of the game. The design of economic incentives 
can also be classified into different levels according to the impacts. 
For instance, developers responsible for different flood risks should 
face different flood tax rates. 
Players may use historical knowledge to guess other players' be- 
haviour. When a game has been played repeatedly, players have 
more opportunities to learn to coordinate their actions to achieve 
Pareto improvement. Cheating, which easily occurs in a static game, 
but may be deterred by punishments such as 'tit-for-tat' in a dy- 
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namic game. 
5.5.2 Limitations of the game theoretical models 
Flood risk management in a catchment often involves far more indi- 
viduals with far more heterogeneous characteristics than have been 
discussed in this chapter. The related information is also more com- 
plicated. In other words, the information required for constructing 
the payoff matrix, rules of obtaining the equilibrium, welfare, and 
constraints becomes too complicated to be clearly expressed in a 
game theoretical model. Hence, mechanisms for integrating differ- 
ent interests and producing efficient solutions should be introduced. 
Moreover, the game theoretical models in this chapter are not 
tactical because the information on the geographical and economic 
conditions of players is often explicit, Bargaining tactics involve del- 
icate strategies such as bluffing, cheating, making concession, threat- 
ening, deterrence, the timing of actions and personal relationships 
among players (trust). However, only the actions that can be related 
to rationality are discussed. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter explores the interplay among decision-makers, and 
shows how flood risk externalities open the way to decentralised 
management, on a catchment-scale in particular. The assumption 
of centralised decision-making is relaxed to investigate optimal re- 
source allocation in a catchment that covers multiple decision-makers 
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from multiple regions. The game theoretic models show that effi- 
ciency losses in terms of an embankments race and insufficient soft 
mitigation are a consequence of decentralised decision- making. 
Increasing upstream hard mitigation forces downstream areas 
into higher levels of hard mitigation. Once an upstream embank- 
ment or drainage system is built, downstream mitigation follows. 
Upstream soft mitigation, on the other hand attenuates downstream 
flood risks. 
Since the social optimum level or the threshold, whichever is 
smaller, is the split point between cooperation and non- coop erat ion, 
information about the social optimum is important for designing 
cooperation mechanisms and for solving the embankments race and 
the undersupply of soft mitigation. 
Other methods for internalising flood risk externalities, such as 
the establishment of developer's responsibility for mitigating flood 
risks are considered in later chapters. However, whether there is an 
efficiency improvement or not depends on a welfare comparison of 
the outcomes under different institutions. Most methods for inter- 
nalising the externalities, such as tax, fees, and compensation, are 
consistent with a centralised management system. 
The next chapter will explore the options in a decentralised sys- 
tem taking the insufficiency of information and biased decision- 
makers into account. The stakeholders' committee, for integrating 
diverse interests to obtain the social target, will be introduced along 
with the tradeable permit system, for obtaining the target effectively 
and efficiently. 
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Decentralised Flood Risk Management Using 
the Stakeholders' Committee and '11radeable 
Flood Permits 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 considered mitigation and development in 
the context of optimal flood risk management from a social planner's 
viewpoint. However, this assumes that there exists a policy-maker' 
who is omnipotent and altruistic, that information is complete and 
perfect, and that individual decision-makers have freedom to choose. 
In many cases, these conditions are not satisfied. Very often the 
larger the scale of an issue, the more serious the problem is. 
Nevertheless, relaxing the assumption of centralisation of flood 
'The decision-maker of public affairs is called the policy-maker from now on. 
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management in Chapter 5 presents problems. The adverse exter- 
nality from hard mitigation and the beneficial externality from soft 
mitigation may not be internalised. The former generates an em- 
bankments race while the latter causes insufficient soft mitigation. 
In fact, the very factors that produce market failure also make it 
difficult for government to obtain a satisfactory solution (Friedman 
and Friedman, 1979). 
This chapter addresses market failures within a decentralised de- 
cision framework, rather than resorting to centralised control. Many 
decisions on mitigation are in the hands of government while oth- 
ers are in the hands of local management groups (see Table 6.1). 
All decisions on development are constrained by regulations. ' The 
problem addressed in this chapter is how to coordinate decisions 
among regions within a decentralised framework in order to achieve 
an efficient and equitable outcome. 
Even though improving efficiency is the supreme principle in eco- 
nomics, individuals in fact evaluate efficiency differently. In many 
cases, the outcome reflects a political consensus. In such cases, es- 
tablishing market mechanisms within a framework of collaborative 
management might be a practical option. An 'efficient' public choice 
can be made by allowing a representative group to set the social ob- 
jective, and then using market mechanisms to improve efficiency. 
For collaborative management, a two-tier decision-making pro- 
cess is introduced. First, the social objective is identified through 
a collective consensus-building mechanism. Then, a market mecha- 
21Development in the UK is mainly constrained by the Town and County Planning Act. 
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nism is created to assure an efficient resource allocation for achieving 
this target. This involves two institutions: a stakeholders' commit- 
tee (SC) and a tradeable flood permit (TFP) system (Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2: Characteristics of the two-tier decentralised management 
Stakeholders' committee 'Iýradeable flood permit 
Mechanism Negotiation Market 
Function Defining the social target, Obtaining the target, 
setting up rules, improving efficiency, 
solving the embankments race avoiding free-riding 
The SC can more comprehensively cover topics while the trade- 
able permit system often focuses on one specific aspect in manage- 
ment. The SC obtains objectives through negotiation while the TFP 
system improves efficiency by allowing agents to optimise their use 
of resources within a quantitative restriction. In conflict resolution, 
issues that do not threaten life can resort to the market while those 
that are life-threatening rely on negotiation based on equity. 
This chapter focuses on multiple heterogeneous players operat- 
ing in a landscape involving geographical differences. The potential 
effectiveness of the policy regime is examined using the catchment 
of the Yorkshire Ouse, the Swale, the Ure, and the Nidd. 
Section 6.2 considers the problems of commons and their solu- 
tions. Section 6.3 discusses the organisation of an SC in flood man- 
agement. Section 6.4 gives the theoretical background and develops 
three types of TFPs. Section 6.5 presents the chapter conclusions. 
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6.2 Solving the problems of commons 
The problem of commons is addressed in Chapter 5. Decentralised 
decisions on flood management produce the problems of commons 
in terms of insufficient soft mitigation and an embankments race. 
Quantity control, price control, and redefining property rights pro- 
vide the solutions. However, insufficient information and the bounded 
rationality of a policy-maker lead the choice to redefining property 
rights through an SC and a TFP system. 
6.2.1 Problems of commons 
There are a bundle of rights within land. First, development of an 
area (area i) is a public bad for its neighbouring and downstream 
areas (area j, where i :ý j) by increasing their flood risks. Equation 
(5.11) suggests OEWj/Omi <0 where Wj is the welfare function of 
area j. 
Secondly, land used for soft mitigation is a public good for the 
whole catchment excluding upstream areas. An analogous reasoning 
is applied due to the fixed sum of developed land and non-developed 
land that includes undertaking soft mitigation. That is, a decrease 
in mi can benefit area J. 
Thirdly, the right to develop brings income to the land owner. 
WiMmi >0 shows development is a private good for increasing 
area i's welfare. 
Hard mitigation (k) is a public bad because it generates adverse 
externalities to its neighbouring and downstream areas, OWjlOki 
0. However, it is a private good to the area it protects, OWil(9ki > 0. 
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Undersupply of soft mitigation, a result of free-riding, was shown 
by a game theoretical model in Subsection 5.3.3. Comparing the 
equilibria between equation (5.6) and equation (5.8), we find the in- 
sufficiency of WA (Pl (a + b) - I/ (aP, + bf))' units of soft miti- 
gation when f>P,. Knowing whether f is larger than P, is often 
an easy task. The definite efficiency loss of undersupply of soft mit- 
igation is, for example, the triangular area ee'e" in Figure 6.1. 
Oversupply of hard mitigation, an embankments race, is derived 
by the supermodular game in Chapter 5. In an asymmetric em- 
bankments race, downstream mitigation needs to be increased ac- 
cording to any increase in upstream mitigation; in a symmetric em- 
bankments race, enhancing flood walls (or drainage) to mitigate 
the increased flood risk induced by neighbouring embankments (or 
drainage) generates constant conflicts in a common pool. Chapter 
5 shows the efficiency loss of the latter based on the assumption 
of identical players. The former needs to be discussed under the 
assumption of heterogeneous players. 
6.2.2 Solutions to the problems of commons 
A policy-maker needs to justify interfering with private decisions to 
obtain a social optimum. Once the need is confirmed, s/he should 
find the social objective and constraints, and select an efficient policy 
to meet the target . Three solutions are suggested: 
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P 
0 
Figure 6.1: Undersupply of soft mitigation and its solutions. Q* 
is the optimal level; Q' is the current level; S, is the social supply 
curve; Sp is the aggregate private supply curve; Stp is the supply 
under a TFP system; D is the demand curve; e is the equilibrium 
under a tradeable permits system; e' is the equilibrium without 
policy intervention; e" is the initial equilibrium after policy inter- 
vention on Q'; f is the subsidy per unit of soft mitigation. 
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QUANTITY CONTROL 
Quantity control, a type of centralised management, secures the 
optimal quantity of soft and/or hard mitigation. It demands an 
authority to determine and to allocate the social optimal mitigation 
Q* to each area. In theory, the optimal quantity of soft and/or hard 
mitigation can be guaranteed by distributing this optimal quantity 
to individual areas. However, it is often too costly for an authority to 
issue a quota according to the spatial distribution of geographical 
characteristics and economic capacity among regions. Moreover, 
there is no incentive for any area to sacrifice its potential benefits 
from using the land in other ways. Hence, the enforcement of quota 
allocation is at the cost of efficiency. 
PRICE CONTROL 
Price control can internalise externalities through the market mech- 
anism. If the property right of flood risk reduction belongs to the 
bearers of flood risk, a policy-maker shall impose a tax on the under- 
supply of soft mitigation or over-development. On the other hand, if 
it belongs to those who are capable of undertaking soft mitigation, 
(f in Figure 6.1) suppliers of soft mitigation shall receive a sub- 
sidy. However, this implies that the authority has full information 
on supply and demand of development and mitigation like S,, Sp, 
and D. Practically, though the rates of tax/subsidy are adjustable 
over time, the environmental quality (Q*) is often uncertain due 
to the imperfect and incomplete information which is available to 
policy-makers. 
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REDEFINING PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Redefining property rights can also drive the rearrangement of de- 
velopment and mitigation in flood management. Command-and- 
control (disregarded due to its nature of centralisation), negotiation, 
and transaction are the three ways to redefine property rights. 
Hard and soft mitigation, with their own pros and cons, can 
substitute for each other to a certain point. Moreover, the beneficial 
externality generated by soft mitigation and the adverse externality 
generated by hard mitigation are both transferable. Negotiation and 
transaction both have potential for covering the transfer efficiently. 
Quantity control in isolation is highly centralised while price con- 
trol might face uncertainty of environmental quality. A tradeable 
permit system that mixes quantity control with price control is hence 
introduced to secure a certain level of environmental quality in an 
efficient way. Consistent with its nature of compromise, its rule of 
allocating the initial permits and that of operating the system is 
basically a public decision. The authority can either auction or al- 
locate Q* the optimal amount of permits to individuals and then let 
the market reallocate resources. Restrictions on the embankments 
race can be life-threatening, hence negotiation through a mechanism 
like the SC should be introduced. Given the diversity of technical, 
economic, and social contexts in which flood management occurs, 
the need for introducing an SC to reach an agreement on a social 
target and related rules is immediately apparent. 
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6.3 Stakeholders' committee 
Setting the optimal flood risk and related rules is not only a tech- 
nical problem but a political issue. Being a committee composed 
of related stakeholders, an SC chiefly aims at solving two problems: 
determining the optimal setting for management and resolving con- 
flicts which cannot be tackled within the market. Investigating each 
stakeholder's costs and benefits of participating in the committee 
and proposing plans for conflict resolution accordingly are crucial. 
Based on the nature of collaborative management, the SC can also 
enhance the political acceptability of the TFP system. It has been 
widely applied in water management in the Netherlands, Germany, 
and France (Andersen, 1999; OECD, 1996; Uniterkamp et al., 1995) 
and in natural resources and environmental management in the UK, 
Denmark, Hungary, Luxembourg, the USA, Australia, New Zealand, 
Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Taiwan (Selman, 2004; Shaw et al., 
3 2003). According to Selman (2004), most of these works are on a 
small scale, e. g., community-based resources management. Cases on 
a large scale require more expert involvement. 
6.3.1 Aims of a stakeholders' committee 
An SC first needs to set the target before defining a social welfare 
function for the catchment. By agreeing on the acceptable set of 
tradeoffs between flood risk and development benefits, an SC defines 
the indifference curves between the acceptable flood risk and the 
3The current land use management system in the UK is supposed to be consultative, but 
it often fails to engage communities notwithstanding (Corkindale, 2004). 
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social welfare net of floods as indicated in Figure 6.2. Given the 
physical and financial constraints, this makes it possible to identify 
an optimal solution (e). What is left is to find an efficient and 
feasible way to reach the optimum. 
8 
8* 
0 
Figure 6.2: Indifference curves and the optimal solutions in flood 
risk management. IC: indifference curves. BC: budget constraint. 
0*: the probability of being flood damage free. W*: the maximum 
welfare net of floods. e: the combination of (0*, W*), the optimal 
solution. 
Moreover, negotiation is the obvious choice to solve an embank- 
ments race using a decentralised measure. An SC constitutes a form 
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within which to negotiate the conflicts that arise. 
6.3.2 Principles for designing a stakeholders' committee 
The direct involvement of all stakeholders in the decision-making 
process was recommended by the World Bank (1993). It has in- 
formational advantages especially at the design stage of a policy 
since local conditions, technology, customs, and needs can hence 
be engaged for decision-making. Basically, involving all stakehold- 
ers implies dealing with a huge number of participants. Hence, the 
transaction costs of decision-making may be high and agreements 
may not be easy to reach. 
Jonoski (2004) tried to scale down the participation of stake- 
holders by assigning representatives. This does risk losing all the 
relevant interests, but the size of a group also affects the efficiency 
of decision-making and the effectiveness of meeting a target for the 
group. Olson (1965) found that it is easier for a small group to meet 
its target than for a large group because of economic incentives and 
social pressure. Members of a small group often know each other 
and this creates pressure for them to make an effort to achive the 
goal. Contrarily, a large group is often unstable, 'latent' or inclined 
to disappear because of its inability to meet the target. Members in 
a big group will not act to advance their common objectives unless 
there is coercion to force them to do so, or if separate incentives, dis- 
tinct from the achievement of the group interests, are individually 
offered to the members of the group. 
It is easier for a small group to find its way to decentralised 
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management because of its simplicity. When decentralised manage- 
ment evolves into a huge scale of participation, there is a need to 
strengthen the integrity of the group without losing the spirit of de- 
centralisation. An SC consists of small groups with various interests 
or abilities in flood management. Provided there are well-structured 
information and incentive systems, the integrity of a large group 
might be kept intact through the disaggregation of this kind. 
Decisions are made by the majority vote of stakeholders. Votes 
are the signals which reveal the information of each stakeholder. 
There are generally two principles to assign votes. One is the prin- 
ciple of equal contribution while the other is the principle of con- 
tribution and participation. The contribution includes mitigation 
abilities and financial capacities. There has been much debate on 
which principle to choose. Shaw et al. (2003) showed that the prob- 
lems of commons can be avoided by applying the second principle 
rather than the first principle. Applications of the second principle 
are in fact appearing more often. In this case, the distribution of 
votes proportional to the contribution and participation of each in- 
dividual drive the management process. It provides incentives for 
participation in collective action. 
6.3.3 Interested parties 
The major interested parties involved in flood management are the 
organisations responsible for flood mitigation, local authorities, wa- 
ter authorities, land owners, and other potential players. To illus- 
trate, consider the catchment of the Yorkshire Ouse in England. 
175 
Ch6. The SC and the TFP 
ORGANISATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR FLOOD MITIGATION 
The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DE- 
FRA) has policy responsibility for flood risk in England. It provides 
financial support for research on improving flood management. It 
funds most of the Environment Agency's (EA) flood management 
activities in England and other flood defence operating authori- 
ties (e. g., local authorities and Internal Drainage Boards (IDBs)). 
Hence, DEFRA shall also represent opinions of expertise, including 
suggestions from academia. However, DEFRA does not build de- 
fences, nor direct other authorities on what specific projects to do. 
Policy delivery is the responsibility of the EA, local authorities, and 
IDBs. Three basic means of funding for flood defence schemes are 
implemented by these three bodies: local levies (EA), drainage rates 
(IDBs) and council taxes (local authorities). 
The EA maintains and operates vital flood defences, monitors 
river water levels and flows, and assesses flood risk. It advises lo- 
cal authorities of development and environmental problems. The 
EA is also responsible for the national flood warning system. It 
oversees the issue of flood warnings and advises local authorities on 
emergency responses. 
IDBs are responsible for the maintenance of drainage systems, 
some ordinary watercourses and pumping stations. They are also 
involved in habitat protection and species conservation. Some mem- 
bers are elected by the payers of drainage rates while some are ap- 
pointed by local authorities subject to levy funding. 
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LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Local authorities represent the residential and industrial purposes 
within specific administrative boundaries. The related local author- 
ities in this catchment are East Riding County Council and North 
Yorkshire County Council. Local authorities participate in operat- 
ing flood warning systems managed by the EA. The level of their 
involvement in flood defence and land drainage depends mainly upon 
the nature of the area of the local authority. 
With respect to flood defences, a local authority assesses the po- 
tential effects on socio-economic and environmental aspects, max- 
imises efficiency, raises funds, and abides by conservation rules. It 
also ensures the maintenance of flood defences on private land while 
the private land owners are responsible for the maintenance of flood 
defences. It sometimes operates pumping stations and culverts. 
A local authority needs to ensure the optimal operation of some 
ordinary watercourses within their authorised areas, e. g., clearing 
the excess silt and aquatic vegetation and keeping screens clear of 
debris. It also provides an emergency response service, e. g., the dis- 
tribution of sandbags to vulnerable properties, with the assistance 
of the police force. The ambulance service, and fire and rescue ser- 
vices also participate in emergency operation. Avoiding pollution 
caused by public sewers is also the responsibility of local authorities 
under the Public Health Act, 1936. 
A local authority also plays a key role in development that in- 
cludes discouraging inappropriate development in areas at risk of 
flooding. Here lies a tradeoff. In carrying out its responsibilities, 
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a local authority should balance economic development against en- 
vironmental health. With its local knowledge and its influence on 
policy-making, a local authority should provide a well-balanced plan 
for economic development and flood mitigation. Some local author- 
ities secure substantial funds from developers for compensation for 
the hydrological consequences of development, whether within the 
region or in upstream areas. 
REGIONAL FLOOD DEFENCE COMMITTEES (RFDCs) 
Regional Flood Defence Committees (RFDCs) are made up of rep- 
resentatives appointed by DEFRA, EA, and local authorities. The 
RFDCs supervise all matters relating to flood defence within a cer- 
tain region. This catchment for instance, is mainly administered by 
the Yorkshire RFDCs. 
WATER COMPANIES 
The water company (e. g., Yorkshire Water in Yorkshire) is not di- 
rectly in charge of flood control, though it may favor the mitigation 
that increases future water collection. Nevertheless, it is responsi- 
ble for water quality affected by flood-related water pollution, e. g., 
sewer flood. Involving water authorities in flood management is de- 
sirable to avoid problems associated with the aftermath of flooding 
and the supply of water. Mitigation and development located at up- 
stream or in neighbouring areas to water treatment facilities might 
be their main concern. 
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LAND OWNERS 
Farmers manage over 3/4 of the land in the UK and hence they are 
in charge of water management over a large scale. However, farmers 
accounted for only 1.8% of the workforce in 2003 and agriculture's 
contribution to the gross domestic product has been declining in the 
UK (see Figure 6.3). Even though the importance of agriculture in 
the economy has been weakening, its potential environmental signif- 
icance, such as mitigating flooding, remains strong. Farmers might 
bargain by themselves or delegate the bargaining power to the local 
authority or a farming organisation such as the National Farmers' 
Union (NFU). The NFU represents about 3/4 of full-time commer- 
cial farmers of England and Wales. Although flood control currently 
is not its major concern, a substantial benefit from regulating water 
amount on farming land might trigger its interests. 
Land owners alongside rivers or roads are responsible for flood 
defences on private land and most roadside ditches. Land owners of 
developed land, upstream areas, flood-sensitive areas, or other places 
with predominant impacts on flood mitigation potentially have in- 
terests in transaction and negotiation of flood management. They 
might participate in the trading or bargaining activities individually 
or through communities or local authorities. 
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Figure 6.3: Agriculture's contribution to GDP in the UK (1973- 
2004). Data source: http: //farmstats. defra. gov. uk/cs/ farm- 
stat s-dat a/ DATA/ nuts -data/ nuts -query. asp. 
OTHER POTENTIAL PLAYERS 
Since mitigation often affects ecological functions, flood manage- 
ment induces attention of environmental groups, such as English 
Nature and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds. More- 
over, some other industries, such as fisheries, might be affected by 
the change of water quantity or quality due to development or mit- 
igation undertaken within or near their areas. 
6.4 M-adeable flood permit 
The idea of tradeable permits, proposed by Crocker (1966) and 
Dales (1968), integrates the advantages of quantitative restriction 
and economic incentives. It can secure environmental quality and 
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efficiency, reduce conflicts between economy and environment, avoid 
the complication of economic growth and inflation, distinguish ge- 
ographical differences, provide financial resources of compensation 
and a possible increase in tax base. In other words, it is designed 
as a market-based instrument in order to deliver a cost-effective so- 
lution in flood management. The policy feasibility can be increased 
by grandfathering. However, it is often criticised due to significant 
transaction costs, possibly no regular income for government and eq- 
uity violation. The pros and cons of implementing tradeable permits 
applied in other environmental aspects, such as water resources, air 
pollution, natural resources, and biodiversity, are listed in Table 6.3. 
There are applications of tradeable permits to the fields of air 
pollution, water pollution, zoning, habitat conservation, fisheries in 
international waters, and biodiversity. Here I investigate the appli- 
cations to flood risk trading which has not been explored. 
6.4.1 Criteria of a successful tradeable permit system 
A successful tradeable permit system should satisfy the following 
criteria. First, the advantages of applying tradeable permits need 
to be manifested. Otherwise, the policy-maker loses credibility when 
using a tradeable permit system instead of other policy instruments. 
Secondly, it should overcome the difficulties related to transac- 
tion costs. High transaction costs might reduce trading levels and 
increase mitigation costs. Asymmetric information and unsound in- 
centive structures are often the key factors of high transaction costs. 
Asymmetric information can lead to low initial trading volume as 
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Table 6.3: Pros and cons of implementing tradeable permits (adapted from 
Baumol and Oates (1988)) 
Pros 
1. Securing environmental quality and efficiency. 
2. Reducing conflicts between economy and environment. 
3. Avoiding the complication of economic growth and inflation. 
4. Distinguishing geographical differences. 
5. Increasing policy feasibility by grandfathering. ' 
6. Providing financial resources of compensation. 
7. A possible increase in tax base. 
Cons 
1. Significant transaction costs 
2. Equity violation due to grandfathering. 
3. Possibly no regular income for government. 
'Grandfathering is to distribute initial permits according to the historical output. It 
provides means of alleviating distributional impacts from the introduction of a tradeable 
permit system. 
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potential traders postpone transactions while waiting for additional 
information (Ben-David et al., 1999). To increase the efficiency of 
communication, application of technology such as the use of the 
internet is an option (Cason and Gangadharan, 1998). To avoid 
problems of asymmetric information, a permit bank that serves as 
a broker can be considered. 
However, Hahn (1986) and Stavins (1995) suggests that the in- 
centive structures provided by a tradeable permit market might 
generate misleading price signals. For instance, a tradeable per- 
mit system might lead to a decrease in tax income due to residents' 
expectation of higher land price in the protected areas and over- 
loaded financial burden for the developed areas due to an increase 
in development. Therefore, adequate incentives are essential for the 
successful use of the trading market. 
Thirdly, a clearly presented and validly justified policy purpose, a 
well-designed number of permits, and well-designated protected and 
developed areas are crucial. These should be based on the knowledge 
of the geographical and economic properties of the targeted areas. 
Lastly, effective public communication eliminates conflicts and 
difficulties during implementation. This highlights the importance 
of collaborative management. Education can also be a catalyst to 
encourage participation in a new management regime. 
Overall, revealing the merits, minimising transaction costs, car- 
ing about the design of a permit system itself, and effecting public 
communication are keys to a successful flood permit system. In 
conjunction with other issues, e. g., flood control, development, and 
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zoning, is also helpful for policy implementation. 
6.4.2 Conditions for converting hard to soft mitigation 
The TFP system chiefly aims at avoiding the insufficiency of soft 
mitigation. Proposition 4.1 holds that investment in soft mitiga- 
tion is more preferred the lower the rate at which future costs and 
benefits are discounted. It is less costly to adopt soft mitigation 
than hard mitigation in a less developed economy while it becomes 
problematic to reclaim the developed land for flood mitigation in 
a highly developed economy. Undertaking soft mitigation is only 
appropriate in certain situations. Guidelines for converting hard to 
soft mitigation are summarised in the following: 
Effectiveness. When the anticipated energy of flooding is too 
strong for soft mitigation to cope with, options should lie be- 
tween hard mitigation (Burgess, 2004) and adaptation. Soft 
mitigation should only be undertaken when it is sufficiently ef- 
fective. Inappropriate replacement of embankments with salt- 
marshes might incur devastating floods instead. The adoption 
and the scale of soft mitigation hence need careful evaluation. 
Sufficient area. The size of the area dedicated to soft mitigation 
shall be sufficient to mitigate flooding for the targeted area. An 
insufficient area only offers limited protection against localised 
flooding (Mauchamp et al., 2002) or may even lose its function. 
9 Local interests and knowledge. Local interests and knowledge 
should be taken into account, not only for the tradeoff between 
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economic and environmental values but for choosing a proper 
way to manage flood risk. 
Integrated approach. To balance the capacity for coping with 
huge flood energy against ecological concerns, an integrated ap- 
proach that combines hard mitigation and soft mitigation can 
be considered. Hard mitigation can be constructed in a way 
of minimising damage to the ecosystems, such as using envi- 
ronmentally friendly materials and giving aquatic biota proper 
space and design (e. g., fish entrainment at flood defences). Its 
impact on the flow regime must also be considered. Soft mit- 
igation can be undertaken with flexible hard mitigation, e. g., 
movable gates. The optimal ratio of hard mitigation to soft 
mitigation depends on economic capacity, flood risk, geograph- 
ical characteristics, and local interests. 
Minimising damage from mitigation conversion. Avoiding side 
effects of mitigation conversion is essential. For instance, any 
change of land use can cause massive disturbance in soil charac- 
teristics, amenity uses, ecological resources, and water courses. 
Inadequate understanding of ecosystems is often a main reason 
for the failure of land restoration (Harris et al., 1996). 
Capacity. The capacity for implementing mitigation conver- 
sion shall be sufficient to accomplish the mission (Harris et al., 
1996). Failure in carrying through all aspects of the plan causes 
unsuccessful conversion. 
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Options for converting hard to soft mitigation considered in Chap- 
ter 2 are natural processes restoration, riparian buffer zones creation, 
and allowing flooding on the land. Restoring natural processes in 
an area is to resume its natural condition as it was in the past. Ri- 
parian buffer zones improve bank stability, reduce silt deposition, 
and remove sediments and pollutants. Land owners can also retain 
water or allow water to flood their land, especially during a certain 
period of time. What they can do is either simply opening water 
gates to lead water in or increasing the infiltration capacity of the 
land by improving the vegetation. 
In some cases, tradeoffs do not lie between hard mitigation and 
soft mitigation. When both economic and ecological concerns are 
high, adaptation such as migration, relocating economic activities 
to a safe area, is a compromise. 
6.4.3 Theoretical models 
This subsection considers the reason for introducing a TFP system 
using theoretical models. Suppose a catchment consists of f areas. 
Decisions of each area influence the flood risk of itself and its neigh- 
bouring and downstream areas. 
Assume areas are heterogeneous in terms of geographical charac- 
teristics such as infiltration capacity and flow direction. The hetero- 
geneity of areas is presented by G, a geographical coefficient that 
indicates the influence of spatial characteristics on runoff. gji indi- 
cates that one unit of runoff from source i contributes to the runoff 
at area j. gji <I because the runoff from area i towards other areas 
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(js) at least partially infiltrates into soil or evaporates. The smaller 
the value of Ejý=, gji, the less runoff generated from i reaches other 
areas (js). The property of runoff accumulation in the catchment is 
described by an fxe matrix of unit runoff reduction coefficients: 
9ji 
For a common-pool, each gji, where i :ýj, has an identical pos- 
itive value. For upstream-downstream flows where areas are coded 
from I at the top to f at the bottom along the stream, each gji =0 
when j<i and 0< gji <I when j>t. This yields a triangular 
matrix. Here we focus on the case of upstream-downstream flows. 
A is the total amount of land; m is the amount of developed 
land; 'A - m' is the amount of non-developed land assumed to be 
dedicated to soft mitigation; k is the amount of hard mitigation; and 
r* is the optimal probability of flooding. Runoff, described by G, 
links to the probability of flooding. kj increases the amount of runoff 
released at j by draining water downwards while 'A - mj' decreases 
the amount of runoff from j by improving infiltration capacity. 
We can infer that upstream soft mitigation generates beneficial 
externalities and hard mitigation produces adverse externalities. 
Knowing G, one can derive the optimal amount of each type of 
mitigation for every area. 
Using a tax or subsidy regime to obtain efficiency in a geographi- 
cally complicated catchment is costly for the SC. The optimal rates 
of tax/subsidy should be set up according to different geographical 
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conditions. A TFP system is hence introduced to let market forces 
tackle geographical and economic differences within a secured level 
of flood risk. 
There are two ways to develop TFPs. The first concerns trade in 
soft mitigation. This type of tradeable permit aims only at avoiding 
the undersupply of soft mitigation. The second involves trade in 
both soft mitigation and hard mitigation, given the optimal proba- 
bility of flooding. Permits of this sort are aimed at improving the 
efficiency of the overall flood mitigation. 
One might think of encouraging a trade in hard mitigation only, 
but given the safety concern, it would be improper for the SC to 
restrict hard mitigation at the cost of risking lives and properties. 
A policy-maker should be cautious of using this instrument. If there 
is any trading regime involved, its function should only be efficiency 
improvement in hard mitigation itself rather than in the overall mit- 
igation. Hard mitigation can only be restricted in specific cases in 
which soft mitigation takes over the role or adaptation is arranged. 
The model proposed in Baumol and Oates (1988) is to min- 
imise the cost given a certain target. If we take this cost as an 
opportunity cost, the problem can turn out to be targeting at max- 
imising welfare. Social welfare of the catchment is assumed to be 
scaled down by flood risk. R(ri*) shapes the amount of runoff cor- 
responding to the optimal probability of flooding at i. R(r*) 
(R(rl*), R(r2*),..., R(r; ))'. f 
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TRADE IN SOFT MITIGATION 
Suppose EW(m)' >0 and EW(m)" < 0. h(mi) indicates the 
amount of runoff caused by development at i. h(m)' >0 and 
h(m)" > 0. H(m) = (h(mj), h(M2), -.., h(mf))T. 
The SC faces a problem of choosing development (and soft mit- 
igation) to maximise expected social welfare, EjEWj, given the 
probability of flooding the catchment is prepared to tolerate (r*): 
max,,,...,,, EW(mi) 
s. t. G- H(m) < R(r*) 
The necessary conditions for an interior solution are 
f 
EW(mi)'--I: (Aj. gji). h(mi)', f 
j=l 
G- H(m) = R(r*) 
which can be re-written as 
, 
(Aj - gji) EW(mi)'/h(mi)', i=I... f 
j=l (6.2) 
G- H(m) R(r*) 
where Aj is the shadow value of the targeted probability of flooding 
at 
Let (Aj - gji) = Ri which presents the magnitude of the ef- 
fect on flood risk i can generate. Equation (6.2) presents a positive 
relationship between Ri and soft mitigation 'A - mi' at i. When the 
magnitude of the effect on flood risk i can generate is large due to 
the geographical conditions or the targeted probability of flooding in 
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other places, adopting soft mitigation instead of development bene- 
fits the catchment. However, this equilibrium cannot exist under a 
decentralised system where each area makes decisions on its own. 
Without concern for externalities, Ri = Ai - gii, the optimal level 
of soft mitigation is lower for i unless E Aj - gji = 0,1 =ý i- Wi in this 
case is higher than that in equation (6.2). If the property right of 
generating runoff to other places belongs to each area itself, a welfare 
transfer should take place for the beneficiaries to compensate those 
who undertake soft mitigation. On the other hand, if the property 
right of generating runoff belongs to the runoff receptors, those who 
generate runoff should buy the right from the receptors. 
This model is only appropriate when hard mitigation is constant 
or when hard mitigation plays a minor role in flood control. The 
next model will incorporate the importance of hard mitigation. 
TRADE IN MITIGATION 
The assumptions of m remain. Suppose EW(k)' >0 and EW(k)" < 
0. h(mi, ki) indicates the amount of runoff caused by development 
and hard mitigation at i. h(k)' <0 and h(k)" < 0. H(m, k) 
(h(mi, ki), h(M2, k2)) .... h (me, kf) 
)T. 
The SC faces a problem of choosing development, soft mitigation, 
and hard mitigation to maximise expected social welfare, Ej EWj, 
given the level of risk the catchment is prepared to tolerate (r*): 
max, EW(mi, ki) 
s. t. H(m, k) < R(r*) 
(6.3) 
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The necessary conditions for an interior solution are 
f 
EW(mi)'== E(Aj - gji) - h(mi)', 
j=l 
f 
EW(ki)'= E(Aj - gji) - h(ki)', 
j=l 
G- H(m, k) = R(r*) 
which can be re-written as 
f 
j: (Aj - gji) - EW(mi)'/h(mi)'= EW(ki)'Ih(ki)', f 
j=l 
G- H(m, k) = R(r*) 
(6.4) 
where Aj is the shadow value of the targeted probability of flooding 
at 
Equation (6.4) shows that i balances the optimal hard mitigation 
with soft mitigation with respect to Ri. Similar to that in equation 
(6.2), it describes a positive relationship between Ri and soft mitiga- 
tion 'A - mi' at i. However, Ri does not have a constant relationship 
with hard mitigation. 
When Ri is high, adopting soft mitigation at Z can benefit the 
catchment. However, whether increasing or decreasing hard mitiga- 
tion at i depends on the marginal impacts, EW(ki)' and h(ki)'. 
The first model suggests that soft mitigation is appropriate for 
areas that generate severe externalities of flood risk. Whether incen- 
tives or penalties should be offered depends on the definition of the 
property right to runoff. The second model has similar implications 
for soft mitigation while the choice of hard mitigation relies on its 
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marginal impact on welfare and that on runoff. 
6.4.4 Types of tradeable flood permits 
A TFP system aims at allocating 'flood risk' efficiently by consider- 
ing flood mitigation and land use. There are three types of TFPs for 
implementation, developed from the two models in subsection 6.4.3 
(refer to Figure 6.4) . First is the tradeable development permit 
(the 
TraD permit, also named the transferable development right). It 
only relates to land use and has been implemented for management 
of flood hazards, preservation of historical remains, and conserva- 
tion of ecological systems. To integrate hard mitigation into flood 
management, the tradeable flood reduction permit (the TFR per- 
mit) and the tradeable risk neutral permit (the TRiNe permit) are 
developed. They are aimed at restricting choices of land use and/or 
flood mitigation which increase flood risk and/or cause related ex- 
ternalities. Incentives to sell permits are monetary while those to 
purchase permits are either environmental or economic. 
I TRADABLE DEVELOPMENT PERMIT (TraD PERMIT) 
The purpose of implementing the TraD permit on a floodplain is 
to restrict the increase in flood risk in designated areas. Issuing 
development permits is a common strategy to control flood risk. It 
originally aims at protecting open space and historic sites, though 
the areas allowed to develop might end up with high density of devel- 
opment. Making the development permits tradeable was suggested 
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(1) TraD Permit 
I sending area sell to receiving area 
(2) TFR Permit (2-Step) 
stakeholders' committee sell to mitigation suppliers 
and then 
mitigati more efficient mitigatio): nj sell to 
(3) TRiNe Permit 
soft mitigation (in some areas) sell to 
Figure 6.4: Transactions in the three types of TFP systems 
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in the Town and County Planning Act in the UK and has been 
implemented in many places, especially in the USA. 
A TraD permit system should have well-designated 'sending ar- 
eas' (where land conservation is sought) and 'receiving areas' (where 
land development is encouraged) and a well-designed market. A de- 
veloper should buy enough TýaD permits in sending areas to proceed 
with the development in receiving areas (McConnell et al., 2003; 
Corkindale, 1999). 
There are two ways of using the Tral) permit to decrease flood 
risk. First is to designate sensitive areas and upstream districts as 
sending areas. More credits can be assigned to land with higher eco- 
logical sensitivity (River Basin Center, 1998) and that with better 
infiltration capacity. Each piece of land is valued according to its en- 
vironmental importance. Secondly, the SC or other non-developers 
can purchase permits without exercising the right of development. 
Sellers are those land owners ' in sending areas. Buyers are ei- 
ther those who demand development in receiving areas or those who 
support a decrease in environmental risk. 
With a knowledgeable SC that discerns the mitigation capacity 
and flood vulnerability of each area, a TraD permit system can avoid 
undersupplied soft mitigation. However, merely considering land use 
is insufficient in flood management when hard mitigation is crucial. 
4Property owners can also be sellers in some cases of Transferable 
Development Rights. 
Here only land is under consideration. 
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TRADEABLE FLOOD REDUCTION PERMIT (TFR PERMIT) 
The purpose of implementing the TFR permit is to decrease flood 
risk using the most efficient mitigation strategy. Different types of 
mitigation and locations generate diverse effects. Hard mitigation 
is immediately and locally effective while soft mitigation is sustain- 
ably and extensively functional. Soft mitigation benefits the local 
area and generates beneficial externalities to downstream and neigh- 
bouring areas. Adverse externalities of undertaking hard mitigation 
partially counteract the benefits to the local area it generates. 
The SC determines the optimal flood risk, and then auctions or 
issues the permits to mitigation suppliers. Transactions then fol- 
low. Obtaining information of mitigation in each region is no longer 
necessary. Information is revealed through the market mechanism. 
Buyers are those who have responsibilities for flood mitigation, 
those who benefit from a decrease in flood risk, or less efficient miti- 
gation adopters. Potential sellers are those who can offer mitigation, 
especially more efficient mitigation. For instance, the downstream 
area might purchase upstream soft mitigation or compensate the 
upstream area to abandon hard mitigation. Additionally, the SC 
need not participate in transactions and is required to only provide 
relevant information to ease the transactions. 
The TFR permit is appropriate to the cases in which adverse 
externalities of hard mitigation are not severe. Otherwise, either 
imposing a restriction on hard mitigation or introducing the follow- 
ing type of permit should be considered. 
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TRADEABLE RISK NEUTRAL PERMIT (TRiNe PERMIT) 
In the TRiNe permit system, a region can secure its rights to un- 
dertake hard mitigation or to develop only if it can neutralise the 
incremental flood risk of the externality receptors by purchasing 
them enough mitigation. Apparently, soft mitigation that generates 
beneficial externalities is encouraged. 
Even though the spirit of decentralisation does not remain strong 
due to the regulation, the SC is only in charge of establishing and 
enforcing rules. Transactions of the TRiNe permits take place. De- 
velopers and hard mitigation adopters purchase mitigation for the 
receptors of the externalities generated by them. Hence soft miti- 
gation that does not generate adverse externalities is encouraged. 
Sellers, the suppliers of soft mitigation, are mostly farmers and 
other land owners. Free-riding can be avoided while soft mitiga- 
tion adopters are compensated by market mechanisms. 
Furthermore, setting a higher standard for risk reduction instead 
of neutralisation is a good attempt to modify this type of TFP 
system. On the other hand, a lower standard for risk reduction can 
be a compromise. 
DISCUSSION 
The TraD, TFR, and TRiNe permits differ in trading objectives and 
the information an SC needs. Hence they are recommended under 
different institutional conditions. 
The TraD permit system focuses on land use. If the SC knows the 
extent of flood risk externality an area can generate, the marginal 
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welfare/cost with respect to development, and the marginal effect of 
development on generating runoff of some areas in the catchment, it 
will be capable to undertake the TraD permit system. Adopting the 
TraD permit system guarantees the undertaking of soft mitigation. 
Though this system originates from neutralising or attenuating the 
adverse externalities, it focuses only on land use. Hence, the man- 
agement is flawed when hard mitigation is crucial. 
The TFR permit system incorporates soft and hard mitigation. 
The access to information about the extent of flood risk external- 
ity an area can generate, the marginal welfare/cost with respect to 
development, the marginal welfare/cost with respect to hard miti- 
gation, the marginal effect of development on generating runoff, and 
the marginal effect of hard mitigation on generating runoff are not 
required for the SC. It increases the efficiency of mitigation but faces 
problems of adverse externalities. 
The TRiNe permit system targets obtaining zero adverse ex- 
ternality. When the problem of externalities is critical, the ex- 
tent of flood risk externality in most areas is large for instance, 
an externality- free system of this sort can be brought into play. The 
conditions for adopting these three types of permit systems are pre- 
sented in Table 6.4. 
Similar to other 'user-pay' based methods of flood management, 
the financial burden of flood control can be apportioned. When 
the property rights and the targeted areas of flood risk reduction 
are obvious, the financial source can also be clear. The difference 
is money goes directly to those who should be compensated rather 
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than through the SC. Consequently, contrary to taxes, the price of 
mitigation is determined by the market instead of by a policy-maker. 
In the two-tired decentralised management, an SC decides which 
type(s) of the permits the catchment (or region) is going adopt, 
sets up the rules, designs and distributes the permits, and monitors 
the implementation of the permit system. In the UK, an SC may 
want to ask the current environmental authority in charge of flood 
mitigation, such as the Environment Agency, to report to the SC. 
Table 6.4: Conditions for adopting the three types of tradeable permit systems 
Condition TýaD TFR TRiNe 
Hard mitigation (k) is essential 
Severe ecological externalities of k V/ 
Severe flood risk externalities of k -%/ 
Soft mitigation at certain locations is essential -V/ 
Uncertainty about marginal cost of k 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has proposed a way to coordinate decisions among 
local areas within a decentralised framework to achieve an efficient 
and effective outcome in flood management given the limitations of 
information and bounded rationality. This entails the introduction 
of the two-tier decentralised decision-making process. 
Information valuable for management is brought together by in- 
corporating multiple interests of the SC and by introducing the mar- 
ket mechanism of the TFP. An SC is responsible for determining 
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related targets and rules to improve both efficiency and equity. The 
market mechanism ensures the internalisation of externalities and 
compensation goes directly to those who suffer from losses. Three 
types of TFPs, TraD, TFR and TRiNe permits, are suggested based 
on different institutional conditions composed of different policy foci 
and the information accessed by the SC. 
In application, a change of flood risk can be estimated from the 
change of hard mitigation capacity and that of infiltration capacity. 
The capacity of hard mitigation is given by engineering. Infiltration 
capacity can be measured using a ring infiltrometer or estimated 
using river flow and catchment area. The application of this two- 
tier decentralised flood management is particularly promising in the 
catchment with severe externalities from upstream economic activ- 
ities such as over- development, deforestation, or hard mitigation. 
The development of this decentralised management system is still 
at an early stage. Bridging knowledge between related disciplines, 
such as hydrology and economics, as well as systems design, is indis- 
pensable to enhancing its practicality and improving the efficiency. 
Finally, tasks and knowledge involved differ in cases. This chap- 
ter demonstrates the way to form the SC. The next chapter will 
focus on the feasibility and the institutional setup of implementing 
the TFP system in the catchment of the Yorkshire Ouse, the Swale, 
the Ure and the Nidd. 
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Feasibility of the Tradeable Flood Permit 
System 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims at examining the feasibility of implementing the 
tradeable flood permit (TFP) system in the catchment of the York- 
shire Ouse, the Swale, the Ure and the Nidd in order to make policy 
recommendations for flood management. Section 7.2 reviews the 
incidence and severity of flood events and the hydrological charac- 
teristics in this catchment to provide an overview of the problem 
of flooding and its connection to natural factors. Section 7.3 in- 
vestigates the anthropogenic factors influencing floods in the catch- 
ment and the prerequisites for adopting the TFP system. The het- 
erogeneity in the geographical and economic dimensions, and the 
externalities in land use and mitigation are reviewed. Section 7.4 
compares the effectiveness of the three permit systems with that of 
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the current management system and identifies the prioritisation of 
the three TFP systems. It also addresses the institutional setup for 
implementing the new management system. Section 7.5 presents the 
chapter conclusions. 
7.2 The problem of flooding 
The purpose of this section is to characterise the problems of flood- 
ing and to pinpoint the nature of the problem in the test catchment. 
7.2.1 Flood events 
There are two types of floods in this catchment - fluvial flood and 
tidal flood. The tidal waters have a reach of 317 krn upstream in 
the River Swale (Winn et al., 2003). Only fluvial flooding is under 
consideration in this research. 
Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1 show an increasing frequency of flood 
events over time. This phenomenon may result from an increase 
in flood occurrence or the improvement in flood recording. The 
peak-over-threshold (POT) counts at Skelton on the Ouse (Figure 
7.2) coincides with this pattern and suggests an increasing flood 
risk after the late 1950s. The runoff and river flow data will be 
reviewed in Subsection 7.2.2 to judge which is the case. Table 7.1 
also indicates that heavy rainfall, with snowmelt in some cases, is 
the predominant cause of flooding in this catchment. Additionally, 
most floods occur in autumn, winter and early spring. However, this 
pattern has changed recently after the summer floods in the years 
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2000 and 2002. 
Cý 
C\l 
15 
73 
LL 
q .............................. 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Water Year 
Figure 7.1: Counts of flood occurrence per year in the catchment of the Yorkshire 
Ouse, the Swale, the Ure, and the Nidd (1947-2005), based on data from Table 
7.1. 
7.2.2 Hydrological characteristics 
This catchment has a temperate maritime climate. The maritime 
climate is strongly influenced by the oceans, which maintain fairly 
steady temperatures across the seasons. However, there is no specific 
feature in terms of precipitation pattern in a climatic zone of this 
sort. The temporal trends of catchment runoff, of river flow, and of 
rainfall, and the impacts of snow, are reviewed below. 
The time series of hydrological data are calculated over the water 
year from October I to September 30 in the following year in the UK. 
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Figure 7.2: Counts of the p eak-over- threshold (POT) per year at the Skelton 
on the Ouse (1885-2002). Solid line: original data; dashed line: smoothing the 
original data using 5-year moving average. Data source: Environment Agency 
Hiflows Dataset. POT threshold is 249.38 M3/SeC. 
The gauging stations, listed in Table 7.2, were chosen on the basis of 
availability of long-term data sets and sub-catchment coverage. The 
catchment is divided into eight sub-catchments (refer to Figure 7.3): 
the upstream Swale (upstream of Richmond, coded S,, ), the down- 
stream Swale (downstream of Richmond, coded Sd), the upstream 
Ure (upstream of Ripon, coded U,, ), the downstream Ure (down- 
stream of Ripon, including Ripon, coded Ud), the upstream Nidd 
(upstream of Harrogate, coded N,, ), the downstream Nidd (down- 
stream of Harrogate, including Harrogate, coded Nd), the upstream 
Ouse (upstream of York, including York, coded 0,, ), the downstream 
Ouse (downstream of York, coded Od). Hence, there are potentially 
two layers of transactions in the permit market, within each river 
and between upstream and downstream rivers. 
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Table 7.2: Selected gauging stations 
River Runoff Flow Rainfall 
Ouse Skelton Skelton York 
Swale Richmond Crakehill Richmond 
Crakehill 
Ure Kilgram Bridge Kilgram Bridge Leighton Reservoir 
Low Houses 
Nidd Hunsingore Weir Hunsingore Weir Birstwith 
Gouthwaite Reservoir Harlow Hill Reservoir 
TEMPORAL TREND OF CATCHMENT RUNOFF 
The trend of runoff over time is examined in terms of the annual 
maximum of monthly runoff at the chosen gauging stations. The 
original and smoothed data are presented in Figure 7.4.1 Consider 
the model for testing the trend in the annual maximum of monthly 
runoff 
rt = ao + a, -t+c (7.1) 
where t is water year, rt is the annual maximum of monthly runoff 
at water year t, ao is the intercept, a, is the slope of the linear 
line, and c is the error term. The null hypothesis is a, =0 while the 
alternative hypothesis is a, =ý 0. The regression results are presented 
IFor the purpose of the research, the method employed to deal with the missing values 
is more than adequate, and the author would not want to introduce other elements that 
might distract from the main goal. If one introduces methods of imputation, investigation 
and comparison with other dataset will be required and always problematic to use. 
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Figure 7.3: The catchment of the Yorkshire Ouse, the Swale, the Ure, and the 
Nidd. 
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in Appendix B. The fitted regression lines are shown respectively: 2 
o Kilgram Bridge: 
rt =83.64 + 2.56t 
[. 03] [. 00] 
* Skelton: 
rt =80-75 + 1.35t 
1.001 1.011 
e Crakehill: 
rt =68-35 + 1-08t 
[. 00] [. 00] 
,* Richmond: 
rt =194.56 - 2.28t 
[. 00] [. 25] 
* Gouthwaite Reservoir: 
rt =136-75 + . 84t 
[. 00] [. 04] 
9 Hunsingore Weir: 
(7.2a) 
(7.2b) 
(7.2c) 
(7.2d) 
(7.2e) 
rt =100.63 + . 29t (7.2f 
[. 00] [. 24] 
The results suggest that we can reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no trend over time in the maximum monthly runoff at Skel- 
ton (the Ouse), Kilgram Bridge (the Ure), Crakehill (the Swale), 
and Gouthwaite Reservoir (the Nidd) at the 90% significance level. 
2The p-values are in the square brackets. 
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The sign of the paramater indicates an increasing trend in the an- 
nual maximum of monthly runoff. On the other hand, we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no trend in the maximum of 
monthly runoff at Richmond (the Swale) and Hunsingore Weir (the 
Nidd). 
TREND OF RIVER FLOW 
Figure 7.5 presents the annual maximum values of daily flow at the 
chosen stations. Consider the model for testing the trend of the 
annual maximum of daily flow, the maximum value of daily flow in 
each water year 
ft = ao + a, -t+c (7-3) 
where t is water year, ft is the annual maximum of daily flow at 
water year t, ao is the intercept, a, is the slope of the linear line, 
E is the error term. The null hypothesis is a, = 0 while the alter- 
native hypothesis is a, =ý 0. The regression results are presented in 
Appendix C. The fitted regression lines are shown respectively: 
* Kilgram Bridge: 
ft =211.46 + 2.10t (7.4a) 
[. 00] [. 06] 
* Skelton: 
ft =: 213.92 + 10.77t (7.4b) 
[. 001 1.011 
9 Crakehill: 
ft =169.32 + 2-08t (7.4c) 
[. 00] [. 04] 
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Figure 7.4: Trends over time in the annual maximum of monthly runoff in the 
catchment of the Ouse, the Swale, the Ure, and the Nidd. Solid line: original 
data; dashed line: smoothing the original data using 5-year moving average. 
Courtesy to Ms. Felicity Sanderson of2N*tional Water Archive. 
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o Hunsingore Weir: 
ft =66.89 + . 65t (7.4d) 
[. 00] [. 05] 
According to the results, we can reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no trend over time in the maximum values of daily flow at 
all the gauging stations, Skelton (the Ouse), Kilgram Bridge (the 
Ure), Crakehill (the Swale), and Hunsingore Weir (the Nidd), at 
the signicance level of 90%. The sign of the paramater indicates an 
increasing trend in the annual maximum daily flow, which could be 
due to progressively more extreme precipitation events, to effects of 
changes in catchment land use, or scouring effects of upstream river 
channel. The scouring effect on the river beds is left out in this 
discussion. 
TREND OF RAINFALL 
Table 7.1 indicated the major cause of most flood events in this 
catchment is heavy rainfall. Figure 7.6 and Figure 7.7 summarise 
the annual rainfall and ratio of winter rainfall (from October to 
March in the following year) to annual rainfall (from October to 
September in a water year). 
Consider the models for testing the trend of the annual rainfall 
and that of the ratio of winter rainfall 
pt = ao + a, -t+ Ep 
(7.5a) 
wt = bo + bi -t+ cw (7.5b) 
where t is water year, pt is the annual rainfall at water year t, wt is 
the winter rainfall at water year t. ao, a,, and ep are the intercept, 
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Figure 7.5: Týrends over time in the annual maximum of daily flow in the catch- 
ment of the Ouse, the Swale, the Ure, and the Nidd. Solid line: original data; 
dashed line: smoothing the original data using 5-year moving average. Courtesy 
to Ms. Diana Orr of the Environment Agency at York. 
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7.2 The problem of flooding 
slope, and residual of the model in equation (7.5a); bo, bl, and 6"' are 
the intercept, slope, and residual of the model in equation (7.5b). 
The null and alternative hypotheses for the first model are a, 0 
and a, :ý0 while that for the second model are b, =0 and b, 0. 
The regression results are presented in Appendix D. The fitted 
regression lines are shown respectively: 
4p York: 
pt =640.74 - . 51t 
[. 00] [. 27] 
(7.6a) 
wt =. 4707 + . 0004t 
[. 0000] [. 2809] 
e Richmond: 
pt =793.91 - 1.31t 
[. 00] [. 54] 
(7.6b) 
wt =. 4767 + . 0028t 
[. 0000] [. 0834] 
9 Low Houses: 
pt =1023.01 - 1.95t 
[. 00] [. 41] 
(7.6c) 
rt =. 5130 + . 0029t 
[. 0000] [. 0307] 
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,D Leighton Reservoir: 
pt =991.37 - 2.42t 
[. 00] [. 3444] 
(7.6d) 
wt =. 5197 + . 0034t 
[. 0000] [. 0285] 
9 Birstwith: 
pt =914.09 - 3.51t 
[. 00] [. 15] 
(7.6e) 
wt =. 4929 + . 0029t 
[. 0000] [. 0307] 
,* Harlow Hill Reservoir: 
pt =814.45 - . 48t 
[. 00] [. 49] 
(7.6f) 
wt =. 4910 + . 0009t 
[. 0000] [. 0503] 
The results associated with the annual rainfall suggest that there 
is no strong evidence against the null hypothesis that there is no 
trend in annual rainfall at each gauging station. However, that 
related to the ratio of winter rainfall to annual rainfall suggests that 
we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no trend in the ratio of 
winter rainfall to annual rainfall at each gauging station apart from 
York (the Ouse). The sign of the paramater indicates an increasing 
trend in winter rainfall relative to annual rainfall (i. e., wetter winters 
and/or drier summers). 
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Figure 7.6: Trends over time in the annual rainfall in the catchment of the 
Ouse, the Swale, the Ure, and the Nidd. Solid line: original data; dashed line: 
smoothing the original data using 5-year moving average. Data source: MIDAS 
Land Surface Station Data of the British Atmospheric Data Centre. 
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SNOW AND SNOWMELT 
Snow and snowmelt are also factors or catalysts of flooding in this 
catchment. At higher elevations in the Pennines a significant amount 
of winter precipitation falls as snow. Snow hence affects the flow of 
the rivers which drain the area. Flooding in winter might be asso- 
ciated with rain on snow or rapidly thawing snow. Serious floods 
might come from snowmelt coupled to heavy rainfall. 
In Yorkshire, some of the greatest floods have been associated 
with an extreme rainfall event when there is snow on the ground. As 
a result, snowmelt is also added to the rainfall for runoff generation 
in Table 7.1. Snowmelt is a major factor of flooding of the Ure in 
particular. 
7.2.3 Summary 
The increasing trends in the maximum value of monthly runoff each 
year, and in maximum value of daily flow each year suggest an in- 
crease over the years in extreme runoff and flow. On the other hand, 
the annual rainfall in this catchment indicates no increasing trend, 
even though ratio of winter rainfall to annual rainfall is tending 
to increase. Flood events in summers of 2000 and 2002 suggest a 
change of rainfall pattern recently. Since the rainfall pattern does 
not provide any conclusive evidence of being the driving force of the 
increasing flood risk in this catchment, the anthropogenic factors as- 
sociated with economic behaviour (land use) and averting behaviour 
(hard mitigation and soft mitigation) for flooding need to be inves- 
tigated. The nature of these anthropogenic factors also affect the 
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feasibility of the TFP system and will be discussed in the following 
section. 
7.3 Checking the prerequisites for implementa- 
tion of a tradeable flood permit system in 
the catchment 
This section provides a preliminary analysis of the feasibility of ap- 
plying a TFP system by checking the prerequisites for implementing 
such as trading system. The check on these prerequisites in the test 
catchment is conducted through consideration of sub-catchments. 
The prerequisites for implementing a TFP system are heterogene- 
ity of geographical and economic characteristics, and the externali- 
ties generated by land use and averting behaviour are summarised 
in Table 7.3. The nature of the externalities and the accessibility of 
information in the context of prioritising the Tral), the TFR, and 
the TRiNe permit systems should refer to Table 6.4. 
Table 7.3: Prerequisites of adopting a tradeable flood permit system 
Prerequisite Perspective 
Heterogeneity geographical and economic characteristics 
Externality land use and averting behaviour 
7.3.1 Heterogeneity within the catchment 
The heterogeneity of the sub-catchments is examined with respect to 
their geographical characteristics and their economic characteristics. 
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GEOGRAPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
The Ouse, the Swale, the Ure and the Nidd system drains a catch- 
ment of approximately 400,000 hectares. It lies in the eastern part 
of central England and extends from the high altitude Pennines 
in the northwest to the lower ground of the Vale of York and the 
Humber Estuary. Most of the upland area in the Pennines is more 
than 600 m above sea level while most of the land south of York is 
less than 20 m above sea level. The Ure and the Swale are princi- 
pally upstream while the Nidd is a principal tributary of the Ouse 
which flows south to the Humber Estuary and runs to the North 
Sea. The difference in height between the upstream areas and the 
downstream areas results in fast river flow and short lead time for 
each flood event. 
The River Swale rises in the moorlands bordering on Westmoor- 
land. It passes through ravines, valleys, woods and meadows, and 
finally enters the Vale of York. In its further course it receives the 
Wiske, Codbeck, and a few smaller streams, and joins the Ure at 
Myton (GENUKI, 2005). The upstream area of Richmond (S,,, ) is 
mainly highland while the downstream area of Richmond (Sd) is 
mainly residential. 
The River Ure has its source in a spring on the summit of a 
hill (2,186 feet high) on the borders of Westmoorland. It rises in 
the upland regions of the Pennines and falls through the Yorkshire 
Dales National Park, the Nidderdale Area of Outstanding Natural 
Beauty, toward the Vale of York. It joins the Swale to form the 
Ouse (Halcrow Group Limited, 2001). The upstream area of Ripon 
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(U,, ) is mainly highland while the downstream area of Ripon (Ud) is 
mainly residential. 
The River Nidd starts from the west of Harrogate District and 
flows through the Nidderdale Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty, 
and a number of designated Sites of Special Scientific Interest and 
Conservation Areas. It continues through Nidd Gorge, which sep- 
arates Harrogate and Knaresborough, and the Green Belt between 
Harrogate and Knaresborough and a designated Conservation Area 
located to the south of Knaresborough. The river then continues 
through agricultural land. In the end it flows into the Vale of York 
where it meanders east to join the Ouse at Nun Monkton on Har- 
rogate District's boundary (Babtie Brown and Root, 2005). This 
sub-catchment is relatively small. The steep, narrow profiles of the 
main and tributary valleys cause the river to rise quickly in response 
to rainfall. The area upstream of Harrogate (N,, ) is mainly highland 
while the area downstream of Harrogate (Nd) is mainly residential. 
The River Ouse has its source to the west of Linton-on-Ouse, at 
the entry point of the Ure. The Ure and the Swale are the two major 
tributaries while several other rivers such as the River Derwent and 
the River Wharfe also flow into the River Ouse to the south of York. 
The Ouse runs through the Vale of York and becomes tidal below 
Naburn Weir (Environment Agency, 2004). ' The area upstream of 
York (0,, ) is mainly residential while the area downstream of York 
(0d) is mainly industrial. 
313efore the construction of Naburn Weir in 1757, the river upstream of Naburn was also 
affected by tide (Buckham, 1967). 
220 
7.3 Checking the prerequisites for implementation of a tradeable 
flood permit system in the catchment 
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 
The catchment mainly lies within the administrative areas of North 
Yorkshire in Yorkshire and Humberside. The economic characteris- 
tics mainly relate to land use patterns. Apart from land use, regional 
GDP is also reviewed to indicate the productivity of this catchment 
and the potential cost of flood losses. 
Problems of catchment management often result from the lim- 
itation of administrative boundaries. However, the economic data 
for analysis mostly needs to be compiled from administrative areas. 
Hence the interpretation of the data demands caution. 
The catchment currently covers seven districts, Craven, Scarbor- 
ough, Ryedale, Hambleton, Richmondshire, Selby, and Harrogate, 
and the York City Council area. Prior to 1974, it belonged to the 
North Riding of Yorkshire. Though it does not exactly match its ge- 
ographical boundary, the North Riding of Yorkshire (prior to 1974) 
and (North Yorkshire of) Yorkshire and Humberside (after 1974) 
represent the administrative boundary of the study area. 
GDP contribution 
Figure 7.8 shows the contribution to GDP of activities in this 
study area. There is an increasing trend in GDP per capita over 
time; GDP contributed by agriculture has fluctuated; it has in- 
creased overall at a low rate, but fell in 1997. Manufacturing and 
service industries contribute significantly more to GDP than agri- 
culture. 
Land use change 
This catchment supports a variety of land uses from natural land 
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Figure 7.8: Left: GDP, GDP per capita, and GDP contributed by agriculture in 
the catchment of the Ouse, the Swale, the Ure, and the Nidd; solid line: GDP; 
dashed line: GDP per capita; dotted line: GDP contributed by agriculture, 
hunting, forestry and fishing. Right: GDP contributed by agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing. Data source: Economic and Social Data Service. 
(open moorland) through pasture and arable to urban areas. The 
land use along the Swale, the Ure and the Nidd is mostly rural 
while that along the Ouse (0,,, ) is a mixture of intensive agricultural 
land (such as the Vale of York) and the residential and industrial 
areas such as York, Selby and satellite settlements like Naburn and 
Cawood (0d). Tourism is also an important economic activity in 
this catchment. 
1. Agriculture 
In the theoretical model, agricultural land and manufacturing 
land are represented as 'natural' and 'non-natural' land cover for 
simplicity. In reality, agricultural land does not guarantee a natural 
infiltration process. Moreover, the drainage and flood walls which 
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aim at improving agricultural productivity might generate adverse 
externalities via downstream flood risks. 
2. Other industries 
Mining has also been an economic feature in this catchment. The 
Pennines, Yorkshire Dales and Peak District used to have prosperous 
mining in lead and zinc. Currently, there are three major sand and 
gravel quarries alongside the Ure at Masham, West Tanfield and 
Ripon Racecourse. Selby Coalfield on the Ouse has had a long 
history of prosperous mining. 
Industries are mostly located in the downstream areas of York 
(0d). Apart from the coalfield, Selby currently has food processing 
and chemical industries near to the river for both historical transport 
reasons and because of the ready supply of water. Long Drax Power 
Station is also located on the Ouse and uses the river for cooling 
water. 
Development 
The development pressure is generally not great in this catch- 
ment. Popular tourist sites such as North Yorkshire Dales and other 
tourist towns/cities like Ripon and York may have further devel- 
opment that leads to an increase in downstream flood risks. The 
annual average change from undeveloped land to developed land in 
Yorkshire and Humberside from 1991 to 2000 is 525 hectares, ac- 
cording to the Office for National Statistics. 
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7.3.2 Externalities in the catchment 
The nature of the externalities is identified below to provide infor- 
mation for the prioritisation of the three permit choices following 
confirmation of the appropriateness of adopting the permits system. 
The reasons for a policy-maker to intervene in flood mitigation 
and development activities lie in the flood risk externalities between 
upstream and downstream areas. Flood risk externalities involve 
flood damage and possible flood-related environmental health prob- 
lems. The externality of flood damage depends on land use patterns 
and averting behaviour while that of flood-related environmental 
health problems depends on water quality. 
LAND USE PATTERNS 
Over recent decades, a drastic increase in agricultural productivity 
and the introduction of winter crops in the 1940s to 1950s (after 
the second world war) led farmers to drain their land, especially 
for winter crops (refer to Figure 7.9). Flood gates and drainage 
accordingly were built on a huge scale. 
Figure 7.10 illustrates the increasing trend in the arable land 
and a decreasing trend in fallow land. Permanent grassland, shown 
in Figure 7.11, has fluctuated over time with a strongly decreasing 
trend. 
Spatially, land use upstream raises three concerns. The first is 
an increase in drainage. Land-drainage grants given to local land 
owners in order to encourage them to improve the moors for grouse 
shooting and sheep grazing by draining the uplands in the 1960s- 
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Figure 7.9: Winter crops (wheat, potato, and linseed) in the North Riding of 
Yorkshire. The data gap is a result of change of administrative boundary in the 
1970s. No data is available in the 1980s. Data source: DEFRA Agricultural 
Census Data. 
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Figure 7.10: Arable land and fallow land in the North Riding of Yorkshire. The 
data gap was a result of change of administrative boundary in the 1970s. No 
data is available in the 1980s. Data source: DEFRA Agricultural Census Data. 
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Figure 7.11: Permanent grassland in the North Riding of Yorkshire. The data 
gap was a result of change of administrative boundary in the 1970s. No data is 
available in the 1980s. Data source: DEFRA Agricultural Census Data. 
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1970s played a role in affecting the hydrological characteristics in 
the catchment. For example, grip drains were dug in the upstream 
Swale (S,, ) and they have allowed rain water to run directly into the 
Swale. The downstream Swale (Sd) and the Ouse (0,,, and Od) have 
been affected as a result. 
Furthermore, as the moors have dried out, the soil has lost its 
sponge-like quality so that in terms of high rainfall water poured into 
the river system raising flood levels way above natural flash flood 
conditions. Nevertheless, there are few published data to support 
this proposition. Currently an experiment is being conducted in 
the catchment of the Wharfe to test this hypothesis (Environment 
Agency, 2004). 
The second problem is overgrazing on the highlands (S,,, U,, and 
N,,, ). Overgrazing further reduces the level of vegetation, exacer- 
bating already acute conditions. The number of cattle has been 
increasing while the number of sheep increased back to its level of 
the 1930s during the 1960s (refer to Figure 7.12). Both show a 
decreasing trend after the 1980s. The number of cattle and sheep 
decreased drastically after the foot and mouth epidemic. 
Finally, clear felling of commercial timber plantations in the up- 
stream areas (S,,, U,,, and N,,, ) might also have exacerbated down- 
stream flood risks (Sd, Ud, Ndj Ou) and Od). Deforestation in this 
catchment nowadays is not a problem. Instead, forestry plantations 
have occurred. However, the timing of felling commercial timber 
can be crucial to the occurrence of a flood event. 
Mineral workings in the Ure (U,,, and Ud) and the Ouse 
(Ou and 
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Figure 7.12: Cattle and sheep in the North Riding of Yorkshire. The data gap 
was a result of change of administrative boundary in the 1970s. No data is 
available in the 1980s. Data source: DEFRA Agricultural Census Data. 
Od) have four key links to flood events. Firstly, there is potential 
for sites to be restored to provide off-line flood storage and/or wet- 
land habitat enhancement. Secondly there is the impact of the mine 
and mining activities on water quality, especially due to flood events. 
Old mine workings can produce large quantities of acid drainage wa- 
ter containing toxic substances in solution. Heavy rain can give rise 
to flash floods which cause severe erosion of waste heaps and severe 
contamination of water courses (Bradshaw and Chadwick, 1980). 
Thirdly, mining affects the water environment by dewatering or dis- 
charges. Fourthly, mining substances can also affect flood defences 
and their standard of protection, for example, if water is pumped 
from below ground, or ceases to be used for mineral processing, or 
streams are dammed to retain water for use when needed. 
In summary, an increase in agricultural practice (in terms of graz- 
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ing, area of winter crops, and drainage) in the 1940s-1950s and its 
associated effect on flood mitigation in the 1960s-1970s, and an in- 
crease in development are probably the causes of a higher likelihood 
of flooding in this catchment. Changes in other previous and cur- 
rent economic activities such as mining and development also may 
impose an increasing risk of flooding on the downstream areas. 
AVERTING BEHAVIOUR 
Averting behaviour undertaken in the study area involves land in 
both public and private ownership. Local authorities and the Envi- 
ronment Agency in principle are responsible for the flood defences. 
The Internal Drainage Boards are responsible for general supervi- 
sion over all aspects of land drainage and for improving aspects of 
land drainage, including pumping stations, conservation and raising 
income to support land drainage works. 
The record of hard mitigation and soft mitigation is not complete. 
Not all defence locations are identified, and not all types of flood 
defence are known (DEFRA, 2001). It is also not easy to date accu- 
rately the construction of individual flood mitigation works. There 
have been two stimuli for the construction of flood defences. One 
is the occurrence of significant flood events, such as those in 1947, 
1982, and 2000 in this catchment (Environment Agency, 2004). The 
other is the increase in agricultural productivity by introducing win- 
ter crops after the second world war. 
Hard mitigation 
Hard mitigation in this catchment includes drainage, flood de- 
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fences, reservoirs, and pumping stations. Earth embankments and 
drainage are prevalent in rural areas while flood walls and pumping 
stations are common in urban areas. 
Reservoirs, often located upstream (U,,, and N,, ), e. g., Gouthwaite 
Reservoir on the Nidd, are built for multiple purposes. In spite of 
regulating water during flooding and drought, they are also used for 
hydraulic mining (called 'hushing' in the Northern Pennines), ore 
processing and separating, and to supply the canal network which 
expanded in the late eighteenth century (Newson, 1992). 
Drainage is often installed to 'dry' local land. Each sub-catchment 
contains drainage works (S,,, Sd, U,,, Ud, N,,, Nd, 0,, and Od). The 
impact of drainage on soil erosion often results in an increase in 
downstream flood risks. For instance, moorland gripping (provision 
of upland drainage channels) was practised extensively in this catch- 
ment, and was especially widespread in parts of upper Wensleydale, 
with the main period of activity in the 1960s to 1970s. It was en- 
couraged by significant grant aid from the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food. In some areas the grip channels have become 
severely eroded and deepened and result in more runoff from rain- 
fall. As these enlarged channels become larger, they are even more 
efficient at transferring rainfall to a river in the form of runoff - 
Some 
residents in Harrogate and York blamed the increase in the upstream 
drainage of this sort for causing flooding in the 1980s (Rimington, 
1982; Robinson, 1990). 
Similar adverse externalities occur due to the construction of 
embankments. Embankments protect arable and urban land from 
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flooding. However, they also delay the use of floodplain storage dur- 
ing events where flood water is passing through houses immediately 
upstream. 
The operation of pumping stations leads water to other places 
and hence similar adverse externalities might also take place. The 
dependence on power supply suggests another problem for pumping 
stations in a flood event. For instance, the efficiency of the Foss 
Barrier Pumping Station was reduced during the peak of the 2000 
flood event because of problems with power supply. 
Hard mitigation of this sort is undertaken in each sub-catchment. 
The conditions of the mitigation works in 2004 in each sub-catchment 
evaluated by the Environment Agency are summarised in Table 
7.4. Those with 'very poor' condition are owned by local Internal 
Drainage Boards (IDBs). Note that the condition of hard mitiga- 
tion at the Nidd downstream is relatively poor while that at the 
Ure downstream is reasonably good. The conditions of hard mitiga- 
tion for the Ouse upstream and downstream do differ significantly. 
There is no hard mitigation upstream for the Swale, according to 
the records. 
Soft mitigation 
Creation of washlands and control of development are the major 
strategies of soft mitigation in this catchment. The use of mineral 
workings for flood storage and agri-environmental schemes for flood 
alleviation are also options, especially under the consideration of a 
TFP system. 
Washlands are areas of floodplain where water is stored in terms 
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Table 7.4: Conditions for the mitigation works (hard mitigation) on the up- 
stream and downstream areas of the Ouse) the Swale, the Ure and the Nidd. 
Courtesy to Ms. Dinan Orr of the Environment Agency at York (2004). 
Sub- 
catchment 
No. of mitigation 
works very good 
Conditions 
good fair poor very poor 
0" 36 1 7 23 4 1 
Od 98 1 21 74 2 0 
U. 7 0 151 0 
Ud 37 1 12 21 3 0 
S. 0 0 000 0 
Sd 65 2 10 41 12 0 
N,, 8 0 341 0 
Nd 16 0 068 2 
of flood. The principal washlands in this catchment are located at 
the following places: Myton, Ellenthorpe and Morton on the Swale 
(Sd); Nunwick (U,,, ) and Aldborough (Ud) on the Ure; Nun Monkton 
and Moor Monkton on the Nidd (Nd); Linton (0,, ), Clifton (0,, ), 
Middlethorpe (0d), Kelfield (0d), Riccall (0d), Cawood-Wistow 
Lordship on the Ouse (0d)- 
The washlands on the Nidd are in the vicinity of the confluence 
with the Ouse. They are too far downstream to benefit any signif- 
icant property or road within the catchment. Instead of benefiting 
the Nidd, they can have an effect on flood flows in the Ouse. 
Development control aims not only to maintain natural ways to 
mitigate flooding but also to avoid generating new flood risks. For 
instance, development in an excavated section of the valley side that 
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leads to an increase in flood risks, such as Shaw Mills on the Nidd, 
should be avoided. 
To enforce the developer's responsibility for flooding, Regional 
Planning Guidance for Yorkshire and the Humber (2001) stressed 
the need to ensure that new development does not increase the like- 
lihood of flooding, which was stricter than the previous regulation 
in Policy and Practice for the Protection of Floodplains. 
Afforestation is also an option (Environment Agency, 2004) in 
soft mitigation. Though deforestation on a large scale is not a press- 
ing problem nowadays, restoration of woodlands can aid the reten- 
tion and delay the release of floodwater, as long as any ploughing 
at time of planting is not downslope. 
Briefly, the recorded downstream hard mitigation was mainly un- 
dertaken after the 1947 flood and during the 1980s, while the up- 
stream hard mitigation occurred in the 1940s to 1950s and the 1960s 
to 1970s. This suggests a possible time lag between the upstream 
and the downstream averting behaviour. Currently there is intense 
hard mitigation located in the upstream catchment. Hence, an in- 
crease in upstream soft mitigation and a decrease in upstream hard 
mitigation may be a solution to ameliorate adverse externalities to 
the downstream catchment. 
WATER QUALITY AS AN INDICATOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
HEALTH RISK 
There are five primary sources of pollution of concern during flood 
events. First is sewage or waste water leakage, a point source of pol- 
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lution. No records of this have been found so far. Sewage treatment 
works are mostly adjacent to the rivers, and associated with pop- 
ulation centres. Hence they should be monitored carefully during 
flood events. The possible overloading of some works due to influxes 
of tourists during the peak season needs to be taken into account. 
Water quality is bad in some places due to the discharge of sewage 
such as at Oak Beck and Crimple Beck (tributaries of the Nidd), and 
Masham. on the Ure (Halcrow Group Limited, 2001; Babtie Brown 
and Root, 2005). 
Second is another point source of pollution, industrial discharge, 
including mining. The industrial discharge may be made worse or 
diluted by flooding. In the Nidd catchment, there are few direct 
industrial discharges, but those that do exist are generally associated 
with food processing works. The downstream areas of the River 
Ouse contain more industries and hence this problem should be 
cautiously considered. 
The third pollution source is non-point source pollution, due to 
the usage of agricultural chemicals. This is particularly important 
for catchment areas with primary agricultural land, located in up- 
stream areas. 
Fourth, previous mining activities may also affect flood risks, for 
example via the resurfacing of underground water. The historic 
lead and zinc mining in the Northern Pennines, Yorkshire Dales 
and Peak District significantly affect water and sediment quality in 
downstream areas, and have done for many years (Macklin et al., 
1997; Hudson-Edwards et al., 1999). 
234 
7.3 Checking the prerequisites for implementation of a tradeable 
flood permit system in the catchment 
Fifth, polluted water from landfills is also a concern (Babtie 
Brown and Root, 2005). Landfills on the catchment of the River 
Ouse include the industrial waste landfill sites at Drax and British 
Sugar in York, and smaller household, commercial or industrial 
waste landfill sites at Barlby, Naburn, Nunthorpe, and York. Hence, 
concentrations of zinc and cadmium, corresponding to the tribu- 
taries associated with mining, should be observed in water quality 
monitoring. 
To further investigate whether these affect the study catchment, 
the relationship between water quality and river flow is reviewed. 
The available data on water quality provided by the Environment 
Agency at York in 2002-3 suggest no critical threat in terms of water 
chemical quality when river flow is high. The results of correlation 
tests at each gauging station in Table 7.5 should indicate any po- 
tential risk at high flow. All the significant correlations of the con- 
centrations of ammonium, nitrite, and zinc with flow above the 5% 
significance level are consistently positive while the concentrations 
of nitrate, magnesium, and calcium consistently negatively corelate 
with flow. It is well known (Cresser and Edwards, 1987) that cal- 
cium and magnesium concentrations fall under high flow conditions 
in British upland rivers, as water flowing from acidified upper soil 
horizons makes a greater contribution to river discharge. Both cal- 
cium and magnesium are derived largely from mineral weathering, 
which is more important under base-flow conditions when water 
drains lower, more mineral-rich soils. This also implies the enhance- 
ment effect is dominant for the former three species and the dilution 
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effect is dominant for the later three. 
The relationships between ammonium concentraion and discharge, 
between nitrite concentration and discharge, between nitrate con- 
centration and discharge, and between BOD and discharge are shown 
in Figures 7.13,7.14,7.15, and 7.16. 
Table 7.5 shows that the concentration of ammonium is signifi- 
cantly positively correlated to discharge at Topcliffe on the Swale. It 
also shows that the concentration of nitrite is significantly positively 
correlated to discharge at Catterick on the Swale, Topcliffe on the 
Swale, and Middleham/Wensley on the Ure. Both of these species 
could be associated with sewage works effluent discharge under high 
flow conditions, possibly when the capacity of treatment works is 
temporarily exceeded. Main works related to the gauging stations 
are listed in Table 7.6. BOD (Figure 7.16) also is quite high at high 
discharge at Topcliffe. 
However, there is a significantly negative correlation between the 
concentration of nitrate and river flow at Catterick on the Swale and 
Middleham/Wensley on the Ure. This may be for several reasons. 
When soil is saturated due to high precipitation, the soil conditions 
may transform from aerobic to anaerobic, leading to denitrification. 
Secondly, although higher flows occur during autumn and winter 
periods, when crop uptake of nitrate is much reduced, the dilution 
effect may be greater, and nitrification rate lower, in winter. 
In summary, the heterogeneity of the geographical and economic 
characteristics, and the occurrence of the externalities in land use 
and averting behaviour suggest the potential for implementing the 
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Figure 7.13: Relationships between ammonium concentration and river flow in 
the catchment of the Ouse, the Swale, the Ure, and the Nidd. Data source: 
courtesy to Ms. Diana Orr of the Environment Agency at York. 
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Figure 7.14: Relationships between nitrite concentration and river flow in the 
catchment of the Ouse, the Swale, the Ure, and the Nidd. Data source: courtesy 
to Ms. Diana Orr of the Environment Agency at York. 
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Figure 7.15: Relationships between nitrate concentratio 
catchment of the Ouse, the Swale, the Ure, and the Nidd. 
to Ms. Diana Orr of the Environment Agency at York. 
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Figure 7.16: Relationships between river flow and BOD in the catchment of the 
Ouse, the Swale, the Ure, and the Nidd. Courtesy to Ms. Diana Orr of the 
Environment Agency at York. 
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Table 7.6: Sewage/waste water treatment works at or at the upstream area 
of the selected gauging stations 
Gauging station Treatment work Receiving watercourse 
Catterick Catterick the Swale 
Topcliffe Skipton the Swale 
Wensley Wensley the Wensley Brook 
Middleham; Wensley Witton West the Ure 
Borough Bridge Borough Bridge the Ure 
Westwick Skelton-on-Ure the Ure 
Nether Poppleton Linton-on-Ouse the Ouse 
TFP system (see Table 7.7). The geographical heterogeneity and the 
externalities provide the physical foundation while the economic het- 
erogeneity gives the financial incentives necessary for the transaction 
to take place. The nature of the externalities and the accessibility 
of the related information for each sub-catchment are summarised 
in Table 7.8, which suggests the choice among three permit systems. 
Evaluation of water quality at high discharge did not suggest signifi- 
cant sewage overflow contamination in the rivers. The health risk is 
thus more likely to be associated with backflushing of sewage from 
local water drains in developed areas themselves. 
7.4 Institutional setup for the tradeable flood 
permit system 
Section 7.3 considered whether the conditions that are needed to 
underpin use of different TFP systems are satisfied. It is argued 
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Table 7.7: The checklist of adopting the tradeable flood permit system in 
the Catchment of the Ouse, the Swale, the Ure, and the Nidd 
Condition The whole catchment 
Heterogeneity in geographical characteristics 
Heterogeneity in economic characteristics 
Adverse externality in flood risk 
Beneficial externality in flood risk 
Adverse externality in environmental health V/ 
Table 7-8: The checklist of adopting the TraD, the TFR, and the TRiNe 
permit systems in the Catchment of the Ouse, the Swale, the Ure, and the 
Nidd. (H): Hard mitigation is essential; (E): Ecological externalities of hard 
mitigation are severe; (F): Flood risk externalities of hard mitigation are 
severe; (S): Soft mitigation is essential; (U): Uncertainty about the marginal 
cost of hard mit4zation. 
Condition 0,, Od Su Sd Uu Ud Nu Nd 
(H) V, 
(E) 
(F) 
(S) 
(U) V, V, V, 
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that a trading regime is suitable for the Ouse, the Swale, the Ure, 
and the Nidd, and the sub-catchments of the last three rivers. A 
trading system may not be effective only in the sub-catchment of 
the Ouse due to the lower level of heterogeneity between upstream 
and downstream areas. 
This section considers whether the institutional conditions exist 
and could support a trading system. The economic efficiency of the 
tradeable permit system depends on participants being able to buy 
and sell permits relatively easily, with incidental transaction costs 
at competitive prices. In other words, the number of participants 
and transactions, the size of transaction costs, and the potential for 
competitive market are three criteria required to establish a feasible 
TFP system. 
Externalities are generated by soft mitigation, hard mitigation, 
and development in this catchment, particularly in the upstream ar- 
eas. Hence transactions that adjust upstream behaviour in exchange 
for benefits to downstream areas would be expected. 
7.4.1 Comparisons among TraD, TFR, and TRiNe permit 
systems 
Table 7.8 indicates that no sub-catchment is ready to adopt the 
Tral) permits system given current conditions. The TRiNe per- 
mits system could be applied to the upstream and downstream sub- 
catchments of each river, especially when flood risk externalities are 
severe. The TFR permits system suits all upstream and downstream 
sub-catchments except for the Swale. The economic characteristics 
244 
7.4 Institutional setup for the tradeable flood permit system 
of the general catchment indicate that the variety and number of 
land owners protect against market thinness. Where there are nu- 
merous small land owners, either the local authority, the community, 
or the agricultural/ industrial organisation can play a role in negotia- 
tion. Moreover, the number of participants, with free entry, can lead 
to a competitive market. Transaction costs depend predominantly 
on the design of the trading system. 
The TraD system is appropriate only for soft mitigation. Adopt- 
ing only the TraD system would offer incomplete flood protection 
unless there were other measures for alleviating externalities gener- 
ated by hard mitigation. 
The TFR system, on the other hand, includes soft and hard miti- 
gation which are both crucial for this catchment. Participants in this 
system can freely select the ways and locations of mitigation. This 
property leads to the expansion of the market for permits. Each 
downstream sub-catchment may purchase soft mitigation from its 
upstream sub-catchment to reduce the flood risk. Alternatively, it 
may pay the upstream sub-catchment to decrease the hard miti- 
gation that generates adverse externalities to the downstream sub- 
catchment. For the Yorkshire Ouse, this applies especially to the 
Swale, the Ure, and the Nidd, particularly for the first two, larger, 
sub-catchments. 
The TRiNe system is a drastic management method to solve to 
problems of externalities. It can be considered when the externalities 
remain problematic. 
Overall, there is a potential for land owners (especially farmers) 
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in the upstream sub-catchments to sell soft mitigation to residents 
and industries in the downstream sub-catchments, especially dur- 
ing winter. Converting upstream hard mitigation to soft mitigation 
can also be considered by taking the benefits from downstream into 
account. 
7.4.2 Efficiency improvement by the tradeable flood per- 
mit system 
Current management focuses on the regulation of development com- 
bined with subsidies for undertaking soft mitigation and charges 
for development in some administrative regions. The Environment 
Agency and local authorities are responsible for flood risk mitiga- 
tion for the public, while the IDBs are in charge of the mitigation 
of flood risk in farming regions. 
The implementation of a tradeable permit system can save the 
public investment in hard and soft mitigation, and the subsidies 
for undertaking soft mitigation. It can also encourage the IDBs to 
improve the existent mitigation works without the cost of policy 
enforcement. Current management cost of planned mitigation con- 
version and that of establishing and maintaining mitigation data 
can be saved once the trading regime is implemented. 
Take the TFR permit for example. Its implementation is ex- 
pected to bring mitigation conversion from hard mitigation to soft 
mitigation in the upstream sub-catchments. Research on mitigation 
conversion in coastal areas often shows improvements. According 
to Farber and Costanza (1987), a storm defence in the coastal wet- 
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lands in Louisiana in the USA is valued between $1,915 and $7,549 
(American dollars) per acre. The estimated costs of adopting soft 
mitigation (sum of the benefits from commercial fisheries, fur trap- 
ping, and recreation) are relatively low, between $514 and $1,428 
per acre. King and Lester (1995) estimated that an 80 m wide strip 
of salt marsh in the UK could result in cost savings of between 
L300,000 and 1600,000 per acre. In this case, there is a bargaining 
range for the land owner and the authorities responsible for miti- 
gating coastal flood risk. 
However, mitigation conversion in riverine areas is more com- 
plicated due to the higher land costs. Experience shows that the 
costs of engineering work are minor compared to land opportunity 
costs (DEFRA, 2002). Fluvial defence costs L8,400 km/yr (DE- 
FRA/Environment Agency, 2002). To obtain efficiency, soft mitiga- 
tion can only be undertaken in the places with lower land cost such 
as agricultural land, rather than residential and industrial areas. 
Moreover, inclusion of other costs of adopting hard mitigation, e. g., 
ecological impacts (though there is no common consensus amongst 
ecologists (DEFRA, 2002)) and sustainability in mitigation is nec- 
essary. In this catchment, each upstream sub-catchment is likely 
to provide soft mitigation to their corresponding downstream sub- 
catchment. As for which areas can provide soft mitigation to down- 
stream, the information will be revealed once the permit market is 
established. 
Overall, while soft mitigation does indeed involve management 
at the catchment scale, at the margin a change in the manage- 
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ment regime generally involves a single investment /project. In or- 
der to consider the temporal and spatial externalities and conduct 
a complete cost effectiveness analysis of soft and hard mitigation, 
a broader scope that involves catchment based strategies and long- 
term perspectives is required. 
7.4.3 Institutional setup 
The institution for the TFP system needs to be set up. Apart from 
the current measures to encourage soft mitigation and to restrict 
development, some other efforts are demanded to launch the TFP 
system. 
First is the information system. Introducing the stakeholders' 
committee (SC) can enrich the information supplied to the policy- 
making process. Each individual has the chance to adjust his/her 
decisions based on the incentives provided. Techniques such as on- 
line transaction can be applied to organise the huge amount of in- 
formation and to decrease the transaction costs. The abundant in- 
formation is also helpful to obtain a competitive equilibrium in the 
market to gain efficiency. 
Second is the incentive system. The incentive system is formed 
with the permit market. Price can reflect the benefits and costs of 
the mitigation and development of different locations and actions. 
Rewards are directly transferred from beneficiaries to those who are 
adjusting their mitigation or development decisions. 
In summary, the TFR permit system is recommended for launch- 
ing the TFP system in this catchment because of its inclusion of mit- 
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igation and development, and the insufficient information on catch- 
ment mitigation and the market thickness. Alternatively, the TraD 
permit system can be adopted with other measures which aim at 
solving the externalities generated by hard mitigation. However, 
the administrative cost can be high because there is currently no 
complete data set which collates all the hard mitigation works in 
the catchment. Unlike many other places in the world, upstream 
deforestation is not a crucial problem for this catchment. The exter- 
nalities are mainly from upstream farming practices and the accord- 
ingly hard mitigation. The adoption of the TRiNe permit system is 
not urgent. It can be adopted when the implementation of the TFR 
permit system has high effectiveness. 
With the consent from the related parties, the SC can facili- 
tate the implementation of the trading system. Additionally, the 
willingness-to-pay from downstream areas and the willingness-to- 
accept from upstream areas needs to be researched in order to pro- 
vide a foundation of establishing the information system. 
7.5 Conclusion 
The catchment of the Yorkshire Ouse, the Swale, the Ure, and the 
Nidd provides a promising case of implementing the TFP system be- 
cause of its geographical and economic heterogeneity and the nature 
of its externalities. The upstream-downstream externalities lead to 
the intervention of flood management. Its geographical and hydro- 
logical heterogeneity provides the reasons, while its economic hetero- 
geneity indicates the capability and the capacity for implementing 
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the TFP system. 
The TFR permit system is recommended for each upstream- 
downstream sub-catchment except for the Swale. However, the 
upstream-downstream Swale sub-catchment, as the upstream Ouse, 
can join the permit market designed for the Ouse. The recom- 
mendation is based on the importance of hard mitigation and the 
insufficient information on mitigation. 
Precipitation, though, plays a crucial role in the occurrence and 
the pattern of flooding, as suggested in other research such as that 
by Lane (2001). There is no strong evidence of increasing rainfall 
in this catchment, however. Instead, the increasing frequency of 
flood events has a strong link to the economic characteristics and 
averting behaviour. This result provides the foundation for policy 
intervention. 
Tradeable flood permits provide economic incentives to guide the 
reallocation of mitigation and development under a secured level of 
the flood risk. Introducing the SC as shown in Chapter 6 can smooth 
the implementation of the permits system by incorporating related 
interested parties, bringing together information, and flexibly ad- 
justing rules and objectives. Market initialisation, grandfathering 
for instance, should also be decided by the SC. 
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Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
This thesis considers the problems of flood risk management and lays 
the groundwork for their solution. The integration of economics and 
hydrology has been developed for this purpose. The thesis first mod- 
els the social planner's decisions on flood management, from both 
static and dynamic perspectives. The related problems of the public 
good nature of averting behaviour and common property in catch- 
ment services were then explored using game theoretical models that 
incorporate decisions between multiple uses within a catchment. To 
solve the problem of coordination among local areas, a two-tier de- 
centralised decision-making process that consists of a stakeholders' 
commitee (SC) and tradeable flood permits (TFP) is introduced. 
Preliminary analysis of applying this decision-making process was 
conducted using the Yorkshire Ouse catchment to investigate its fea- 
sibility and practicability. The unanswered questions are addressed 
in the end of this chapter. 
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8.1 Thesis findings 
After pinpointing key issues about flood risk management in Chap- 
ter 1, Chapter 2 reviews various measures of averting behaviour and 
impacts of land use on flood risk. It also formulates the problem of 
the interaction between flood hazards and economic behaviour. It 
suggests that land use, mitigation, and adaptation are incorporated 
as factors in models of the probability of flooding. Both economic 
and health impacts are considered in estimating flood losses. These 
reviews address the importance of incorporating both hydrology and 
economics in flood risk management. Therefore, infiltration theory 
in hydrology is used to link land use to hard mitigation and the 
probability of flood occurrence. At the same time, expected utility 
theory is used to model the collective decision process. 
Chapters 3 and 4 present the decision rules for flood risk man- 
agement in both static and dynamic perspectives, from a social 
planner's viewpoint. The complementarity between economic de- 
velopment and environmental protection suggests that facilitating 
the social capacity for coping with flood risks is critical. These re- 
sults suggest that sufficient wealth and deteriorating environmental 
health are the driving forces for an economy to undertake averting 
behaviour. 
Chapter 3 uses the expected welfare approach to analyse deci- 
sions under uncertainty where there are multiple purposes in flood 
risk management. Expected welfare links the causes and impacts 
of flooding and scales welfare by the related environmental risk. 
The product of the probability of being flood damage free and wel- 
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fare net of floods involves both substitution and complementarity 
between environmental and economic functions. Compared with 
existing studies, this prototype model offers a more comprehensive 
way for welfare estimation in cases of uncertainty, by including both 
mitigation and adaptation into decision-making process. 
Proposition 3.1 suggests that development will keep increasing 
(decreasing) while it has positive (negative) marginal impact on the 
expected welfare. The same logic applies to averting behaviour. 
Proposition 3.2 holds that by maximising the product of probabil- 
ity of being flood damage free and the welfare net of floods, an 
economy should increase the former if the latter is high and vice 
versa. Additionally, when the opportunity cost of hard mitigation 
is high, the option of soft mitigation or adaptation will be preferable. 
When the costs of both hard mitigation and adaptation are high, 
and are accompanied by high levels of development, soft mitigation 
is favoured. 
Chapter 4 stresses the importance of restraining development and 
increasing investment in averting behaviour due to concerns for the 
future and for environmental health. Proposition 4.1 suggests that 
a fall in the discount rate discourages investment in development. 
Proposition 4.2 suggests when the compulsory ratio of hard mitiga- 
tion increases, investment in developed land is encouraged. It indi- 
cates the complementarity between development and hard mitiga- 
tion. On the other hand, soft mitigation is encouraged/discouraged 
by decreasing/increasing the compulsory ratio of hard mitigation. 
Because of the spatial interdependence of areas within the catch- 
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metn, such decision rules can mean problems for a whole catch- 
ment. These problems are explained, for a decentralised system, 
in the game theoretical models introduced in Chapter 5. Chap- 
ter 5 explores the interplay between multiple institutional decision- 
makers from multiple regions in a catchment. The theoretic model, 
based on a supermodular game, shows that externalities take the 
form of an embankments race and insufficient soft mitigation (over- 
development). Even though the chapter suggest that incentives for 
cooperation, such as taxes and subsidies, could improve efficiency, 
information on the social optimum and the threshold levels is re- 
quired to design cooperation mechanisms. Hence, Chapter 5 sheds 
light on scope for integrating the whole catchment into a manage- 
ment scheme. 
Instead of centralisation, which involves problems of imperfect 
information, insufficient incentives, and conflicting interests in flood 
management, we then consider the development of decentralised 
measures proposed in Chapter 6. A two-tier decentralised decision- 
making process that consists of an SC and TFP system is suggested 
to solve economic inefficiency in flood management. The partici- 
patory and multiple-purpose strategies induced accordingly is con- 
sistent with the Catchment Flood Management Plans in the UK. 
Information valuable for management is brought together by incor- 
porating multiple interests within the SC and by introducing the 
market mechanism of the TFP system. An SC is responsible for de- 
termining related targets and rules to improve both efficiency and 
equity of the management framework. Three types of TFP, the 
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tradeable development permit (TraD), the flood reduction permit 
(TFR) and the tradeable risk neutral permit (TRiNe), are developed 
for different institutional conditions, comprising different policy foci 
and information accessed by the SC. 
Chapter 6 illustrates how the SC might work, while Chapter 7 
provides a preliminary analysis of the feasibility of applying the 
TFP system in the catchment of the Yorkshire Ouse. According to 
Chapter 7, this catchment provides a promising case for the TFP 
system because of its geographical and economic heterogeneity and 
nature of its externalities. The research finding suggests that the 
Environment Agency and Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs might consider an SC and the use of the TFP system 
given the insufficiency of information about mitigation works and 
the complexity of flood management. For the moment, the TFR 
system is recommended. Once the problems of externalities become 
serious, the authority might want to consider the TRiNe system. 
Further research is therefore worthwhile before reaching detailed 
policy suggestions. 
This thesis shows the problems of centralisation in managing 
catchment flood risks. To solve the problems, decentralised man- 
agement, incorporating an SC and TFPs, provides one answer. 
8.2 Further Research 
In practice, there are quite different hydrological and geographical 
conditions and residents' preferences in every region. The models 
and analysis in this thesis provide a basis for policy design in a 
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range of catchments, but detailed research needs to be done before 
identifying solutions for particular catchments. 
For instance, only two sectors were considered in this research for 
the sake of expository and analytical convenience, In practice, mul- 
tiple sectors should be incorporated in an empirical model. More- 
over, models developed in Chapters 3 to 6 should be estimated for 
individual cases. The tradeoffs between economic development and 
environmental risks should reflect the interests and concerns of resi- 
dents and related groups. However, constrained by the limitations of 
regional economic data and the insufficiency of data associated with 
flood mitigation, these tradeoffs were not explained in this thesis. 
Besides, to further investigate the feasibility of the SC and TFP 
system in the Yorkshire Ouse catchment, research aimed at bridging 
the gap between policy-makers and decision-makers should be con- 
ducted. It should be based on surveys of interested parties' willing- 
ness to accept the new management systems or farmers' willingness 
to take up soft mitigation. These would provide more information 
to facilitate the setup and the operation on the SC and TFP system. 
Additionally, the development on the SC and TFP system on 
flood management is still at an early stage. Bridging knowledge be- 
tween related natural and social science and system designs, such as 
applying flood economics, is indispensable to the practicability and 
the efficiency improvement in application. Furthermore, not only 
the inclusion of regions, but the integration of different dimensions 
of natural resources in a catchment using both market-based instru- 
ments and the SC might improve the efficiency of environmental 
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management. This is not within the scope of this research however. 
Furthermore, applications of the SC and TFP system to other 
places that have severe flood risk externalities and geographical and 
economic heterogenity can also be considered. To maintain the ef- 
ficiency of the collaborative management, regional catchments with 
previously stated properties are preferred in applying this two-tier 
decentralised decision-making process in flood management. Appli- 
cations to large scale catchments, especially transboundary catch- 
ments, should be treated with particular caution. The decision 
process should be able to incorporate representative local interest 
groups. 
Some of the existing guidelines or institutional conditions should 
also be taken into consideration. The application of TFP system, 
the role of a catchment in the conservation of biological diversity 
for instance can be considered. Besides, the legislative background, 
such as the Town and Country Planning Acts, the European Wa- 
ter Framework Directive, and Catchment Flood Management Plans 
should also be taken fully into account in the design of related policy. 
Finally, the integration of economics and hydrology in the anal- 
ysis of the hydrological issues such as flood risk management has 
clear potential but also needs further work. This thesis attempts 
to blend theory and policy in both disciplines. Furthermore, there 
is scope for integrated hydrological management that incorporates 
the hydrological cycle in totality rather than differentiating between 
floods and droughts. 
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AppendixA 
Deriving the phase diagram in 
Figure (4.1) 
This appendix depicts the process of deriving the phase diagram in 
Figure (4.1). 
M is total extent of developed land while m is the investment 
in developed land. A is the total amount of land. 9, is the de- 
preciation rate of developed land. The costate variable p, denotes 
the marginal shadow value of the developed land. o- is the social 
rate of time preference. EW = (I - (MIA) )a (p(M +, M))b where 
0<a, b < 1. 
Suppose F=0 and G=0 denote the curves of M=0 and 
rh = 0, the motion of M=0 and that of m=0. Equation 4.3c 
shows that aH =Mm-J,, - M. Equation 4.4 shows that apm 
Th =0 when EWýj ++J,, ) - EW,, = EW,,, m - m, which is 
+ J,, ) + (M + (I - b)m) ba0. 
(ýW 
- A-m) = 
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At the steady state, 
F=m-J, M=O 
G+J,, ) + (M + b)m) 
(b 
_a =0 m A-m 
The slopes of the stationary isoclines are given by: 
' 
dm 
IAý 0= 
OFIOM 
- 
Fýj 
__- 
JM 
= JM >0 dM OF/am FI, I 
(A. I a) 
dm iriz=o OGIaM G'm 
dM aGlam GI 
M 
+a 
M2 (A- M)2 
M 
(A. I b) 
ba 
M (A-M) 
0 when 
b_a>0 
<M (A-M) < 
Since there is only one steady state equilibrium in this system, we 
do not need to be bothered about the complicated shape of curve 
Th = 0. We know that EWý, <0 at the steady state, so -L - M 
a<0. Therefore, the slope of the curve Th =0 around the (A-m) 
steady state is negative. 
The slope of the function F, is positive and equal the dM 
1, 
ý1=01 
depreciation rate of manufacturing land J,. The slope of function 
(negative) while G' < 0. Fýj <0 implies we G, -! i'-jj, =0 is positive M dM 
happen to have M' >0 (M' < 0) to the left (right) of the M' =0 
curve; hence the plus (minus) signs on the left (right) of that curve. 
Analogously, G' < 0, around the steady state, implies as we move M 
continuously from north to south, m' steadily increases. We have 
m' <0 above the curve m' =0 and m' >0 below the curve m' = 0. 
Therefore, the equilibrium is a saddle point with two saddle paths. 
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Estimation Results of the Trend 
in the Annual Maximum of 
Monthly Runoff 
This appendix summarises the estimation results of the trend in the 
annual maximum of monthly runoff at the selected gauging stations. 
1. Skelton 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = ITS Mean= 102.5000000 , S. D. = 28.11521861 
Model size: Observations = 30, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 28 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 18081.16821 , Std. Dev. = 25.41173 
Fit: R-squared= . 211239, 
Adjusted R-squared = . 18307 
Model test: F[ 1,28] = 7.50, Prob value = . 01061 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -138.5896, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -142.1490 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 6.535, Akaike Info. Crt. = 9.373 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.74409, Rho = . 12796 
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Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > t] Mean of X 
Constant 80.74527890 9.1999190 8.777 . 0000 
T 1.345652851 
. 49140548 2.738 . 0106 16.166667 
2. Gouthwaite Reservoir 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = FG Mean= 167.2111250 1 S. D. = 55-56434222 
Model size: Observations = 56, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 54 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 157299.8508 , Std. Dev. = 53.97185 
Fit: R-squared= . 073654, Adjusted R-squared = . 05650 
Model test: F[ 1,541 = 4.29, Prob value = . 04305 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -301.7962, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -303.9384 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 8.012, Akaike Info. Crt. = 10.850 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic =: 1.69767, Rho = . 15116 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > t] Mean of X 
Constant 136.7510502 16-374143 8.352 . 0000 
T . 8398641996 . 40532266 2.072 . 0430 36.267857 
3. Crakehill 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. =- FC Mean= 93.75980435 , 
S. D. = 30-98440193 
Model size: Observations = 46, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 44 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 33720.31513 , 
Std-Dev. = 27.68340 
Fit: R-squared= . 219464, 
Adjusted R-squared = . 20172 
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Model test: F[ 1,44] = 12,37, Prob value = . 00103 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -217.0071, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -222.7059 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 6.684, Akaike Info. Crt. = 9.522 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.41629, Rho = . 29185 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > t] Mean of X 
Constant 68.34682899 8.2983314 8.236 . 0000 
T 1.081403207 . 30745106 3.517 . 0010 23.500000 
Hunsingore Weir 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = FH Mean= 111.6481075 1 S. D. = 34.57922345 
Model size: Observations = 57, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 55 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 65306.14482 , Std. Dev. = 34.45845 
Fit: R-squared= . 024706, Adjusted R-squared = . 00697 
Model test: F[ 1,55] = 1.39, Prob value = . 24294 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -281.6275, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -282.3405 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. -- 7.114, Akaike Info. Crt. = 9.952 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.73986, Rho = . 13007 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > t] Mean of X 
Constant 100.6329621 10.388348 9.687 . 0000 
T . 2947714967 . 24972994 1.180 . 
2429 37.368421 
5. Kilgram Bridge 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
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Dep. var. = FK Mean= 208.9240544 , S. D. = 51.61349640 
Model size: Observations = 35, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 33 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 67234.50377 , Std. Dev. = 45.13767 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 257688, Adjusted R-squared = . 23519 
Model test: F[ 1,33] = 11.46, Prob value = . 00185 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -181.9732, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -187.1880 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 7.675, Akaike Info. Crt. = 10.513 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.90230, Rho = . 04885 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > t] Mean of X 
Constant 83.63548381 37.795096 2.213 . 0339 
T 2.556909603 . 75544878 3.385 . 0019 49.000000 
6. Richmond 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = FR Mean= 171.7924416 , S. D. = 46.09463165 
Model size: Observations = 19, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 17 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 35289.52546 , 
Std. Dev. = 45.56155 
Fit: R-squared= . 077274, 
Adjusted R-squared = . 02300 
Model test: F[ 1,17] = 1.42, Prob value = . 24919 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -98.4654, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -99.2294 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 7.738, Akaike Info. Crt. = 10.575 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.75283, Rho = . 12358 
264 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > t] Mean of X 
Constant 194.5626351 21.758688 8.942 . 0000 
T -2.277019345 1.9083631 -1.193 . 2492 10.000000 
265 
ADDendix 
266 
Appendix 
Estimation Results of the Trend 
in the Annual Maximum of Daily 
Flow 
This appendix surnmarises the estimation results of the trend in the 
annual maximum of daily flow at the selected gauging stations. 
1. Skelton 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. =: FS Mean= 388.2532258 , S. D. == 215.9826307 
Model size: Observations = 31, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 29 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 1094096.758 , Std. Dev. = 194.23562 
Fit: R-squared= . 218198, 
Adjusted R-squared = . 19124 
Model test: F[ 1,29] = 8.09, Prob value = . 00807 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -206.2946, Restricted (b=: 0) Log-L = -210.1100 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. == 10.601, Akaike Info. Crt. == 13.438 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic =: 1.14657, Rho = . 42671 
267 
Appendix 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > t] Mean of X 
Constant 213.9241772 70-511158 3.034 . 0051 
T 10.76533965 3.7840063 2,845 
. 0081 16-193548 
2. Kilgram Bridge 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = FK Mean= 245.1146129 1 S. D. = 55.63666484 
Model size: Observations = 31, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 29 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 81892.83359 , Std. Dev. = 53-14029 
Fit: R-squared= . 118134, Adjusted R-squared = . 08773 
Model test: F[ 1,29] = 3.88, Prob value = . 05834 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -166.1144, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -168.0630 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 8.008, Akaike Info. Crt, = 10.846 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 2.54726, Rho = -. 27363 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > t] Mean of X 
Constant 211.4631613 19.559950 10.811 . 0000 
T 2.103215726 1.0670828 1.971 . 0583 16.000000 
3. Hunsingore Weir 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = FH Mean= 90.91932759 ) S. D. = 46.77103407 
Model size: Observations = 58, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 56 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 116063.4422 , 
Std. Dev. = 45.52539 
Fit: R-squared= . 069178, 
Adjusted R-squared = . 05256 
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Model test: F[ 1,56] = 4.16, Prob value = . 04607 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -302.7405, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -304.8194 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 7.670, Akaike Info. Crt. = 10.508 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic =- 1.82939, Rho = . 08530 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > t] Mean of X 
Constant 66.88762179 13.209800 5.063 . 0000 
T . 6534641052 . 32031487 2.040 . 0461 36.775862 
4. Crakehill 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. =: FC Mean= 193-2318636 , S. D. = 31.15949818 
Model size: Observations = 22, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 20 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 16559-51931 , Std. Dev. = 28.77457 
Fit: R-squared= . 187829, 
Adjusted R-squared = . 14722 
Model test: F[ 1,20] = 4.63, Prob value = . 04391 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -104.0771, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -106.3655 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 6.806, Akaike Info. Crt. = 9.643 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 2.38285, Rho = -. 19142 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > t] Mean of X 
Constant 169.3160649 12.700158 13-332 . 0000 
T 2.079634670 . 96697352 
2.151 . 0439 11.500000 
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Estimation Results of the Trend 
in Rainfall Patterns 
This appendix surnmarises the estimation results of the trend in the 
annual rainfall and the ratio of winter rainfall to annual rainfall at 
the selected gauging stations. 
1. York 
Annual rainfall: 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RY Mean= 617.8802469 , S. D. = 109.0444524 
Model size: Observations = 81, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 79 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 936739.7395 , 
Std. Dev. = 108.89199 
Fit: R-squared= . 015259, 
Adjusted R-squared = . 00279 
Model test: F[ 1,79] = 1.22, Prob value = . 27190 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -493.8403, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -494.4631 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 9.405, Akaike Info. Crt. = 12.243 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.52848, Rho = . 23576 
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Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > tj Mean of X 
Constant 640.7448079 23.946612 26.757 . 0000 
T -. 5118931571 . 46265443 -1.106 . 2719 44.666667 
Ratio of winter rainfall to annual rainfall: 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RRY Mean= . 4885554341 1 S. D. = . 8624481528E-01 
Model size: Observations = 80, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 78 
Residuals: Sum of squares= . 5788646119 , Std. Dev. = . 08615 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 014892, Adjusted R-squared = . 00226 
Model test: F[ 1,78] = 1.18, Prob value = . 28088 
Diagnostic: Log-L = 83.6334, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = 83.0333 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = -4.879, Akaike Info. Crt. = -2.041 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 2.10017, Rho = -. 05009 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > t] Mean of X 
Constant . 4706891681 . 19065136E-01 24.688 . 0000 
T . 4051307469E-03 . 37309178E-03 1.086 . 2809 44.100000 
2. Richmond 
Annual rainfall: 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. =: RR Mean=: 770.9000000 , 
S. D. = 112.7488201 
Model size: Observations = 29, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 27 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 351000.6729 , Std. Dev. = 114.01765 
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Fit: R-squared= 
. 013889, Adjusted R-squared = -. 02263 
Model test: F[ 1,27] = . 38, Prob value = . 54262 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -177.4673, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -177.6701 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 9.539, Akaike Info. Crt. = 12.377 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.04907, Rho = . 47547 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > t] Mean of X 
Constant 793.9095412 42.901255 18.506 . 0000 
T -1.313536803 2.1300583 -. 617 . 5426 17-517241 
Ratio of winter rainfall to annual rainfall: 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RRR Mean= . 5261827528 , S. D. = . 8736123281E-01 
Model size: Observations = 29, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 27 
Residuals: Sum of squares= . 1908544531 , 
Std. Dev. = . 08408 
Fit: R-squared= . 106886, 
Adjusted R-squared = . 07381 
Model test: F[ 1,27] = 3.23, Prob value = . 08344 
Diagnostic: Log-L = 31.6921, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = 30.0530 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = -4.885, Akaike Info. Crt. = -2.048 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.76523, Rho = . 11738 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > t] Mean of X 
Constant . 4767239192 . 
31634951E-01 15.070 . 0000 
T . 2823437350E-02 . 
15706834E-02 1.798 . 0834 17-517241 
3. Low Houses 
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Annual rainfall: 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RLH Mean= 990.7035714 , S. D. = 127.3765008 
Model size: Observations = 28, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 26 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 426405.4453 , Std. Dev. = 128.06330 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 026625, Adjusted R-squared = -. 01081 
Model test: F[ 1,26] = . 71, Prob value = . 40675 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -174.5635, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -174.9413 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 9.774, Akaike Info. Crt. = 12.612 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.28928, Rho = . 35536 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > t] Mean of X 
Constant 1023.009680 45.313031 22.577 . 0000 
T -1.949506564 2.3117260 -. 843 . 4067 16.571429 
Ratio of winter rainfall to annual rainfall: 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RRLH Mean= . 5603483003 , 
S. D. = . 7447801794E-01 
Model size: Observations = 28, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 26 
Residuals: Sum of squares= . 1247053573 , 
Std. Dev. = . 06926 
Fit: R-squared= . 167345, 
Adjusted R-squared = . 13532 
Model test: F[ 1,26] = 5.23, Prob value = . 03065 
Diagnostic: Log-L = 36.0658, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = 33.5019 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = -5.271, Akaike Info. Crt. = -2.433 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.78698, Rho = . 10651 
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Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > tj Mean of X 
Constant . 5129908953 . 24504977E-01 20.934 . 0000 
T . 2857774438E-02 . 12501656E-02 2.286 . 0307 16-571429 
4. Leighton Reservoir 
Annual rainfall: 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RL Mean= 952.2633333 , S. D. = 132.9610975 
Model size: Observations = 30, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 28 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 496288.3729 , Std. Dev. = 133.13371 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 031974, Adjusted R-squared = -. 00260 
Model test: F[ 1,28] = . 92, Prob value = . 34444 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -188.2739, Restricted(b=O) Log-L -- -188.7613 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 9.847, Akaike Info. Crt. = 12.685 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.25616, Rho = . 37192 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > t] Mean of X 
Constant 991.3651662 47.370990 20.928 . 0000 
T -2.418670077 2.5150177 -. 962 . 3444 16.166667 
Ratio of winter rainfall to annual rainfall: 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RRL Mean= . 5754383179 , 
S. D. = . 8467757560E-01 
Model size: Observations = 30, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 28 
Residuals: Sum of squares= . 1746635040 , 
Std-Dev. = . 07898 
Fit: R-squared= . 160023, 
Adjusted R-squared = . 13002 
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Model test: F[ 1,28] = 5.33, Prob value = . 02850 
Diagnostic: Log-L = 34.6232, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = 32.0075 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = -5.013, Akaike Info. Crt. = -2.175 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 2.15434, Rho = -. 07717 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > t] Mean of X 
Constant . 5197284327 . 28102599E-01 18.494 . 0000 
T . 3445972279E-02 . 14920215E-02 2.310 . 0285 
16.166667 
5. Birstwith: 
Annual rainfall: 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RB Mean= 853.9354839 , 
S. D. = 138-5683070 
Model size: Observations = 31, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 29 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 535217.9110 , Std. Dev. = 135.85209 
Fit: R-squared= . 070859, 
Adjusted R-squared = . 03882 
Model test: F[ 1,29] = 2.21, Prob value = . 14777 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -195.2119, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -196.3511 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 9.886, Akaike Info. Crt. = 12.723 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.16424, Rho = . 41788 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > t] Mean of X 
Constant 914.0888492 47.238116 19.351 . 0000 
T -3.505177302 2.3569689 -1.487 . 
1478 17.161290 
Ratio of winter rainfall to annual rainfall: 
276 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RRB Mean== . 5435509222 ) S. D. = . 7984811493E-01 
Model size: Observations = 31, Parameters -- 2, Deg. Fr. = 29 
Residuals: Sum of squares= . 1623682138 , Std. Dev. = . 07483 
Fit: R-squared= . 151112, Adjusted R-squared = . 12184 
Model test: F[ 1,29] = 5.16, Prob value = . 03068 
Diagnostic: Log-L = 37.4170, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = 34.8776 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = -5.123, Akaike Info. Crt. = -2.285 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 2.18148, Rho = -. 09074 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > t] Mean of X 
Constant . 4929320849 . 26018230E-01 18.946 . 0000 
T . 2949593899E-02 . 12981923E-02 2.272 . 0307 17.161290 
6. Harlow Hill Reservoir 
Annual rainfall: 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RH Mean= 795.6594203 , 
S. D. = 128.9291111 
Model size: Observations = 69, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 67 
Residuals: Sum of squares= 1122239-171 , Std. Dev. = 129.42117 
Fit: R-squared= . 007171, 
Adjusted R-squared = -. 00765 
Model test: F[ 1,67] = . 48, Prob value = . 
48906 
Diagnostic: Log-L = -432.4439, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = -432.6922 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = 9.755, Akaike Info. Crt. = 12.593 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.91891, Rho = . 04055 
Ratio of winter rainfall to annual rainfall: 
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Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > t] Mean of X 
Constant 814.4537419 31.187923 26.114 . 0000 
T -. 4765924991 . 68511381 -. 696 . 4891 39.434783 
Ordinary least squares regression Weighting variable = none 
Dep. var. = RRH Mean= . 5247575372 , 
S. D. = . 8290618525E-01 
Model size: Observations = 69, Parameters = 2, Deg. Fr. = 67 
Residuals: Sum of squares= . 4412333805 , Std. Dev. = . 08115 
Fit: R-squared= 
. 055970, Adjusted R-squared = . 04188 
Model test: F[ 1,67] = 3.97, Prob value = . 05033 
Diagnostic: Log-L = 76.3972, Restricted(b=O) Log-L = 74.4100 
LogAmemiyaPrCrt. = -4.994, Akaike Info. Crt. = -2.156 
Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic = 2.00167, Rho = -. 00084 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[ITI > t] Mean of X 
Constant . 4909932409 . 19555905E-01 25.107 . 0000 
T . 8562059707E-03 . 42959003E-03 1.993 . 0503 39.434783 
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